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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
PUBLIC SERVICE VALUES AND DISPARATE PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF 
SECTION 8 HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER (HCV) PROGRAM  
 
by 
 
Melissa Gomez Hernandez 
Florida International University, 2018 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mohamad G. Alkadry, Major Professor 
Public administration scholars accept that public service values guide 
administrators’ behavior. This guidance also derives from social and cultural values that 
motivate administrators’ individual attitudes. A part of the field recognizes that public 
servants play an active role during the implementation process through their daily use of 
discretion. Nevertheless, public administrators’ values and attitudes are rarely linked to 
policy implementation and organizational performance. In consequence, public policy 
evaluation seldom considers the role of values and attitudes of those implementing policy. 
This study examines how public administrators’ values and attitudes towards 
citizens shape policy implementation and influence organizational and program 
performance. The implementation and results of Section 8 HCV Program serve as case 
study to address the linkage between public service values and performance. The Section 
8 HCV is the federal government's major program that assists low-income families, elderly 
and disabled people to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private market. The 
Program allows participants to choose any housing that meets its requirements.   
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This research hypothesizes that environmental and organizational factors impose a 
toll on organizational and policy performance, and that public administrators’ values and 
attitudes towards recipients buffer some of these effects. The study employs a quantitative 
methods approach to examine and combine demographic characteristics of the 
communities that surround Public Housing Authorities -where the Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher Program is implemented-, statistic indicators of the local housing market, 
Section 8 HCV structural factors of operation, levels of poverty and race desegregation in 
vouchers recipient, and the quality of their neighborhoods, to establish a correlation 
between Public Housing Authorities’ poor performance and less advantageous 
environmental factors, and vice versa.  
I conducted semi-structured interviews among Section 8 HCV Program’s case 
managers, directors and front-line practitioners in Public Housing Authorities in the states 
of Florida and California to identify the Public Service Values-based strategies that 
influence program’s implementation, and both, organizational and program’s performance.  
The quantitative evidence collected and analyzed in this dissertation indicates that 
environmental and organizational factors impose a toll on Public Housing Authorities and 
Section 8 HCV program’s performance. Meanwhile, the qualitative portion of the study 
suggests that public administrators’ values and attitudes towards recipients permeate the 
implementation process and influence Section 8 HCV program’s results. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 1997, Sandra J. Newman and Ann B. Schnare determined that housing programs 
in the U.S. had failed to deliver on the promise of neighborhood quality to vulnerable 
citizens (Newman & Schnare, 1997: 726). Nowadays, public housing programs continue 
to be affected by concentrated poverty and disproportionate rates of racial segregation of 
minority recipients (Austin Turner, 2003; Carlson, Haveman, Kaplan & Wolfe, 2009; Deng 
2007). The outcome disparities within housing programs in the United States are so 
notorious that even the most well regarded and successful housing policy initiative, the 
Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, specifically created to tackle problems of 
poverty and minority concentration, also faces these difficulties (Deng, 2007: 22; Devine 
et al. 2003; Galvez, 2010: 6; Hartung and Henig 1997; Newman & Schnare, 1997: 726; 
Pendall 2000; Varady & Walker, 2000; Varady, 2010: 402).  
In the midst of this policy failure (Deng, 2007: 22; Newman & Schnare, 1997: 726), 
housing scholars explain Section 8 HCV program’s unaccomplished goals, going from the 
existence of markets with serious housing shortages (Deng, 2007: 21), to racial 
discrimination in society (Pendall, 2000: 892), to program’s internal inadequacies (Grigsby 
& Bourassa, 2003: 982). Yet, a core question remains unasked and unanswered: Do public 
administrators’ values and attitudes play a role in this policy failure?  
Some indicators focus the attention on “administrative inefficiency at the local 
level” (Basolo & Hastings, 2003; Katz & Turner, 2001, Popkin & Cunningham, 1999, in 
Marr, 2005: 86), the presence of a “troublesome bureaucracy” (Marr, 2005: 92), red tape 
(Grigsby & Bourassa, 2003: 988), and evidence of landlords’ complaints of the 
‘Bureaucratic System’ in section 8 vouchers (Grigsby & Bourassa, 2003: 988). 
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Nevertheless, public administrators’ part in policy implementation and organizational 
performance remains unexplored.  
Public administration scholars accept that public values guide administrators’ 
behavior (Andersen et al., 2012: 294). Such guidance also derives from “social and cultural 
values” (Molina, 2015: 49) that motivate administrators’ individual attitudes. Public 
administrators’ attitudes towards citizens accrue an affective component, the “emotional 
basis for serving others” (Knoke & Wright-Isak, 1982 in Andersen et al. 2012: 295). For 
instance, apparently unimportant emotional and physical factors, such as mealtimes, are a 
significant predictor of ruling outcomes among judges, as important as inmates’ past 
recidivism and participation in rehabilitation programs (The Economist, 2011). Public 
administrators’ values also perform an important role during the implementation process 
(Elmore, 1979: 604; Matland, 2015: 49), where street level bureaucrats “shape public 
policy through their daily use of discretion” (Bastien, 2009: 665). In the same vein, public 
servants reflect their “values or interests in the goals being pursued more or less effectively 
by public organizations”, resulting in administrators influencing performance as well 
(Fried, 1976: 15 in Talbot, 2010, 137).  
Despite the evidence, policy implementation and organizational performance have 
been less frequently linked to public administrators’ values and attitudes (Bastien, 2009). 
In consequence, the evaluation of any public policy seldom passes by the consideration of 
the role of public service values and attitudes of its implementers.  Thus, the main research 
question of this study is: Do values and attitudes applied by public administrators to the 
implementation process of Section 8 HCV program influence recipients’ access to high 
quality, affordable, non-racially segregated and non-poverty concentrated homes? 
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In this dissertation, I analyze how public administrators’ values and attitudes shape 
a given policy, overcoming the influence of environmental and organizational factors that 
impact both, organizational and program’s performance. The unsatisfactory results of the 
American housing policy serve as case study. The case study examines the linkage between 
the Section 8 HCV Program staff’s values and attitudes towards citizens -applied during 
the implementation process-, and three specific outcomes of the program: 1. the ability to 
provide decent and affordable housing; 2. the incidence of housing desegregation in terms 
of poverty and race, and 3. housing and neighborhood quality among program recipients.   
The study has two stages that respond to two different operative questions. In the 
first stage, I use quantitative techniques to answer: If, and to what extent, do organizational 
and environmental conditions, such as demographics and political preferences of 
communities, economic factors, and racial disparities affect public organizations’ 
performance and policy? Through the use of secondary data, I test how environmental 
factors (from political preferences, to geographic location, to housing market conditions), 
and some structural organizational conditions, impose a toll on PHAs and Section 8 HCV’s 
performance. In the study, I also analyze how environmental and organizational factors 
affect the distinctive goal of poverty and race desegregation that first inspired the creation 
of the Section 8 HCV program (Austin Turner, 2003: 1). The second stage takes advantage 
of the information collected in the first stage.  
In the second stage, and after mapping and analyzing the influencing factors of 
PHAs and Section 8 HCV program performance disparity, I analyze the predominant sets 
of public values and attitudes utilized by Section 8 HCV program’s directors, front-line 
staff and case managers to implement policy and overcome adverse environmental factors 
    
4 
 
surrounding their organization and program. I conduct interviews with Section 8 HCV 
program’s staff at PHAs, along with ethnographic observation of public administrators’ 
quotidian rapport with program recipients in the states of Florida and California. This stage 
responds to the second operative question: how do public administrators’ preferred set of 
values and attitudes coincide with either positive or negative organizational and policy 
performance at the Section 8 HCV Program? 
 I expected to find matches between public administrators’ individual responses to 
in-depth interviews about public service values and attitudes used by them when addressing 
citizens, and the results of the general quantitative analysis. I also expected to find that a 
more democratic set of values and ‘holistic’ attitudes (Marr, 2016) towards recipients 
would coincide with PHAs and Section 8 HCV program’s higher levels of performance. 
Conversely, more bureaucratic/managerial oriented set of values carried by public 
administrators would coincide with less positive or even negative results of the program. 
The study fills several gaps in the Public Administration literature. Other authors 
previously addressed the importance of public service values and attitudes in public 
administrators’ actions towards elected officials (Golden, 1998; Lindblom, 1977: 141; 
Ringquist, 1995; Yackee & Yackee, 2006). This study incorporates the effects of 
administrators’ actions on citizens/program recipients, adding citizenship to the politics-
administration dichotomy equation. In the same vein, public service values are seldom 
addressed throughout a practical policy case study (Bastien, 2009; Watkins-Hayes, 2009). 
Instead, values are approached as self-contained entities, with no surrounding policy 
context (Molina, 2015: 53). This research utilizes a policy case -the Section 8 HCV 
program- and analyzes administrators’ public service values and attitudes in actual 
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implementation actions towards citizens and their influence on organizational and policy 
performance. Finally, this dissertation attempts to move the discussion about political 
neutrality of public administrators from a theoretical venue to a practical one. 
Statement of the Problem 
Public housing programs are affected by concentrated poverty and disproportionate 
rates of racial segregation of minority recipients (Austin Turner, 2003; Carlson, Haveman, 
Kaplan & Wolfe, 2009; Deng 2007). Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program gives 
recipients the freedom to select the particular housing location and unit’s characteristics 
that best suit their demands (Austin Turner, 2003: 1). Created to tackle poverty and 
minority concentration problems of public housing, Section 8 HCV faces the same 
difficulties as its unit-based housing assistance counterparts (Deng, 2007: 22; Newman & 
Schnare, 1997: 726; Varady & Walker, 2000; Varady, 2010: 402). “Nearly 10 percent of 
voucher recipients in the 50 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas lived in neighborhoods 
with poverty rates above 40 percent, and approximately 22 percent lived in tracts with 
poverty rates above 30 percent” (Galvez, 2010: 5). 
These adverse outcomes have been attributed to market tightness (Austin Turner, 
2003: 1; Deng, 2007: 22; Ross, Shlay & Picon, 2012: 39; Williamson, Smith & Strambi-
Kramer, 2009: 121), budgeting causes (Austin Turner, 2003: 1), recipient households’ 
preferences (Deng, 2007: 22), and landlords’ racial and ethnic discrimination (Beck, 1996: 
159). Nonetheless, the question of the role of individual policy implementers, i.e., front-
line staff officials and case managers, has been largely overlooked.  
The main research question of this study is: Do values and attitudes applied by 
public administrators’ to the implementation process of Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher 
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program influence recipients’ access to high quality, affordable, non-racially and non-
poverty concentrated homes?  
To answer this question, I test four hypotheses. First, I hypothesize that Public 
Housing Authorities and Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program nationwide display 
dissimilar performance that results in recipients’ differentiated access to quality, 
affordable, non-racially, and non-poverty concentrated homes. Second, I hypothesize that 
such performance disparities are correlated to environmental, organizational, and policy 
factors, and that these factors impact both, PHAs and Section 8 HCV performance. Third, 
I claim that an implementers’ democratic-centered set of public values (those that address 
program recipients as citizens) and attitudes will coincide with positive policy outcomes 
regarding poverty/race desegregation and higher levels of housing and neighborhood 
quality. Conversely, I hypothesize that an orthodox/managerial/domination-oriented set of 
public values (those that address recipients as Client/Customer/subject) will coincide with 
negative policy outcomes in terms of the factors mentioned above.   
To test these four hypotheses I employ a mixed methods approach. A direct causal 
relation between public administrators’ values and attitudes, and organizational and policy 
performance does not apply in this study. The subjective condition of public servants’ 
values and the existence of other factors that influence organizational and policy 
performance impedes this task. Nevertheless, this study hypothesizes that public 
administrators' implementation motivated by certain values and attitudes could coincide 
with a given organizational and policy outcome and vice versa.   
I develop two consecutive and interdependent stages of the study. In the first stage 
I use quantitative techniques to identify the performance disparities in Section 8 HCV 
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Program. This stage of the study addresses the first research question: if, and to what extent, 
do organizational and environmental conditions, such as demographics and political 
preferences of communities, economic factors, and racial disparities affect public 
organizations’ performance and policy? The fundamental aim is to determine and map the 
variations and discrepancies in PHAs and Section 8 HCV programs results across the 
United States and to determine how environmental and organizational factors impact both, 
organizational and program’s performance. The factors analyzed encompass five 
fundamental dimensions. The first three indicate historical program’s success: 1. Poverty 
and race desegregation; 2. Neighborhood quality; and 3. Housing quality.  While the other 
two dimensions speak for: 4. Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program structural 
factors, and 5. Demographic characteristics of surrounding communities. Ordinary Least 
Square method is utilized to address this operative question.  
The second stage is a case study and takes advantage of the information collected 
in the first stage. I address the second research question: How do public administrators’ 
preferred set of values and attitudes coincide with either positive or negative 
organizational and policy performance at the Section 8 HCV Program?  
After mapping PHAs and Section 8 HCV Program performance disparity 
nationwide, along with the environmental factors that cause such disparity at the county 
and county seat level, I determine the most predominant sets of public values and attitudes 
among Section 8 HCV program officials (either more democratic or 
Orthodox/managerial/domination oriented). Through a qualitative approach, I find matches 
between public servants’ individual responses to in-depth interviews, and the results of the 
quantitative analysis. This stage attempts to identify: 1. Public administrators’ discursive 
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devices towards citizens in terms of values and attitudes, specially their capitalization of 
technical expertise as source of discretion (Foucault, 1980), the rationales behind their 
attitudes (Alexander & Stivers, 2010; Alkadry & Blessett, 2010; Marr, 2016) and their 
utilized set of values, 2. The perceived scope of public administrators’ actions during the 
implementation process, including those possible constrictions posed by structural factors 
(Marr, 2016: 225), and, 3. Their perceived impact on policy outcomes and organizational 
performance.  
Due to reasons of demographic diversity, environmental heterogeneities, housing 
market variabilities, and population, I selected the states of California and Florida for the 
case study.  
Purpose of the Study 
The goal of this study is to understand how public administrators apply values and 
attitudes towards citizens during the implementation process, overcoming difficult 
organizational and environmental conditions while influencing both, organizational and 
policy performance. To analyze this research problem, I address the correlation between 
environmental characteristics of communities surrounding public housing authorities that 
implement the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, and PHA’s organizational 
performance. I also identify a number of Section 8 HCV Program Structural Factors and 
their influence on PHAs and program’s performance. My hypothesis is that such factors 
impose a toll on Public Housing Authorities and Section 8 HCV program’s performance. 
Consequently, I identify which of these environmental and organizational factors influence 
the most, both, organizational and policy performance and provide feasible explanations 
from literature and observation. Finally, I use a qualitative approach to address public 
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administrators’ values and attitudes towards citizens, identifying coincidences between 
public administrators’ behavior and the results of the quantitate analysis.  
Background and Significance 
The fundamental aim of any housing policy is the sustained provision of “decent 
and safe housing for eligible low-Income families, the elderly, and persons with 
disabilities” (US Department of Housing and Urban Development). This major objective 
lies in the pursuit of social equity (Austin Turner & Kingsley, 2008: 13; Grigsby & 
Bourassa, 2003: 976; King, 2000: 116), understanding social equity as “the basic 
underpinning principle for welfare provision” (King, 2000: 115). Housing programs are 
also meant to guarantee a proper and fair allocation of goods in society (Rawls, 1973), and 
the assurance of a sustainable growth by the mitigation of social inequalities (Berg & Ostry, 
2011).  
The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program attempts to solve previous public 
housing issues by “avoid[ing] concentrations of poverty typical of some public housing 
projects, and to permit assisted households to gain access to a wider range of higher-quality 
neighborhoods than they would have reached without the voucher, or if they have been 
offered a place-based housing unit.” (Galvez, 2010: 1).  
Despite these remarkable policy aims, the objective has not been fully 
accomplished. Voucher holders experience high levels of socio-economic and racial 
clustering (Newman & Schnare, 1997: 714; Ross, Shlay & Picon, 2012: 36; Wang, Varady 
& Wang, 2008: 65), with white recipients being more prone to gain access to housing in a 
wider range of metropolitan neighborhoods than African American and Hispanic 
households (Austin Turner, 2003: 2).  
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This study is relevant to a policy audience. It addresses public administrators’ part 
in policy implementation, performance and outcomes, which has been the most neglected 
factor when considering Section 8, or any other program deficiencies. While examining 
environmental and structural factors such as budget and market tightness, scholars largely 
overlooked public administrators' values and attitudes towards citizens during the 
implementation process.  
The research is equally significant to the field of public administration, since 
updates a number of theoretical discussions that impact organizational practices: The 
inclusion of citizenship into the politics-administration dichotomy. The approach to public 
service values as shaping elements of policy and performance, and the translation of the 
principle of political neutrality debate from a traditionally conceptual setting to a pragmatic 
one. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Public Administrators’ Values and Attitudes in the Policy Implementation Process: An 
Overview   
The notion of public service values in public administration is predominantly 
normative. It is presented as “the ideals, coined as principles to be followed when 
producing a public service or regulating citizens behavior, thus providing direction to the 
behavior of public servants” (Andersen et al., 2012: 293). In this tradition, values in public 
administration have been widely studied in two ways. Firstly, as the development of 
thoughtful lists of relevant and frequently used public service values such as neutrality, 
efficiency, and accountability (Box, 2015; Demir, Reddick & Nank, 2013: 83). These lists 
emphasize an idealistic depiction of these values and the servants that incarnate them. 
Secondly, public service values are grouped into public administrators’ categories, 
organized according to the prevalent set of values utilized during their administrative 
activities. This categorization goes from Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1984) ideal types of 
administrative roles of public servants as Mediator, Steward, Magistrate, and Advocate 
(Molina, 2015: 50), to Kernaghan’s categories of public service values (Box, 2015: 27) 
classified as ethical, professional, democratic, and human (Molina, 2015: 57).  
Scholars are aware of the existence of a broad variety of public service values and 
the competition among them (Andersen et.al. 2012: 293). Values are also definitive 
motivators of public servants’ behavior (Demir, Reddick & Nank, 2013: 79). Accordingly, 
Molina (2015: 49) states that “public administrators are broadly influenced by a wide range 
of social and cultural values, and will tend to accept organizational values as long as they 
are perceived as being consistent with those wider values”. Despite recognizing the impact 
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of public administrators’ attitudes and values on their administrative activities, very few 
scholars contextualize the discussion of public servants’ values preferences in a political 
and ideological perspective (Molina, 2015: 49). Conversely, most public administration 
scholars affirm that public values can coexist despite tensions, rejecting that values can be 
mutually exclusive. Following Van Wart (1998), public servants come to reach a 
“workable gestalt” that provides them with a feasible resolution in a particular competing 
values dispute scenario. This normative approach poses a difficulty when linking public 
service values to quotidian administrators’ behaviors, and when connecting both –values 
and behaviors- to the realities of policy implementation and outcomes.  
Public Service Values and Organizational Performance 
Public Administration scholars approach the notion of performance as “the 
achievements of public programs and organizations in terms of the outputs and outcomes 
that they produce” (O’Toole Jr. & Meier, 2011: 2). Efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and 
public satisfaction (Boyne, 2003 in O’Toole Jr. & Meier, 2011: 2) are fundamental 
dimensions of such a notion. Performance measurement of public organization and policy 
leads to the improvement of delivered services, transparency, organizational innovation 
and the “quality of policymaking” (De Bruijn, 2001: 5).  
The most recurrent interest within the field is the way performance measurement is 
developed for management and accountability purposes, and their link to budgetary 
processes (Fawcett & Kleiner, 1994, in Van der Waldt, 2004: 49). Following Van der 
Waldt (2004: 49), “Measurement is the yardstick by which the value of productivity 
improvements can be quantified and assessed.” In this vein, scholars conduct their research 
efforts towards the “determinants of performance in public organizations” (Boyne, Meier, 
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O’Toole Jr., & Walker, 2006: 1), focusing on management (O’Toole Jr. & Meier, 2011: 4; 
Walker, Boyne, & Brewer, 2010: 8), and less frequently addressing environmental factors, 
regarded by some scholars as the “most poorly understood and poorly measured aspect of 
the production process” (Smith, in Boyne, Meier, O’Toole & Walker, 2006: 87).  
In identifying “management practices and external constraints” (Walker, Boyne & 
Brewer, 2010: 8) that impact organizational and policy performance, a number of 
dimensions account as components of performance indicators: “quantity of outputs, quality 
of outputs, efficiency, equity outcomes, value for money, and consumer satisfaction” 
(Boyne, 2003 in Brewer, in Boyne, Meier, O’Toole Jr., & Walker, 2006: 36). In this, 
apparently straightforward, measurement process, several perspectives emerge to question 
certain aspects of performance, as both, concept and measurement indicator.  
A significant number of scholars have come to agree that, far from being objective, 
organizational performance is “a socially-constructed concept; thus, all measures of 
performance are subjective” (Brewer, in Boyne, Meier, O’Toole Jr., & Walker, 2006: 35). 
This subjectivity extends itself to the difficulties associated with measuring government’s 
outcomes, a given policy or organization’s ultimate effect that is not always easily 
determined (Smith, 1993 in Van der Waldt, 2004: 48). More interestingly, a few specialists 
interrogate the construction of public value through performance measurement (Talbot, 
2010: 130), pointing out the challenges of measuring notions such as “equity, democracy, 
participation, and citizenship” (Talbot, 2010: 49).  
This study focuses on the following unexplored questions of the performance 
literature, formulated by Fried (in Talbot, 2010: 137): “We take administrative 
performance to be measurable not only by effectiveness but by the question of effectiveness 
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for whom, by what measure or indicator? Whose values or interests are reflected in the 
goals being pursued more or less effectively by public organizations?” These set of 
questions identify a gap in the literature, where a competition among public service values 
is revealed, and values such as effectiveness express themselves as “inherently paradoxical 
(…) as organizations have to satisfy contradictory demands and values simultaneously to 
be really effective” (Quinn & Cameron, 1988; Cameron, 2006 in Talbot, 2010: 151).  
In pursuing and measuring performance, it may happen that “improvements on a 
given criterion (efficiency, for instance) might result in declines on another (equity, say)” 
(O’Toole & Meier, 2011: 2). Such a value-conflict environment extends questions to public 
administrators as implementers of policy to be measured and evaluated, above all, on “how 
individual behavior relates to organizational or institutional arrangements” (Talbot, 2010: 
190).  
The Principle of Political Neutrality as Technical Expertise  
Researchers address the principle of political neutrality in public administration 
almost exclusively from the perspective of the hierarchical separation between elected 
officials and public administrators. Described as “the impartiality of administrators in 
political issues” (Overeem, 2005: 313), political neutrality lies at the center of the 
orthodoxy paradigm (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011: 9) where public administrators behave 
as obedient and unbiased executors of public policy.  
Two main approaches dominate the theoretical construction of the principle of 
political neutrality. On the one hand lies “the orthodoxy heritage” (Waldo, 1998), the 
predominant and almost naturalized position of public administrators as value-neutral 
(Overeem, 2005: 313). On the other hand, there is a critical elaboration against political 
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neutrality as a fundamental component of the ‘efficiency’ or ‘orthodox’ paradigm. This 
posture condemns the negligence of the linkage between public administrators and citizens 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000: 555), attacks the fixation with efficiency and rationalism, 
along with the prevalence of market-driven and mechanistic models of management, 
privileging more ‘democratic’ and participative schemes of administration (Dahl, 1947: 1; 
Frederickson, 1997: 35). In the interstices of these two opposite approaches lie the 
historical critiques (Friedrich, 1940; Svara, 2006) of the principle of political neutrality that 
reject the ideal of public administrators as value-neutral, while reaffirming the 
impossibility of a dichotomist relationship between politics and administration.  
The claims of Friedrich’s (1940) and Svara’s (2006) theoretical contenders, 
Herman Finer (1941), and the more contemporary Patrick Overeem (2005), introduce the 
principle of political neutrality in public administration as an unreachable ideal. Despite 
their vehement defense of the political impartiality of administrators, both authors, Finer 
and Overeem (2005: 322), concede the existence of an imperishable ‘grey zone’ of 
discretion on public administrators’ behavior. 
This study addresses seven theoretical hypotheses on the political neutrality of 
public administrators: 1. the principle of political neutrality is an ideal, impossible to 
accomplish in the reality of public administrators (Friedrich, 1940: 3). 2. Public 
administrators do exert administrative discretion in their daily decision-making and 
implementation processes (Friedrich, 1940; Lipsky, 1980; Svara, 2006). 3. Due to the 
impossible applicability of the principle of political neutrality in real scenarios, 
administrators replace neutrality with a more reachable value. 4. Public servants use 
technical expertise as the proxy for political neutrality (Dahl, 1947: 1). 5. Administrative 
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discretion is justified by administrators’ technical expertise (Dahl, 1947; Foucault, 1980). 
6. Public Administrators’ ‘expertise’ is founded not exclusively in technical knowledge but 
in political (citizenship), social, and cultural constructions of identities (socio-economic 
status, race, gender, background) (Forester, 1984: 26). 7. Such identities’ construction 
impacts policy outputs (Habermas, 1973, in Fischer, 1993: 166).  
The Notion of Attitude  
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the word ‘attitude’ as “the way you think 
and feel about someone or something.” The dictionary also explains that an attitude is “a 
feeling or way of thinking that affects a person’s behavior.”  While public service values 
are self-contained entities, specifically described and listed, for instance, the value of 
efficiency is “to act in a manner that achieves the desired results using minimal resources” 
(Molina, 2015: 53), public servants’ attitudes towards citizens possess a more elusive 
content.  
Alexander and Stivers (2010, 583) explain that “(…) administrators themselves are 
embedded within a political and cultural context, and their reasons for actions are drawn 
from it.” In this vein, public administrators’ actions of policy-making and implementation 
are imbued by the “way they think and feel” about the citizens they serve, which include 
“predominant understandings of causes of poverty and appropriate interventions.” (Marr, 
2016: 217). Administrators guide themselves not only by administrative values but also by 
“society’s customs and conventions” (Alexander & Stivers, 2010: 582).  
One of the most salient examples of public administrators’ attitudes towards 
citizens is the reproduction of cultural patterns regarding race. Race and ethnicity manifest 
themselves “in patterns of policy interpretation and discretionary judgments of individual 
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administrators” (Alexander & Stivers, 2010: 578). In consequence, public administrators 
often act under their “racial patterns” (Alexander & Stivers, 2010: 578; Marr, 2016: 217), 
which frequently results in negative outcomes for particular groups (Alkadry & Blessett, 
2010: 549). 
The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program: Public Administrators’ values and 
attitudes Influencing Performance and Policy Outcomes   
The Housing Choice Voucher Program allows the recipient to select the housing 
location and unit’s characteristics that best suit his/her demands (Austin Turner, 2003: 1). 
In theory, recipients "choose better neighborhoods than they might otherwise be able to 
afford” (Pendall, 2000: 881). There is a deliberate and thoughtful policy aim behind this 
program’s mobility characteristic, the idea that the freedom to select quality housing and 
neighborhood will facilitate racial and economic desegregation (Schwartz, 2010 in Ross, 
Shlay & Picon, 2012: 36).  Despite this policy objective, Section 8 HCV program results 
are unsatisfactory at the very least (Austin Turner, 2003: 2; Galvez, 2010: 5; Pendall, 2000: 
882).  
Scholars concur on a number of causes that account for the unaccomplished goal 
of poverty and racial desegregation, and the absence of housing betterment for Section 8 
Voucher program recipients. First, there are “market causes.” Authors who advocate for 
these arguments (Austin Turner, 2003: 1; Deng, 2007: 22; Ross, Shlay & Picon, 2012: 39; 
Williamson, Smith & Strambi-Kramer, 2009: 121) blame the shortages of moderately 
priced rental housing and the tightness of local housing markets for the voucher recipients’ 
difficulties in finding a proper, non-segregated home. Frequently, rental housing is 
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concentrated in distressed neighborhoods (Pendall, 2000: 882), an intrinsic market 
situation over which neither the Program nor the recipients have control.  
Secondly, there are the “budgeting causes” (Austin Turner, 2003: 1). According to 
Turner and Kingsley (2008: 3), “Only 5.5 million (31 percent) of the total 18.0 million 
eligible households with housing needs receive assistance. That number represents just 23 
percent of the 23.6 million that are eligible”. These figures express the inadequacy of 
federal spending in affordable housing, where only one in approximate three eligible 
households get assistance (Austin Turner, 2003: 1).  
Thirdly, there are “family preferences” or “individual needs” (Deng, 2007: 22). 
Sometimes, despite the availability of rental housing in socio-economic and racially 
deconcentrated neighborhoods, many voucher holders face the dilemma of improving their 
quality of life by renouncing their support systems formed by family, friends, churches, 
and services (Deng, 2007: 22). A substantial number of these households make the decision 
to live in economically distressed and racially concentrated neighborhoods that are at the 
same time familiar and supportive ones.  
The fourth factor that prevents Section 8 HCV Program to reach the goal of poverty 
and racial desegregation among its recipients is landlords’ racial and ethnic discrimination. 
Following Beck (1996: 159), “The Section 8 program’s minimal success in promoting 
integration is attributable to the widespread discrimination against prospective section 8 
tenants by private landlords, especially in largely white, middle-class communities”. The 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2013: 39) has evidence of systemic 
discrimination against black, Hispanic and Asian home seekers in rental and sales market.  
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Finally, there are the obstacles inherent to the program. Tegeler et al. (1995) 
subdivide these intrinsic limitations of the Housing Choice Voucher Program into four 
categories: “(…) disproportionate allocations; residency preferences; multiple admissions 
requirements; and discretionary administrative practices that impede eligible families from 
obtaining subsidies.” (Tegeler, Hanley & Liben, 1995: 467).  
Tegeler et.al. Rationalize the influence of public administrators’ values and 
attitudes towards program recipients and their impact on policy outcomes by introducing 
“discretionary administrative practices” as a possible cause for Section 8 HCV Program 
shortcomings. Through this term, Tegeler et al. explain situations such as “African-
American city residents waited over ten years for subsidies they would never receive, 
[while] white suburban applicants received subsidies within eighteen to twenty-four 
months.” (Tegeler, Hanley & Liben, 1995: 472). Other scholars incidentally allude to 
public administrators’ responsibility in policy outcomes by qualifying the “program’s 
portability feature” as a “bureaucratic nightmare” (Austin Turner, 2003: 1). These authors 
also mention administrative malfeasance in Section 8 HCV program, consisting in “delays 
in conducting inspections and approving leases, unreliability in making subsidy payments, 
and lack of responsiveness to landlord inquiries or complaints” (Turner, Popkin, and 
Cunningham in Austin Turner, 2003: 3). Despite these efforts to include public 
administrators in the policy outcomes discussion, and the existence of an ‘intuitive 
knowledge’ about how public servants’ values and attitudes affect the implementation 
process, the authors above fall short exploring the subject. 
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Chapter 3: Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Theoretical Framework 
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
Chapter 3 comprises the research questions, hypotheses, and theoretical framework. Table 
1 below encompasses research questions and their corresponding hypotheses, design, and methods.  
Table 1. Research Questions and Hypotheses  
Research Questions Hypotheses Design Methods 
Q1.  If, and to what extent, 
do organizational and 
environmental conditions, 
such as demographics and 
political preferences of 
communities, economic 
factors, and racial disparities 
affect public organizations’ 
performance? 
H1. Environmental and 
organizational factors pose 
a toll on organizational 
performance.  
 
Quantitative 
Secondary 
Data  
OLS  
Q2.  Do environmental and 
organizational conditions 
compound the effect of 
Section 8 HCV Program’s 
Hardly-Controllable 
Structural Factors (as 
predictor of performance)? 
 
H2. Environmental and 
organizational conditions 
compound the effect of 
Section 8 HCV Program’s 
Hardly-Controllable 
Structural Factors (as 
predictor of policy 
performance).  
 
Quantitative 
Secondary 
Data 
OLS 
Q3. Do environmental, 
organizational and Section 8 
HCV program structural 
factors affect poverty 
segregation levels on 
Section 8 HCV recipients? 
H3. Environmental, 
organizational, and Section 
8 HCV Program structural 
factors affect poverty 
segregation levels on 
Section 8 HCV recipients.  
Quantitative 
Secondary 
Data 
OLS 
Q4. Do environmental, 
organizational and Section 8 
HCV program structural 
factors affect racial 
segregation levels on 
Section 8 HCV recipients? 
H4. Environmental, 
organizational and Section 
8 HCV Program structural 
factors affect racial 
segregation levels on 
Section 8 HCV recipients. 
Quantitative 
Secondary 
Data 
OLS 
 
H5.1. There are four 
possible sets of public 
Qualitative  
Participant 
observation 
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Q5. If, and to what extent, 
do public administrators’ 
preferred set of values and 
attitudes coincide with 
either positive or negative 
organizational and policy 
performance of PHAs and 
Section 8 HCV Program? 
 
values and attitudes that 
define the behavior of 
public administrators 
towards citizens:  
Client (Orthodoxy); 
Customer (NPM); Citizen 
(NPA - NPS); Subject 
(Critical Theory). 
H5.2. A more democratic-
centered set of public 
values and attitudes will 
coincide with positive 
policy performance in 
terms of poverty/race 
desegregation and higher 
levels of housing and 
neighborhood quality. 
H5.3. An 
orthodox/NPM/domination-
oriented set of public 
values 
(Client/Customer/subject 
types) will coincide with 
negative policy 
performance in terms of 
poverty/race desegregation 
and lower levels of housing 
and neighborhood quality.   
and semi-
structured 
interviews 
 
Theoretical Framework  
Theories of bureaucratic politics and the Principal-Agent Model inform this 
research (see Figure 1 below). Both theoretical approaches to bureaucracy admit that public 
administration is neither a “technical and value-neutral activity, separable from politics” 
(Frederickson & Smith, 2003: 41), nor a unitary and single rational exercise of planning 
and execution (Allison & Halperin, 1972: 43). 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework  
 
These theoretical perspectives make three foundational conceptual contributions to 
the present study. The first one lies in the defense of the notion of public administrator’s 
agency, by depicting him/her as a carrier of a significant level of autonomy and discretion 
(Allison & Halperin, 1972: 43; Waterman & Meier, 1998: 175). Second, the idea of the 
implementation process of any policy as highly vulnerable to public servants’ agency, 
autonomy, and discretion. Scholars from the Bureaucratic Politics and the Principal-Agent 
model theories claim that during the implementation process, bureaucrats and their actions 
are often distant from the policy initially formulated. Public servants can also detach 
themselves from the formal decisions of what Allison and Halperin called the “senior 
players” (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983 in Waterman & Meier, 1998: 181; Allison & 
Halperin, 1972: 46).  In this vein, Clifford states that “(…) once a decision is made, 
considerable slippage can occur in implementing it” (Clifford, 1990: 162). The third and 
final contribution from these theoretical views has to do with the agreement on the 
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existence of an accepted set of values among public administrators. A shared corpus of 
attitudes, images, and assumptions that “provide common answers” to practitioners’ 
frequent questions (Allison & Halperin, 1972: 56).  
Street-level Bureaucrats 
The notion of street-level bureaucrats allows public administrators to exercise 
“substantial discretion” in the execution of their work when dealing directly with the public 
(Lipsky, 1980: 3). Administrative discretion of public servants is presented as unescapable, 
where public servants such as social services employees, law enforcement officers, and 
teachers, conduct professional activities that demand direct contact with citizens. 
According to Lipsky (1980), the quotidian actions of these street-level administrators and 
not their agencies’ mandates are what, in fact, determine the public policy direction. 
This notion is important for this study due to two arguments. The first one has to 
do with the ability of the street-level bureaucracy theory to place administrators in a 
position of claiming a certain legitimacy and discretional power, based on their expertise 
(Matland, 1995: 155). Secondly, this expertise-founded legitimacy allows public 
administrators to develop their own “‘coping devices’ for simplifying, and often distorting, 
the aims of policymakers” (Elmore, 1979: 609-10). In the case of the Section 8 Voucher 
Program, housing specialists participate in both “discretionary administrative practices” 
(Tegeler, Hanley & Liben, 1995: 467), and high levels of interaction with the citizenship 
during the different phases of the implementation process. 
Bureaucratic vs. Democratic Values  
The predominant academic position of public administrators’ vis-à-vis public 
service values builds this interaction as “an ongoing dialectic to resolve ‘legitimate 
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competition of values and inevitable shifts in priority’” (Van Wart, 1998: xviii, in Molina, 
2015: 49). Despite admitting that public service values can be mutually exclusive, compete 
from time to time, or attempt to find a desirable balance (Molina, 2015: 50), a limited 
number of scholars delve into the possibility that the selection of an exclusive set of values 
could turn into a permanent preference for public servants. This study follows H. George 
Frederickson (1997: 31) and his claim that “At any point in time, one set of values may be 
dominant and have a lock on the practice of public administration.” In this study, I propose 
four possible set of values for public administrators to utilize in policy implementation and 
rapports with citizens:  
Bureaucratic Values 
The origins of the requirement of political neutrality on public administrators' 
behavior along with the dominance of the classic and neo-bureaucratic models 
(Frederickson, 1997: 31) lie in the early foundation of the administrative state.  There were 
two different and equivalent preoccupations regarding the tensioning relationship between 
politics and bureaucrats. On one hand, there was the American concern about   the strength 
and influence of politicians upon the structure of the administrative state.  Scholars of this 
thought attempted to take “politics out of administration” (Fry, 1989, pp. 1036-1037, in 
Overeem, 2005: 316). On the other hand, Max Weber shared the “American founders” 
preoccupation, but from a contrasting path. Weber’s concern lied in the fear that “politics 
was rather too weak to curb administrative power, and that the danger of 
Beamtenherrschaft (government by functionaries) was imminent” (Weber, 1919/1968, p. 
28, in Overeem, 2005: 316).      
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A particular typology of public administrator-citizen’ rapport emanates from the 
predominance of the previously explained set of values and attitudes within the field. The 
category of “client” gathers the most fundamental formulations of modern American public 
administration’s birth. During this stage, Woodrow Wilson and Frank J. Goodnow fought 
the effects of an unorganized, unprofessional corps of public servants, whose decisions and 
actions were mediated by the political sphere and the actions of its elected officials 
(Kernaghan, 1976: 435; Overeem, 2005: 317; Stivers, 1995: 523). To confront these 
behaviors and turn public administrators into mere executors of policy, the values installed 
at that time were –and still are- efficiency, accountability, and of course, political neutrality 
of public administrators. 
Democratic Values 
By the 1960s, public administrators were criticized due to their apparent lack of 
self-consciousness, insensibility and blind conformity towards the most urgent matters of 
society (Frederickson, 1989: 95-96). The very content of the notion of political neutrality 
was severely questioned, including its moral and ethical validity (Jackson, 1987: 280). The 
Weberian definition of the principle as "obey ‘exactly as if the order agreed with his own 
conviction'" (Weber, in Jackson, 1987: 286) appeared diluted in the midst of the decade.  
The “Minnowbrook Perspective”, later known as “The New Public Administration” 
(NPA), was a movement developed in the field with the support of Dwight Waldo 
(Frederickson, 1989:96). This movement advocated for the contestation of those values 
historically established from the orthodoxy of Woodrow Wilson and Frank J. Goodnow 
and the paradigmatic place of the technical efficiency postulated by Luther Gulick, Herbert 
Simon and Frederick Taylor. The members of this group (Marini, 1971, in Overeem, 2005: 
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318) committed themselves to attack the traditional standards of "input-output ratio as 
token of technical efficiency" (Rutgers & Van der Meer, 2010: 758). Replacing them with 
‘democratic values' such as “equality, freedom, social responsibility, and the general 
welfare, as an end to be promoted when necessary by public action, regulating property 
and restricting profit” (McClosky & Zoller, 1984, in Frederickson, 1989: 96).      
This more normative approach of the New Public Administration (Marini, 1971), 
and the New Public Service (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015) perspectives allows the 
construction of the category of “citizen” to address the relationship between public servants 
and policy recipients. Under this theoretical light, social equity (Frederickson, 1997: 31), 
popular sovereignty (Waldo, 1998), and participation (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011) are 
regarded as the fundamental values of public servants’ practice. 
The Managerial Perspective and the ‘Customer’ Type 
The 1980s welcomed the movement that attempted to revolutionize public 
administration. Many names were assigned to such movement: New Public Management 
(Denhardt, 2011: 141), the New Right, New Conservatism (Peters & Savoie, 1994: 419), 
and Managerialism (Kettl, 2005: 9), among others. This transformation was driven by two 
fundamental assumptions. First, the conception of the bureaucracy as profoundly ill (Peters 
& Savoie, 1994: 418; Savoie, 1995: 112; Kettl, 2005: 41). Among the pathological 
conditions developed by the orthodox modern bureaucracies are the inherent excesses of 
the traditional hierarchy and its authority-driven practices (Kettl, 2005: 41). The traditional 
Weberian bureaucracy was also conceived as “lethargic, cautious, bloated, expensive, 
unresponsive, a creature of routine, […] incapable of accepting new challenges” (Savoie, 
1995: 2014). These critiques favored the general perception of a "broken" classic 
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bureaucracy, needing to be “fixed” (Savoie, 1995: 112) and assessed through the creation 
of a “system of performance accountability” (Moynihan, 2008; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000 
in O’Toole & Meier, 2014: 244).  
The second fundamental conception of the managerial theories alludes to the source 
of the solutions to these bureaucracy’s pathologies. Such solutions would appeal to the 
private sector, under the conviction that “private sector management is superior to public 
administration” (Savoie, 1995: 113). The application of the private sector’s measures 
demanded a new and different type of public servant.  
The NPM administrators are considered “public entrepreneurs” (Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992 in Denhardt, 2011: 142), “doers rather than thinkers” (Peters & Savoie, 
1994: 420), empowered and autonomous, and evaluate themselves by their rapport with 
clients and their capacity of “earning” instead of “spending” (Savoie, 1995: 113). The 
“Customer” type is the relationship established between public servants and citizens in the 
light of the New Public Management’s precepts (Dewitt, Kettl, Dyer & Lovan, 1994; 
Kamensky, 1996; Kettl, 2005). This relation is mediated by values and attitudes such as 
economy (Kettl, 2005: 1), performance (Kettl, 2005: 24), and entrepreneurship (Osborne 
& Gaebler, 1992 in Denhardt, 2011: 142). 
Critical Theory, the Inquiry on the Notion of Neutrality, and the Category of ‘Subject’  
The allocation of services and goods by public administrators is expected to be 
efficient, neutral, democratic, and professional. Nevertheless, a suspicion emerges over the 
behavior of officials in front of vulnerable citizens, and the nature of their expertise-
founded administrative discretion starts to be more intensely interrogated (Alkadry & 
Blessett, 2010: 532).    
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This inquiry comes from the very origin of the principle of neutrality, that emerges 
as part of the liberal tradition of addressing the public sphere as neutral and rational. The 
Rawlsian assumption of a neutral public sphere, in which “Each person possesses an 
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override” 
(Rawls, 1973: 3). This idea includes the ideal of citizenship’s impartiality (Young, 1990: 
97), along with the equally neutral condition of their interactions with public 
administrators. This assumption of neutrality of public administration legitimizes the 
practitioners’ status of “blindness” towards citizens in policy matters (Eagan, 2006: 386).  
The fundamental problem with the acceptance of the principle of political neutrality 
of public servants lies in the existence of a defective liberal notion of citizenship whose 
apparently ‘neutral’ content keeps the assumption that all citizens are equally treated by 
public organizations and their members. In reality, the construction of individuals’ fixed 
identities, like being classified as a woman, or a man, or black, or poor, etc., “(…) 
theoretically frees bodies from their contingencies such as race and gender” [but in reality]  
“creates those seeming contingencies as natural, and marks some as ineligible to be citizens 
subjects in the fullest sense” (Eagan, 2006: 386). The rationale behind Eagan’s claim is 
that identity cannot be hidden because it is body-portable. Public agents -as well as the 
public policy that they design and implement- are clearly able to identify who is who in the 
public game. Therefore, non-full citizens –those whose identities are not hegemonic- are 
subject to exclusion and discrimination (Eagan, 2006: 390; Gomez, 2004). 
The development of this sense of political neutrality among citizens and public 
administrators is deliberate and serves “ideological functions” (Young, 1990: 97). In the 
relationship between officials and citizens, the ideal of impartiality covers the unequal 
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allocation of goods and services through public policy, hiding “(…) the ways in which the 
particular perspectives of dominant groups claim universality, and helps justify 
hierarchical decision-making structures” (Young, 1990: 97). Many times, those claims of 
universality lie right behind the technical efficiency’s discourse. The construction of the 
“subject” type of rapport between public servants and citizens contributes to a more critical 
approach to administrators’ attitudes and values, when introducing power and domination 
as determinant variables (Alkadry & Blessett, 2010; Eagan, 2006; Foucault, 1980; Mouffe, 
1993). 
Knowledge/Technical Expertise as Power  
The doctrine of public administrators' political neutrality is historically supported 
by a disciplinary aspiration of scientism (Dahl, 1947: 1). One that implements the precepts 
and techniques of a positivist, rational method. Its major attempt lies in the accomplishment 
of the objective of "secure the maximal beneficial result contemplated by the law with the 
minimum expenditure of the social resources" (Walker, in Dahl, 1947: 2).     
Demonstrated inconveniences of this efficiency/scientific path have been amply 
discussed (Dahl, 1947; Waldo, 1998). On one hand, there is the problem of the competition 
between ‘democratic values' -liberty and equality (Waldo, 1998: 91)-, and those considered 
non-democratic ones –"national security, personal safety, productivity and efficiency" 
(Waldo, 1998: 91). On the other hand, lies the menace of the endangering of public 
administration's normative principles by inhibiting itself to demonstrate moral values, since 
"(…) science cannot construct a bridge across the great gap between ‘is' to ‘ought'" (Dahl, 
1947: 1).   
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Despite these established disadvantages, public administration insists on its 
scientific purity and efficiency-driven actions (Dahl, 1947: 4). The discipline refuses to 
resign a "power which the West since Medieval times has attributed to science and has 
reserved for those engaged in scientific discourse" (Foucault, 1980: 85).       
Scientific neutrality discourse within public administration is guaranteed by 
administrators’ expert posture. According to John Forester’s typology (1989: 29), “the 
technician supposes that the political context at hand can be ignored. Adopting a benign 
view of politics, the technician believes that sound technical work will prevail on its own 
merits”. Nevertheless, the literature stresses the public sphere as a well-defined field of 
power where non-neutral public administrators make decisions according to determined 
interests (Young, 1990: 112). Following Habermas, “(…) technocratic decisions strategies 
have been introduced to confer scientific legitimation on decisions that would otherwise 
have failed to generate consent in the more open process of public deliberation” (in Fischer, 
1993: 166). 
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Context 
Research Design  
This dissertation employs a mixed methods approach. I do not establish a direct 
relationship of causality between public administrators’ values/attitudes, organizational 
performance and policy outcomes. The existence of structural factors that also influence, 
and even cause, PHAs and Section 8 HCV Program’s performance –such as budget, market 
tightness, and landlords’ discrimination- impedes this task. In general, there are inherent 
difficulties in the identification of causes of performance (Lenz, 1981 in March & Sutton, 
1997: 702; Staw, 1975). This study works under the feasible hypothesis that public 
administrators' actions motivated by different sets of values and attitudes coincide with 
certain levels of organizational and policy performance.  Consequently, this study seeks 
for correlations and trends that relate public administrators’ values and attitudes to 
organizational performance and policy outcomes. 
I conduct two consecutive and interdependent stages of the study. In the first stage, 
I use quantitative techniques to identify and map the variations and discrepancies in PHAs, 
and Section 8 HCV programs results across the United States. I also determine how 
environmental factors impact organizational performance and policy outcomes. In the 
second stage of the study, I use a qualitative approach to determine the most predominant 
sets of public values and attitudes among Section 8 HCV program officials (either more 
democratic or Orthodox/managerial/domination oriented), finding matches between public 
servants’ responses to in-depth interviews, and the results of the quantitative analysis.  
First, I will provide the necessary context for the research, focusing on housing 
policy trends in the recent U.S. history. Second, I will explain Public Housing Authorities 
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and Section 8 HCV program’s origin, nature and operation. Finally, I will describe in detail 
the two methodological stages of the study.  
Study Context 
Housing Policy Trends in the Recent U.S. History 
Like any other policy, public housing policy in the U.S is a discursive act (Conners, 
2017). Originated in the turbulent times of the Great Depression, the American housing 
policy built itself on the paradigmatic premise that housing ownership and housing security 
signify “American progress, wealth, and citizenship” (Conners, 2017: 423). Policymakers 
articulated the act of owning and having a home as “a maker and marker of individual 
welfare, collective well-being, and civic virtue” (Conners, 2017: 423). Such a symbolic 
representation of housing, in times of financial crisis, foreclosures, and unemployment 
(Conners, 2017) allowed the congressional approval of the “first comprehensive federal 
housing legislation” (Conners, 2017: 422): the National Housing Act of 1934. A child of 
the New Deal, the NHA favored housing and home ownership affordability while 
normalizing the acceptance of governmental intervention in the housing market and real 
estate regulation (Conners, 2017: 426).  
This national mindset paved the route to the enacting of the United States Housing 
Act of 1937. The mission of this federal Act was centered on the provision for the needs 
of the segment of the population most severely impacted by the consequences of the Great 
Depression (Bingham & Kirkpatrick, 1975: 65). This national enterprise of subsidizing 
housing for low and extremely low-income families across the country became a reality 
with funding provided by the federal government through the subsequent enacting of the 
Housing Act of 1949. Under this Act, “construction and management of public housing 
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fell to local housing authorities, created by special legislation in individual states or 
localities (Hays, 1995; Quigley, 2000 in Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 35).  
The 1970s marked the end of public housing policy expansion in the country. 
Nonetheless, it continued to be relevant as a fundamental resource for low and extremely-
low income families (Goetz, 2012: 452). By 1985, the public housing program had been 
operating for half a century.  It was the “longest standing program of housing assistance to 
low-income people in the nation” (Goetz, 2012: 452). With age came criticism, fueled by 
a substantial change in the political environment and the discursive milieu. Some of the 
public housing stock located in communities in the east portion of the country seemed 
“visibly dilapidated” (Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 35). Citizens started to repudiate the 
image of high-poverty levels’ communities with the presence of neglected public housing 
“projects” (Chaskin, 2016: 372).  
By the mid-1990s, the public housing policy in the United States was regarded as 
“another ‘failed big government program’” (Cunningham, 2003: 115). Some events and 
major political decisions guided the general public to such conclusion, facilitating the 
dismantling of the program (Goetz, 2012: 452).  
The National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (1989 – 1992) 
had paradoxical and unexpected effects in this regard. It was aimed to assess the situation 
of severely distressed housing and to formulate recommendations accordingly (Goetz, 
2012: 454). After three years of evaluation, the Commission determined that, despite the 
daunting pictures of many public housing developments across the country, a solid 94% of 
public housing nationwide was not ‘severely distressed’ (Goetz, 2012: 454). Upon this 
observation, the Commission recommended the preservation of public housing whenever 
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possible, the promotion of new developments, the modernization and rehabilitation of 
severely distressed stock, and the no-relaxation of the one-for-one unit replacement rule. 
The Commission rejected the “de facto demolitions,” and approved replacement only in 
the most severely distressed cases (Goetz, 2012: 455).   
Despite this positive assessment of the public housing policy in the U.S., legislative 
actions taken after the Commission deviated from its recommendations and conclusions 
(Goetz, 2012: 456). Although retrench and dismantling was not the Commission’s 
recommendation, the HOPE VI program endorsed a “large-scale demolition and 
redevelopment that has eliminated over 100,000 units of public housing and inspired the 
elimination of more than 125,000 additional units outside of the program” (Goetz, 2012: 
454).  
This contradictory policy shift finds its origin in a combined set of reasons. The 
urban planning and design mindset had changed in the early 1990s. The principles of the 
“New Urbanism” questioned the modernist architectural proposal of the public housing 
stock, claiming that such view “had contributed to the rapid decline in living conditions 
and the social environment in these communities” (Cisneros, 2009; Katz, 2009 in Goetz, 
2012: 458). Meanwhile, the paradigmatic idea of Home as “connected to the moral and 
spiritual welfare of citizens” (Conners, 2017: 442) that fostered a comprehensive public 
housing policy after the Great Depression (Goetz, 2012: 453), was replaced by an emphasis 
on concentrated poverty (Goetz, 2012: 456). This was a problem that, according to new 
standards, demanded to be addressed through the creation of “mixed-income housing and 
mobility strategies for low-income, subsidized households” (Goetz, 2012: 452), a distant 
path from the original mid-1930s policy aim. This view promoted the expansion of the 
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Voucher program, reducing funding for developing new public housing and increasing the 
reliance on the market (Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 36).  
A new managerial perspective solidified this vision. A radical public housing 
reform settled the enactment of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998. 
This Act focused on augmenting Public Housing Authorities’ flexibility, while drastically 
reducing their funding (Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 37). This “neoliberal policy 
implementation and devolution” (Garshick Kleit & Page, 2015: 621) posed a financial toll 
on the whole public housing policy infrastructure, where both HUD and public housing 
authorities across the country faced institutional extinction (Goetz, 2012: 458). Executing 
an act of political will, “the Clinton administration worked to move social policy away 
from the New Deal social welfare approach to a neoliberal strategy incorporating market 
incentives, market discipline, and a reduction in the role of government” (Goetz, 2012: 
457).  
Gentrification added to this new public housing policy landscape. The property 
explosion experienced by American cities right after the recession of 1991 led to 
accelerated redevelopment and private-sector investment in the housing market (Goetz, 
2012: 458). Downtown and near-downtown property areas became of interest for 
developers. Most of this stock belonged to local public housing authorities that acquired 
them “during the decades of decline following World War II” (Goetz, 2012: 458). Private 
developers pressured a trend of selling and demolition that, added to the funding situation 
of many PHAs across the country, resulted in the loss of public housing for the poorest of 
the poor (Cunningham, 2003: 114; Goetz, 2012: 459). Some scholars go so far as to call 
this phenomenon “state-led gentrification” (Chaskin, 2016: 372). By 2012, 200,000 public 
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housing units were gone by demolition or selling, and “the public housing model that had 
prevailed for more than 50 years abandoned” (Goetz, 2012: 452). 
Public Housing Authorities and Section 8 HCV Program: Origin, Nature and Operation 
Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) in the U.S. are “quasi-governmental agencies 
with the mission of managing and sometimes constructing affordable housing in local 
communities” (Garshick Kleit & Page, 2015: 621). By 2015, there were over 4,000 PHAs 
in the country (Garshick Kleit & Page, 2015: 621). PHAs administer either public housing 
or Section 8 HCV programs, or both programs “for the federal government at the local 
level” (O’Hara & Cooper, 2003:15). Children of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, Public 
Housing Authorities were created “by special legislation in individual states or localities” 
(Hays, 1995; Quigley, 2000 in Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 35). Nonetheless, PHAs also 
operate under federal regulations, HUD being their main source of funding and the public 
institution that holds them accountable (Cunningham, 2003: 112). Hierarchically speaking 
(see Figure 2 below), PHAs are administered by Board of Commissioners –appointed by 
local mayors-, and managed by executive directors in charge of the staff that runs the 
different programs within the agency (O’Hara & Cooper, 2003: 15; Cunningham, 2003: 
112).  
PHAs are “large, locally based, government-linked entities” that deliver “safe, 
decent, affordable housing to low-income households” (Cunningham, 2003: 97). Their 
importance lies in their capacity to affront housing market’s challenges on behalf of low-
income and extremely low-income families through a “coherent, single-purposed 
infrastructure staffed with trained professionals to provide a complex service to vulnerable 
population” (Cunningham, 2003: 113). In practice, PHAs operate as a “private real estate 
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management regime,” with “rent levels, admission criteria, contracting and procurement 
procedures, [and] accounting standards and personnel management issues” (Cunningham, 
2003: 112).  
Figure 2. A Public Housing Authority’s Structure  
Source: Interviewed PHA’s staff member  
Policy changes impacted Public Housing Authorities and their ability to deliver. 
The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 imposed cuts in public housing 
funding and voucher expansion with a modification of their funding formulas (Garshick 
Kleit & Page, 2008: 34). Public Housing Authorities gained in organizational, program 
authority and financial flexibility; but saw federal funding shrink and the increase of their 
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duties (Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 34). PHAs’ core business was not “to construct, 
manage and maintain public housing” anymore (Lane, 1995; Quercia & Galster, 1997 in 
Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 35). Contrariwise, Housing Authorities started to face the 
“constrained quadrilemma” (Quercia & Galster, 1997: 552, in Garshick Kleit & Page, 
2008: 35) of conflicting goals: “integrating the poor geographically and socially; 
maximizing the values of cross-subsidies, maximizing the private capital invested in PHAs, 
and maximizing the number of poor tenants served by decent, affordable housing” 
(Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 35).  
This policy shift brought significant consequences to current PHAs’ execution of 
their obligations and performance. The first and most important of such effects has to do 
with the uncertainties and dilemmas posed by the substantial reduction of federal funding 
(Garshick Kleit & Page, 2015: 623; Corradino & Tran, 2005: 33). This reduction turned 
into an increased reliance on the private market and developers (Garshick Kleit & Page, 
2015: 624), while jeopardizes the provision of housing for the poorest of the poor due to 
“lack of market visibility” (Fraser et al. 2012, in Garshick Kleit & Page, 2015: 622). 
Secondly, although the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act promised PHAs 
discretion to execute and manage their new responsibilities, HUD’s administrative and 
financial measures ended up reducing this discretion, clotting PHAs with procedural and 
funding complications, and diminishing their ability to deliver housing provision services 
(Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 37). Finally, the most important consequence of PHAs new 
policy landscape lies in the danger of “organizational incoherence and ineffectiveness” 
(Quercias & Galster, 1997, in Garshick Kleit & Page, 2q008: 35) when fulfilling their 
duties.  
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The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program is federally funded by HUD and 
locally administered by Public Housing Authorities across the U.S. PHAs receive funding 
for administering the program that includes the housing subsidy itself, plus administrative 
fees aimed to cover operational costs (HUD, 2015: 1). The Program was created by 
Congress in 1974 (Semuels, 2015), as “a way to assist low-income families, elderly people, 
and people with disabilities to rent decent, safe and affordable housing in the community” 
(O’Hara & Cooper, 2003: 7). Currently, Section 8 is the largest low-income housing 
assistance program, serving 2.1 million households nationwide (HUD, 2015: 1). The 
Tenant-based rental assistance is the “most prevalent and well-known type of Section 8 
Assistance” (O’Hara & Cooper: 2003: 8), and the one studied in this dissertation (see 
Figure 3 below).  
In the mid-1980s, curtailment of fund for constructing new public housing 
coincided with the expansion of the Section 8 HCV Program, a governmental 
demonstration of its increasing reliance on private markets for the provision of affordable 
housing (Garshick & Page, 2008: 36). By the fiscal year 2002, Congress had allocated more 
than 16 billion dollars for Section 8 HCV program, equivalent to half the entire HUD 
budget for that year (O’Hara & Cooper, 2003: 9).  
Despite this apparent success, the Section 8 HCV program has too, endured the 
effects of the changing perspective of federal governments on housing policy. For instance, 
according to Garshick Kleit & Page (2008: 38), the voucher renewal funding formula 
changed each year between 2003 and 2006, causing “flawed funding formulas” (Sard, 
2007) that provoked the loss of 150,000 vouchers. PHAs were induced to make cuts while 
trying to keep their programs alive. Administrative costs have been limited by Congress as 
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well (Semuels, 2015). The fee formula currently in place since 2008 -and based on the local 
Fair Market Rent (FMR)- covered around  90% of the administrative fees that PHAs would 
have received if full funding were available, that percentage dropped to 69.26% in 2013 
and raised to 79.76% in 2014 (HUD, 2015: 1). The severity of the underfunding situation 
of Section 8 HCV programs across the country starts with the formula itself. The 
calculation does not incorporate PHAs specific conditions, housing markets, and program 
particularities (HUD, 2015: 2), along with extra costs –such as office space and personnel- 
that HUD does not pay (HUD, 2015: 8).  
Figure 3. Section 8 HCV Program Process 
 
Source: O’Hara & Cooper, 2003: 11 
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Methodological Stages of the Research 
Stage 1: Quantitative Analysis  
As mentioned before, in the first stage of this research I use quantitative techniques 
to identify the factors of performance disparities in Section 8 HCV Program. This stage of 
the study will address the first research question: if, and to what extent, do organizational 
and environmental conditions, such as demographics and political preferences of 
communities, economic factors, and racial disparities affect public organizations’ 
performance? The fundamental aim is to identify and map the variations and discrepancies 
in PHAs and Section 8 HCV programs results across the United States and to determine if, 
and how environmental factors impact both, organizational and program’s performance.  
The factors analyzed encompass five fundamental dimensions. The first three 
indicate historical program’s success: 1. Poverty and race desegregation; 2. Neighborhood 
quality; and 3. Housing quality.  The other two dimensions speak for 4. Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher Program structural factors, and 5. Demographic characteristics of 
surrounding communities. An ordinary Least Square method is utilized to address this 
operative question.  
After this first analysis, I proceed to test the ability of environmental and 
organizational factors of PHAs to exacerbate the impact of Section 8 HCV program’s 
hardly-controllable factors, such as the average amount of money expended by HUD per 
unit, as a way to anticipate and predict program’s performance, since there is no direct 
performance measurement for the program. This phase will address the question: Do 
environmental and organizational conditions compound the effect of the Section 8 HCV 
program’s hardly-controllable structural factors (as predictor of performance)?  
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The final portion of the quantitative stage will focus on the Section 8 HCV 
Program’s main policy objective: racial and poverty desegregation (Schwartz, 2010 in 
Ross, Shlay & Picon, 2012: 36). The third and fourth operative questions are: Do 
environmental, organizational and Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable 
structural factors affect poverty segregation levels in Section 8 HCV recipients? And Do 
environmental, organizational and Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable 
structural factors affect racial segregation levels in Section 8 HCV recipients? These 
questions will allow to identify environmental and organizational factors of Section 8 HCV 
Program and PHAs that influence either the success or failure of the program, when 
accomplishing the differentiator goal of providing poverty and race deconcentrated 
housing to vouchers’ recipients. 
Unit of Analysis and Study Sample  
The unit of analysis and population of interest is the Public Housing Authority, at 
the County Seat level, nationwide. The sample was selected from HUD’s Public Housing 
Assessment System (NASS-PHAS), as of October 2016. An approximate of 1,106 
observations of County Seat composite PHAS’ scores comprise the sample.  
Data 
Secondary data proves to be extremely useful when analyzing performance 
disparities in PHAs and Section 8 HCV programs, as well as the factors that influence such 
disparities. The information required to address the operative questions formulated above 
comes from institutional sources and comprises the five dimensions discussed in the 
quantitative analysis (1. Poverty and race desegregation; 2. Neighborhood quality; and 3. 
Housing quality; 4. Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program structural factors, and 5. 
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Demographic characteristics of surrounding communities.), at the County and County Seat 
level.  
Poverty and race desegregation indicators come from the “Picture of Subsidized 
Households 2015” database (Based on 2010 Census), specifically, the section of Housing 
Choice Vouchers at the County Level. An indicator of Racial Dissimilarity on White to 
Non-white population was retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ database. 
Housing Market Indicators, such as Housing Unit Estimates (2015), Annual Change in 
House Price Percentage (2015), and the House Price Index (2015) were collected from the 
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division (release Date: May 2016), and the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency, respectively. Neighborhood quality indicators were gathered 
from the Distressed Communities Index, a composite score that “combines seven 
complementary metrics to present a complete and multidimensional picture of economic 
distress–or prosperity–in U.S. communities”1. A housing quality indicator within PHAs 
was retrieved from HUD’s Public Housing Assessment System (NASS-PHAS), as the 
Physical Indicator score based on the physical inspection in the Physical Assessment 
Subsystem (PASS). Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program structural factors include 
Subsidized Units Available, Occupied Units as Percentage of Available, Average HUD 
Expenditure per Month and Average Months on Waiting List (in Section 8) were gathered 
from “Picture of Subsidized Households 2015” database as well. Public Housing 
Authorities’ performance indicator was retrieved from HUD’s Public Housing Assessment 
System (NASS-PHAS) database. County Seat data, such as population, housing, and 
                                                     
1 http://eig.org/dci 
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income was retrieved from the Census Fact Finder, 2015. Finally, Demographic 
Characteristics of Communities, such as population, poverty and income levels, and rural 
vs. urban population were retrieved from Census Tract state, and county estimates 2015, 
the population estimates for 2015 in the American Community Survey, and the 2010 
Census Urban and Rural Classification and Urban Area Criteria. American presidential 
election of 2012 was retrieved from the publically available databases of The Guardian and 
CNN.  
Variables 
Dependent Variables. The first dependent variable, out of four in this study, is an 
indicator of Public Housing Authorities’ performance: The composite PHAS score 
(CS_PHAScores). This variable is a HUD’s instrument of annual assessment that addresses 
four factors: “PASS Score: Physical Indicator score based on the physical inspection in the 
Physical Assessment Subsystem (PASS) and  ranges from 0 to 40 unless points are 
redistributed from other PHAS indicators; FASS Score - Financial Indicator score based 
on the Unaudited or Audited Financial Assessment Subsystem (FASS) submission ranges 
from 0 to 25 points unless points are redistributed from other PHAS indicators; MASS 
Score - Management Operations Indicator based on the Unaudited or Audited FASS 
submission ranges from 0 to 25 points unless points are redistributed from other PHAS 
indicators; and Capital Fund Score - Capital Fund score based on Capital Fund Program 
(CFP) obligation data and Inventory Management System (IMS) occupancy data ranges 
from 0 to 10 points unless points are redistributed from other PHAS indicators.” (HUD, 
2016).   
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The second dependent variable is a composite indicator that comprises the Section 
8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable structural factors that influence program’s performance 
and may indeed, predict it. Public Housing Authorities and Section 8 HCV program’s staff 
have low margin for maneuver over such factors. These factors are Subsidized Units 
Available, Occupied Units as Percentage of Available, Average HUD Expenditure per 
Month and Average Months on Waiting List. 
The third and fourth dependent variables are indicators of poverty and race 
desegregation for Section 8 HCV Program’s recipients. On the one hand, there is the 
percentage of the population below the poverty level in the Census Tract where HUD-
assisted families reside (Census 2010 designation). On the other hand, there is the minority 
percentage of total population in the Census Tract where HUD-assisted families reside 
(Census 2010 designation) (Data Dictionary for Picture of Subsidized Households 2016). 
Independent Variables. The independent variables of this research are both 
environmental and organizational influencers of performance, such as demographic 
characteristics of communities surrounding PHAs and Section 8 HCV programs, housing 
markets’ tightness or softness, poverty and race percentage, and race disparities at the 
county level, and neighborhood quality. Organizational factors are interchangeable 
depending on the model and comprise PHAs scores and Section 8 HCV program factors 
Control Variables. Due to the use of County Seat as unit of analysis for the 
composite PHAS score (CS_PHAScores) within the general use of County for the other 
variables, a number of County Seat variables have been included in the study for 
controlling population, income, housing estimates and housing occupancy at the county 
seat level. Table 2 below provides a substantial variables description.  
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Table 2. Variables Description  
 
Name of Variable Label/Description 
Public Housing 
Authorities Performance 
Indicator(s) 
 
1. CS_PHAScore County Seat Public Housing Authority Score 
The score given to the PHA is a general performance 
grade that include:  PASS Score - Physical Indicator 
score based on the physical inspection in the Physical 
Assessment Subsystem (PASS) and  ranges from 0 to 40 
unless points are redistributed from other PHAS 
indicators 
o FASS Score - Financial Indicator score based on the 
Unaudited or Audited Financial Assessment Subsystem 
(FASS) submission ranges from 0 to 25 points unless 
points are redistributed from other PHAS indicators 
o MASS Score - Management Operations Indicator based 
on the Unaudited or Audited FASS submission ranges 
from 0 to 25 points unless points are redistributed from 
other PHAS indicators 
o Capital Fund Score - Capital Fund score based on 
Capital Fund Program (CFP) obligation data and 
Inventory Management System (IMS) occupancy data 
ranges from 0 to 10 points unless points are redistributed 
from other PHAS indicators 
o Late Penalty Points (LPP) - Late penalty points may be 
applied to the PHAS score where the PHA submits FASS 
after the due date 
o FASS Submission Type - the unaudited or audited type 
of the PHA's financial submission (e.g., Unaudited/Single 
Audit, Audited/Non-Single Audit, Unaudited/A-133) 
Demographic 
Characteristics of 
Communities (County 
level) 
 
2. Population  Population Estimates (2015) 
3. Poverty Poverty Percent All Ages (county) 2015 
4. Income Median Household Income 2015 
5. POPPCT_URBAN Percentage Urban Population 
2010 
6. POPPCT_RURAL Percentage Rural Population 2010 
7. PCT_ObamaVote Percentage of Votes for Obama 2012 
8. PCT_RomneyVote Percentage of Votes for Romney 2012 
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9. Black_PCT Black Percentage per County 2015 
10. Hispanic_PCT Hispanic Percentage per County 2015 
Market 
Tightness/Softness 
(County level) 
 
11. HousingUnit Housing Unit Estimates 2015 
 
12. AnnualChange_PCT Annual Change House Price Percentage 2015 
Captures percentage annual shifts in house price 
gradients within counties  
13. HPI House Price Index 2015 
The house price gradient within a county captures the 
tradeoﬀ between demand for housing at diﬀerent 
locations 
(dataset of mortgage transactions, which includes 
conventional mortgages of single-family purchases and 
reﬁnances that are acquired or guaranteed by Fannie Mae 
or Freddie Mac) 
the Section 8 HCV 
program’s hardly-
controllable structural 
factors 
 
14. SubdUnitAv Subsidized Units Available 
(in Section 8) 
15. Occupied_PCT Occupied Units as Percentage of Available (in Section 8) 
16. AvgHUDExp Average HUD Expenditure per Month (in Section 8) 
17. AvMonths Average Months on Waiting List (in Section 8) 
Poverty and Race 
Desegregation in 
Vouchers Recipient and 
Racial Disparities at the 
County Level 
 
18. MinorityS8_PCT Percentage Head of Household Minority  in Section 8 
HCV 
19. Black_S8 Percentage Head of Household Black in Section 8 HCV 
20. Hispanic_S8 Percentage Head of Household Hispanic in Section 8 
HCV 
21. PovertyCensus Poverty (In Census Tract) 
Surrounding Census Tract Percentage Poverty 
22. MinorityCensus Minority (In Census Tract) 
Surrounding Census Tract Percentage Minority 
23. Diss_Index White to Non-White Racial Dissimilarity Index 2015 
The Racial Dissimilarity Index measures the percentage 
of the non-hispanic white population in a county which 
would have to change Census tracts to equalize the racial 
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distribution between white and non-white population 
groups across all tracts in the county. 
Neighborhood Quality 
(County level) 
 
24. DCI Distressed Communities Index  
The DCI calculates distress scores for every level of 
geography presented here: zip codes, cities, counties, and 
congressional districts, and tabulates data by states as 
well. Scores are based on a geography’s combined 
performance on the seven well-being metrics. The higher 
the score, the greater the distress. The scores range from 
0 to 100, moving from dark green in the most prosperous 
zip codes to dark red in the most distressed ones. 
 
The DCI combines seven complementary metrics to 
present a complete and multidimensional picture of 
economic distress–or prosperity–in U.S. communities: 
 
No High School Degree: Percent of the population 25 
years and over without a high school degree 
Housing vacancy: Percent of habitable housing that is 
unoccupied, excluding properties that are for seasonal, 
recreational, or occasional use 
Adults not working: Share of the population 16 years and 
over that is not currently employed 
Poverty: Percent of population living under the poverty 
line 
Median income relative to state: Ratio of the geography’s 
median income to the state’s median income 
Change in employment: Percent change in the number of 
individuals employed between 2010 and 2013 
Change in business establishments: Percent change in the 
number of business establishments between 2010 and 
2013 
Control Variables: 
County Seat General 
Characteristics  
 
25. CS_Pop County Seat Population  
26. CS_Income County Seat Income  
27. CS_HousingEst County Seat Housing Estimate (Estimate amount of 
housing units) 
28. CS_HousingOcc County Seat Housing Occupied (Amount of these units 
that are occupied)  
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Stage 2: Qualitative Analysis  
In this stage of the study, I analyze three non-quantitative aspects of public 
administrators’ values and attitudes towards Section 8 HCV program recipients (see Figure 
4 below). First, I address public administrators’ discursive devices towards citizens in 
terms of values and attitudes, especially their capitalization of technical expertise as a 
source of discretion (Foucault, 1980), the rationale behind their attitudes (Alexander & 
Stivers, 2010; Alkadry & Blessett, 2010; Marr, 2016), and the set of public service values 
utilized. Second, I inquire into the perceived scope of public administrators’ actions during 
the implementation process, including possible constrictions posed by structural factors 
affecting the Section 8 HCV Program (Marr, 2016: 225), and, finally, I question public 
administrators’ perceived impact on policy outcomes. During this phase, I address the 
second research question: If, and to what extent, do public administrators’ preferred set of 
values and attitudes coincide with either positive or negative organizational and policy 
performance of PHAs and Section 8 HCV Program? To address this question, I interviewed 
staff members of Public Housing Authorities in the states of California and Florida. 
Unit of Analysis and Study Sample 
The unit of analysis is public servants with direct participation in the 
implementation process of the Section 8 HCV Program at Public Housing Authorities 
(PHAs) in the states of California and Florida, at the county and county seat level.  
A “judgment sample” (Marshall, 1996: 523) is the ideal selection to conduct the 
research. The sample demands the inclusion of subjects with particular expertise and 
experience. In consequence, I selected “the most productive one” (Marshall, 1996: 523). 
In this case, the sample was satisfied with 15 experienced public administrators of the high 
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and medium level of authority (Carpenter, 2001) working as case managers and front-line 
practitioners at the Section 8 HCV Program and PHAs at the county and county seat level, 
in the states of California and Florida. These officials must be formally separated from 
elected ones. They must be executors of policy decisions, appointed and promoted by 
merit, and not be engaged in partisan political activities (Kernaghan, 1976: 433). I 
combined the initial ‘judgment sample’ with a Chain Referral or Snowball sampling 
technique (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981: 144), anticipating the construction of an eventual 
network along the interviewing process.   
Qualitative Research Strategy & Data 
I use organizational ethnography (Watkins-Hayes, 2009: 34) as a qualitative 
research strategy to collect and analyze data about public administrators’ values and 
attitudes towards Section 8 HCV Program’s recipients. According to Watkins-Hayes 
(2009), organizational ethnography allows researchers to explore the intersection between 
administrators’ social (attitudes) and professional (public service values) identities. I 
address this intersection by observing the rapports between recipient citizens of the Section 
8 HCV Program and public administrators during the decision-making and implementation 
process.  
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Figure 4. Qualitative Research Strategy 
 
The data collection comes from in-depth interviews with PHAs practitioners. I 
utilize non-structured and ethnographic methods to interview public administrators. I 
expect that through a “particular kind of speech event” (Spradley, 1979: 18, in Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011: 146) the interviewees share “their experiences, their daily activities, and 
the objects, and people in their lives” (Westby, Burda, & Mehta, n.d. in Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011: 146).  
Rationale behind the Selection of the States of California and Florida  
The justification for the selection of Florida and California for the conduction of 
the qualitative research has to do with a number of characteristics that add complexity to 
the decision-making process and implementation environment of the Section 8 HCV 
program. According to the 2010 Census estimations, California is the most populated state 
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in the country (37,253,956), while Florida remains as the third most populated 
(18,801,310), outnumbered by Texas. Beyond population size, both California and Florida 
comprise high levels of diversity regarding race and ethnicity, with representative amounts 
of White, African-American, Asian, and Hispanic or Latino population. In both states, the 
Housing Choice Voucher Programs at the county level experience sharp contrasts in 
accordance with the demographic differences found from one community to the other. 
While South Florida and the southern portion of California deal with tight housing markets, 
unaffordability, and fierce competition; northern territories in both states face less pressure 
regarding housing affordability. More importantly, California and Florida present multiple 
heterogeneities. The most relevant ones are related to the substantial differences of income 
and wealth from county to county, the existence of both, rural and urban areas, and a 
considerable performance disparity among Public Housing Authorities at the local level 
(HUD, 2015).  
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Chapter 5: Environmental and Organizational Influencers of Performance at PHAs 
and the Section 8 HCV Program 
For some authors, the evidence on the determinants of performance in public 
organizations is rather limited (Boyne, 2003; O’Toole & Meier, 1999 in Boyne, Meier, 
O’Toole & Walker, 2006). Nonetheless, a substantial body of literature within the field 
helps to identify the most common environmental and organizational influencers of 
performance, in public organizations and policy (Amirkhanyan, Kim & Lambright, 2013; 
Avellaneda, 2008; Lee & Whitford, 2012; Moynihan, 2005; O’Toole & Meier, 2011; 
Walker, Boyne & Brewer, 2010).  
Among organizational influencers of performance, the most prominent by far is 
Management (Meier et al. 2006). Management variables such as “innovation, leadership, 
managerial quality, and strategy” are broadly analyzed factors of organizational goals’ 
achievement (Boyne, Meier, O’Toole & Walker, 2006: 7). By anticipating and responding 
to external challenges and constraints, managers can positively influence organizational 
performance (Heckman, 2012: 473). Their ability to interpret the context also impacts 
organizational stability (O’Toole & Meier, 1999 in Walker et al. 2010: 6). Scholars 
emphasize on management as a determinant of organizational performance to the point of 
claiming that “what makes the difference between the success and failure of a program is 
public management” (Boyne, 2003; Lynn, 1984, 1987; Meier & O’Toole, 2002; O’Tolle 
& Meier, 1999 in Avellaneda, 2008: 287).  
There are other influencers of performance to be found within organizations. On 
the one hand, individual-level factors such as “job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment, public service motivation, and organizational citizenship behavior” (Kim, 
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2004: 245) contribute to the completion of organizational and program’ objectives. On the 
other hand, organizational resources, namely “administrative, human, financial, physical, 
political and reputation” (Lee & Whitford, 2012: 689) impact organizational and policy 
performance as well.  
Environmental influencers of performance receive less investigative attention than 
their organizational counterparts (Martin & Smith, 2005: 602). The population ecology’s 
perspective grants importance to environmental conditions in organizational chances to 
thrive (O’Toole & Meier, 2011: xii). This view also minimizes the relevance of managerial 
decisions in the accomplishment of organizational goals (Belton & Dess, 1985; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977 in Meier, Favero & Zhu, 2015: 1224). Lately, a more comprehensive 
approach has come to recognize the importance of environment in organizational and 
policy performance, above all, as an external influencer of the “management-performance 
linkage” (O’Toole & Meier, 2014: 237).  
This chapter addresses environmental and organizational influencers of 
performance in Public Housing Authorities and Section 8 HCV programs’ outcomes 
nationwide. The main hypothesis of this portion of the research is that environmental and 
agencies’ structural factors impose a toll on organizational and policy performance and 
outcomes.  
Descriptive Statistics  
This section introduces dependent, independent and control variables of the study. 
Such variables fall into the named categories of demographic characteristics, market 
tightness/softness, Section 8 HCV Program’s hardly-controllable structural factors, PHAs’ 
performance indicators, Section 8 HCV Program’s outcomes indicators of poverty and race 
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desegregation, neighborhood and housing quality, and control variables. A number of these 
variables operate as both, dependent and independent variables in different circumstances 
and models.  I marked these variables with an asterisk (*).  
Independent Variables: Environmental and Organizational Influencers of Performance 
The literature on Public Housing Authorities and Section 8 HCV Program (see 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4) agrees on the factors that influence PHAs’ performance and 
Section 8 HCV program’s outcomes. These influencers of organizational and policy 
performance are the demographic characteristics of surrounding communities such as 
poverty levels, racial composition, and political preferences, neighborhood and housing 
quality within the area, assigned budget by HUD, Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-
controllable structural factors, and conditions of the housing market, among others. Table 
3 below displays the descriptive statistics of PHAs and Section 8 HCV program’s 
environmental and organizational influencers of performance.  
Table 3. Independent Variables: Environmental and Organizational Influencers of 
Performance 
  
  Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Demographic Characteristics      
Population  3140 100793.9 323129.4 85 1.00e+07 
Poverty 3141 16.27482 6.465473 3.4 47.4 
Income 3141 48600.6 12355.27 22894 125900 
POPPCT_URBAN 3142 41.33212 31.50149 0 100 
PCT_ObamaVote 3109 38.40997 14.70253 3.4 93.4 
Black_PCT 3140 9.008503 14.46118 0 85.9 
Hispanic_PCT 3140 8.830955 13.49821 0 98.7 
Market Tightness/Softness      
HousingUnit 3140 42924.9 125820.2 50 3504139 
AnnualChange_PCT 2674 3.081765 4.849619 -56.11 29.96 
HPI 2686 258.3951 165.2065 69.67 1793.12 
Section 8 HCV Structural 
Factors* 
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SubdUnitAv 2923 819.6911 3345.564 1 93270 
Occupied_PCT 2923 72.1755 34.99423 -5 290 
AvgHUDExp 2923 484.5101 287.4167 -5 5749 
AvMonths 2923 17.36059 30.6912 -5 1202 
Racial Disparity      
Diss_Index 3125 27.91987 14.54925 0 77.7 
Neighborhood Quality      
DCI 3128 50.01173 28.8799 0 100 
County Seat Control 
Variables 
     
CS_Pop 1101 44856.49 170111.4 326 3900794 
CS_Income 1102 37395.97 9755.678 14254 89134 
CS_HousingEst 1102 19429.25 68343.37 160 1436543 
CS_HousingOcc 1102 17121.44 61603.64 142 1342761 
 
Dependent Variable 1: County Seat Public Housing Authority Score 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the first dependent variable in this study is an indicator 
of Public Housing Authorities’ performance (see Table 4 below for descriptive statistics). 
The Public Housing Assessment System, or PHAS, is the system utilized by HUD to 
evaluate a PHA’s performance in managing its low-rent public housing programs. HUD's 
Real Estate Assessment Center “effectively and fairly measures the performance of a 
public housing agency” (HUD.GOV). According to HUD, “scores are generated for each 
development, or Asset Management Project (AMP). AMP scores are weighted by how 
many units are in the AMP and then combined into the agency-wide score”. 
HUD uses a centralized system to gather individual subsystem scores by the use of 
various sub-indicators, then produces a composite PHAS score representing PHA’s general 
performance. PHAS uses a 100-point scoring system. The composite PHAS score 
(CS_PHAScores) addresses and unifies four factors: “PASS Score: Physical Indicator 
score based on the physical inspection in the Physical Assessment Subsystem (PASS) and 
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ranges from 0 to 40 unless points are redistributed from other PHAS indicators; FASS 
Score - Financial Indicator score based on the Unaudited or Audited Financial Assessment 
Subsystem (FASS) submission ranges from 0 to 25 points unless points are redistributed 
from other PHAS indicators; MASS Score - Management Operations Indicator based on 
the Unaudited or Audited FASS submission ranges from 0 to 25 points unless points are 
redistributed from other PHAS indicators; and Capital Fund Score - Capital Fund score 
based on Capital Fund Program (CFP) obligation data and Inventory Management System 
(IMS) occupancy data ranges from 0 to 10 points unless points are redistributed from other 
PHAS indicators.” (HUD, 2016). This dissertation utilizes both, the composite indicator of 
PHAs’ performance, and three of the sub-indicators that comprise it (PASS, MASS and 
FASS). HUD utilizes the total score to determine the PHA’s designation under PHAS: 
“Scores below 60 result in a troubled designation. Scores of 90 points or above result in a 
high performer designation. Scores below 90 but above 60 are designated as a standard 
performer. If your PHA scores below 60 in any one indicator, you will be designated as a 
substandard performer” (HUD.GOV).  
Initially, this study’s sample was Public Housing Authorities at the county level. 
Nonetheless, PHAs scores at the county level resulted in a reduced sample of 327 
observations. To increase the sample size, I decided to use PHAs at the County Seat level, 
augmenting the sample size to 1106 observations, while keeping the rest of the variables 
at the County level and adding control variables at the County Seat level.  
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Table 4. Dependent Variable: County Seat Public Housing Authorities Performance 
Indicator(s)  
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CS_PHAScore* 1106 89.31374 8.676286 41 100 
FASS 1102 23.46461 3.95411 0 25 
MASS* 1102 20.70871 4.826838 3 25 
PASS 1106 35.35443 4.419523 14 78 
 
Since a substantial amount of counties/county seats did not have a PHA score, I 
conducted independent samples t-tests to compare County seats with and without PHAs’ 
scores. On the one hand, there is “Group 0,” that comprises the county seats without PHAs’ 
score. On the other hand, there is “Group 1”, which encompasses those county seats with 
a PHAs’ score. I created a new group variable that records whether a county has the PHAS 
score or not (1=Yes; 0=No). The purpose of this analysis is to examine the most relevant 
demographic and organizational characteristics and differences of those Public Housing 
Authorities with, and without PHAS score. 
Table 5 displays significant differences between Group 0 and Group 1 means in the 
scores for Poverty, Income, Percentage of Urban Population, Percentage of rural 
population, and Black population Percentage per County, at the .001 significance level.  At 
the .05 significance level, one environmental influencer (Population), and three out of four 
organizational influencers, Subsidized Units Available, Occupied Units as Percentage of 
Available, and Average Months on Waiting List, in Section 8, are also statistically 
significant regarding mean differences.  
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Table 5. Demographic Analysis of CS_PHAScore – Comparison of Mean Results  
 CS_PHAScore Group 0 CS_PHAScore Group 1 p-value 
 Obs.  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev.  
 
Population 2,034 87709.86  267014.1 1,106 124856.3  405635.4 0.0021** 
Poverty  2,035 15.74983 6.576041 1,106 17.24078 6.143645 0.000*** 
Income 2,035 49694.4 13076.29 1,106 46588.05 10619.83 0.000*** 
POPPCT_URBAN 2,036 37.5671  31.69488 1,106 48.26303  29.94219 0.000*** 
POPPCT_RURAL 2,036 62.4329 31.69488 1,106 51.73697 29.94219 0.000*** 
PCT_ObamaVote 2,003 38.10479 14.8133 1,106 38.96267 14.49005 0.1194 
PCT_RomneyVote 2,003 60.07734 14.76473 1,106 59.44941 14.48271 0.2531 
Black_PCT 2,034 8.129941 14.35738 1,106 10.62423 14.51844 0.000*** 
Hispanic_PCT 2,034 8.639626  13.39013 1,106 9.182821 13.69386 0.2815 
SubdUnitAv 1,868 709.8217  3158.909 1,055 1014.227  3646.193 0.0181** 
Occupied_PCT 1,868 71.06959 36.37242 1,055 74.13365 32.33462 0.0230** 
AvgHUDExp 1,868 483.0819  310.9267 1,055 487.0389  240.3314 0.7208 
AvMonths 1,868 16.47002  22.5345 1,055 18.93744 41.32763 0.0368** 
*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .001 
Dependent Variable 2: The Section 8 HCV program’s Hardly-Controllable Structural 
Factors (as predictor of performance) 
Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable structural factors is the name 
assigned to those performance influencers, idiosyncratic of the Section 8 HCV programs 
across the country (see descriptive statistics in Table 6 below). I hypothesize that these 
variables impact Public Housing Authorities, and that environmental and organizational 
Influencers Compound their effect. The common attribute of these factors is that they are 
hardly controllable, meaning that PHAs do not have the substantial capacity or power to 
modify them easily.  
The first variable of this hardly-controllable group of factors is Subsidized Units 
Available (SubdUnitAv), which stands for the “number of units under contract for federal 
subsidy and available for occupancy” (Data Dictionary for Picture of Subsidized 
Households: 2016). The second variable is Occupied Units as Percentage of Available 
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(Occupied_PCT) that counts for the number of occupied units in Section 8 HCV program, 
as a percentage of those available. The third variable is the Average HUD Expenditure per 
Month (AvgHUDExp) that captures “the monthly housing assistance payment (HAP), 
divided by the total number of occupied units” (Data Dictionary for Picture of Subsidized 
Households: 2016). Finally, there is the Average Months on Waiting List (AvMonths), or 
the time expended by Section 8 HCV Program’s participant households before receiving a 
voucher.  
The underlying hypothesis behind the analysis of these variables is the possibility 
for them to assist in the prediction of Section 8 HCV Program’s performance, in the 
absence of a specific indicator for such purpose. If inherent conditions and resources are 
not ideal during the implementation process of a given policy, one may expect to find a 
certain impact on its resulting outcomes. 
Table 6. Dependent Variable: Hardly Controllable Section 8 HCV Program’s Structural 
Factors (as predictor of performance) 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SubdUnitAv* 2923 819.6911 3345.564 1 93270 
Occupied_PCT* 2923 72.1755 34.99423 -5 290 
AvgHUDExp* 2923 484.5101 287.4167 -5 5749 
AvMonths* 2923 17.36059 30.6912 -5 1202 
 
For the construction of one single variable that accounts for the Section 8 HCV 
Program’s hardly-controllable structural factors, I utilized data from the Picture of 
Subsidized Households 2016 that comprises the information collected for the Section 8 
HCV Program. I selected the variables mentioned above that represent performance 
influencers within PHAs and Section 8 HCV programs in the country. Subsequently, I used 
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Principal Component Factor Analysis (PCF) and factored together the four variables 
(SubdUnitAv, Occupied_PCT, AvgHUDExp, AvMonths) and obtained a composite value 
(Factor1, or S8_StFactors), that operates as a dependent variable in Model 3. Table 7 below 
presents how the four variables factored together while Table 8 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the factored resulting variable. Although Cronbach’s alpha for S8_StFactors is 
discouragingly low, I chose to conduct the analysis for exploratory purposes as there is no 
antecedent of a similar exercise.  
Table 7. Constructing S8_StFactors using Principal Component Factoring (PCF) 
Variable  Factor1 (S8_StFactors) Uniqueness  
SubdUnitAv  0.8482 
Occupied_PCT 0.8554 0.2683 
AvgHUDExp 0.8861 0.2148 
AvMonths 0.5642 0.6817 
(blanks represent 
abs(loading)<.5) 
 
Eigenvalue: 1.98700 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0,0617 
 
 
Table 8. Dependent Variable: The Section 8 HCV Program’s Hardly-Controllable 
Structural Factors 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
S8_StFactors 2923 -4.39e-10 1 -1.962722 11.30745 
 
Dependent Variable 3: Poverty Segregation Indicator 
Poverty desegregation is one of the signature outcomes of the Section 8 HCV 
program. Nonetheless, Section 8 HCV’s recipient households are too, affected by 
concentrated poverty (Austin Turner, 2003: 2; Carlson, Haveman, Kaplan & Wolfe, 2009; 
Deng 2007). In theory, the voucher gives households the freedom to select a home; 
however, many of them end up living in low and extremely-low income neighborhoods.  
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The Poverty Segregation Indicator stands for the percentage of the population 
below the poverty level in the Census Tract where HUD-assisted families reside 
(PovertyCensus) (Census 2010 designation) (Data Dictionary for Picture of Subsidized 
Households 2016). This variable will assist in determining the factors that impact poverty 
segregation among Section 8 HCV program’s holders. Table 9 comprises the descriptive 
statistic for dependent variable PovertyCensus.  
Table 9. Dependent Variable: Poverty Segregation Indicator  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PovertyCensus 2923 16.79747 11.33175 -5 54 
 
Dependent Variable 4: Minority Segregation Indicator 
The second distinctive policy outcome of Section 8 HCV program is minority 
desegregation. As the literature review in this study assert (see Chapter 2), disproportionate 
rates of minority recipients of the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program live in 
ethnic and racially clustered neighborhoods across the country (Varady & Walker, 2000; 
Varady, 2010: 402; Deng, 2007: 22; Newman & Schnare). The Minority Segregation 
Indicator accounts for the minority percentage of total population in the Census Tract 
where HUD-assisted families reside (Census 2010 designation) (Data Dictionary for 
Picture of Subsidized Households 2016). This variable will allow identifying 
environmental and organizational influencers of minority segregation among Section 8 
HCV recipients, according and beyond those defined by the literature. Table 10 displays 
MinorityCensus descriptive statistics.   
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Table 10. Dependent Variable: Minority Segregation Indicator 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MinorityCensus 2923 22.82381 24.38091 -5 97 
 
Regression Diagnostics  
To confirm that regression models in this study meet OLS regression normality 
assumptions, I applied a number of diagnostic tests after conducting Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) analysis. To assure that the models are linear in the relationship between variables 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009: 38), I plotted the standardized residuals of the regressions line 
against each independent variable. Despite eye-balling subjectivity, I confidently did not 
find distinct patterns displayed on the plots; but equally spread residuals around a 
horizontal line. A sign of the conditional expectation of the dependent variables as a linear 
function of the models’ independent variables. 
For ratifying the normality of residuals, I conducted a Kernel density plot of 
residuals. In Figure 5 it can be seen how the distribution deviates from the theoretical 
normal one. A Skewness/Kurtosis test for normality underpins the visual evidence, 
resulting in a Prob>chi2=0.00, indicating a normality problem. Nonetheless, because of the 
test’s bias against large datasets, the normality assumption can be relaxed as the sample 
size used in this dissertation is greater than 500 observations.  
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Figure 5. Kernel Density Plot of Residuals  
 
I detected multicollinearity (Baum, 2006: 84) in the four regression models. I 
conducted the Variance Inflation Factor test finding some problematic variables. I dropped 
CS_HousingEst, CS_HousingOcc, CS_Pop, Population, HousingUnit, and SubdUnitAv 
from Model 1, 3 and 4, being these variables’ VIF greater than 10 (Baum, 2006: 85).  
Independent variables HousingUnit and Population were also dropped from Model 2. 
These drops do not hurt the analysis as such variables share similarities with others that 
stayed in the models. For instance, Population and the percentage of urban population.  
The Breusch-Pagan test confirmed that three out of the four regression models 
violate the assumption of homoscedasticity of the error terms (Gujarati & Porter, 2009: 
544). Model 1, 2 and 3 displayed heterogeneity of the error terms. To correct for this 
condition, I utilized robust standard errors assisted by STATA.  
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Results 
Model 1: Environmental and Organizational Influencers of PHAs’ Performance  
The research question that animates the first regression analysis in this dissertation 
is If, and to what extent, do organizational and environmental conditions, such as 
demographics and political preferences of communities, economic factors, and racial 
disparities, affect public organizations’ performance? I hypothesize that both, 
environmental and organizational factors, pose a toll on organizational performance. The 
quantitative analysis contained in Model 1 accounts for the impact of hardly modifiable 
environmental and organizational conditions on Public Housing Authorities at the County 
seat level across the country. Using an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis, I 
explore the relationship between County Seat Public Housing Authorities’ Score and the 
demographic characteristics of communities surrounding these agencies,  conditions of 
tightness or softness of the housing market, poverty and race levels within the county, racial 
disparities, and neighborhood quality. In this Model, I also consider the influence of 
Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable structural factors as feasible influencers of 
Public Housing Authorities’ performance.  
Table 11 presents the results that partially endorse the hypothesis mentioned above. 
Holding all other variables constant, the analysis accounts for the statistical significance of 
Poverty as a predictor of PHAs score performance. At less than .05 significance level, 
Poverty has a negative relationship with County Seat PHAs’ score. The other 
socioeconomic independent variable, Income, is also a negative significant predictor of 
Public Housing Authority’s Score at less than .01 significance level. Among the 
demographic predictors of the analysis and holding all other variables constant, the 
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Percentage of Urban Population is statistically significant at less than .01 significance level 
and has a negative relationship with PHAs’ score. The regression also reports a statistically 
significant relationship between the percentage of Hispanic population per county and 
PHAs’ scores. Such relationship is positive. The OLS analysis confirms, holding all other 
variables constant, that White to Non-White Racial Dissimilarity within counties has a 
negative and significant relationship with the dependent variable (at 0.028 alpha level). In 
the same vein, the predictor Distressed Community Index, which accounts for distressed 
scores related to neighborhood quality, has a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with PHAs’ score, at 0.011 level of significance. 
Only one of the Section 8 HCV Program’s hardly-controllable structural factors 
accounts for a significant relationship with the dependent variable, CS_PHAScore. 
Holding all other variables constant, Occupied Units as Percentage of Available in Section 
8 has a positive and significant relationship at 0.035 alpha level.  
Table 11. Environmental and Organizational Influencers of PHAs’ Performance 
Dependent Variable: CS_PHAScore  
Regressor  Coef. 
(se) 
Poverty -.28 
(.112)** 
Income -.000 
(.000)*** 
POPPCT_URBAN -.04 
(.014)*** 
PCT_ObamaVote -.00 
(.025) 
Black_PCT -.01 
(.028) 
Hispanic_PCT .04 
(.022)** 
AnnualChange_PCT -.018 
(.050) 
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HPI .00 
(.002) 
Occupied_PCT .027 
(.013)** 
AvgHUDExp -.00 
(.001) 
AvMonths -.00 
(.006) 
Diss_Index -.04 
(.022)** 
DCI -.05 
(.020)** 
CS_Income .00 
(.000) 
R-squared 
n 
0.075 
970 
*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 
R-squared values are substantially low in the OLS linear regressions that analyze 
the environmental and organizational influencers of organizational performance in Public 
Housing Authorities. Nonetheless, the exploratory nature of this dissertation allows 
experimenting with indicators that are not commonly related on the field, “in the quest of 
a more general theory” (O’Toole & Meier, 2014: 237) of performance. In this vein, Models 
1A, 1B, and 1C utilize three out of the four sub-indicators that compose dependent variable 
County Seat Public Housing Authority Score (CS_PHAScore). These sub-indicators are 
used as dependent variables in separate and more specific models. As previously 
mentioned, such sub-indicators account for PASS Score: Physical Indicator score based on 
the physical inspection in the Physical Assessment Subsystem (PASS) and ranges from 0 
to 40; FASS Score: Financial Indicator score based on the Unaudited or Audited Financial 
Assessment Subsystem (FASS) submission, ranges from 0 to 25 points; and MASS Score 
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or Management Operations Indicator based on the Unaudited or Audited FASS submission 
ranges from 0 to 25 points (HUD, 2016). 
Model 1A: Environmental and Organizational Influencers of PHAs’ Management 
Operations 
Model 1A addresses the specific question: If, and to what extent, do organizational 
and environmental conditions influence Managerial Action within Organizations? I 
hypothesize that organizational and environmental conditions influence managerial action, 
limiting or enhancing managerial decision-making. Public Housing Authorities 
performance score’s sub-indicator, Management Operations Indicator (MASS), serves as 
the dependent variable. An Ordinary Least Square regression was conducted to predict the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  
Table 12 below displays the results of the analysis. Holding all variables constant, 
Income is a statistically significant predictor of managerial action within Public Housing 
Authorities at the County Seat level, at 0.067 significance level. The relationship between 
Income and managerial action is negative. The percentage of urban population within the 
county also has a statistically significant relationship with PHAs’ management operations, 
at a 0.036 significance level. Such relationship is negative as well. Finally, the Distressed 
Community Index, which accounts for neighborhood quality, has a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with PHAs’ managerial actions, holding all other 
variables constant, at 0.049 alpha level.  
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Table 12. Environmental and Organizational Influencers of PHAs’ Management 
Operations 
 
Dependent Variable: MASS  
Regressor  Coef. 
(se) 
Poverty -.077 
(.061) 
Income -.000 
(.000)* 
POPPCT_URBAN -.016 
(.008)** 
PCT_ObamaVote -.008 
(.014) 
Black_PCT .004 
(.014) 
Hispanic_PCT -.002 
(.014) 
AnnualChange_PCT -.035 
(.031) 
HPI .000 
(.001) 
Occupied_PCT .007 
(.007) 
AvgHUDExp .001 
(.000) 
AvMonths .000 
(.001) 
Diss_Index -.021 
(.013) 
DCI -.021 
(.010)** 
CS_Income -3.83 
(.000) 
R-squared 
n 
0.027 
966 
*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 
Model 1B: Environmental and Organizational Influencers of PHAs’ Financial Indicator 
In Model 1B, the specific research question would be: If, and to what extent, do 
organizational and environmental conditions influence the financial operation within 
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public organizations? I hypothesize that organizational and environmental conditions 
impact the financial operation of public organizations, in this particular case, Public 
Housing Authorities across the country at the County seat level. Public Housing Authorities 
performance score’s sub-indicator, Financial Indicator (FASS), operates as the dependent 
variable. Once again, an Ordinary Least Square regression was conducted to predict the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  
Again, and holding all other variables constant, Income appears as a negative and 
significant predictor of PHAs’ financial indicator, at 0.019 alpha level (see Table 13 
below). Another statistically significant predictor that holds an equally negative 
relationship with the dependent variable, FASS, is the percentage of urban population in 
the county (at 0.001 significance level). In addition to these predictors, the White to Non-
White Racial Dissimilarity within counties is a statistically significant and negative 
predictor of PHAs’ financial indicator at 0.037 significance level. Holding all other 
variables constant, the percentage of the Hispanic population at the county level has a 
statistically significant and positive relationship with PHAs’ financial indicator. County 
Seat income has a positive and significant relationship with public housing authorities’ 
financial indicator at 0.051 alpha level.  
The only statistically significant organizational factor in this regression is Occupied 
Units as Percentage of Available in Section 8, which has a positive relationship with PHAs’ 
financial indicator a 0.050 significance level.  
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Table 13. Environmental and Organizational Influencers of PHAs’ Financial Indicator 
Dependent Variable: FASS  
Regressor  Coef.  
(se) 
Poverty -.081 
(.079) 
Income -.000 
(.000)** 
POPPCT_URBAN -.021 
(.006)*** 
PCT_ObamaVote -.010 
(.011) 
Black_PCT .021 
(.014) 
Hispanic_PCT .028 
(.008)*** 
AnnualChange_PCT .007 
(.019) 
HPI -.000 
(.001) 
Occupied_PCT .012 
(.006)* 
AvgHUDExp -.001 
(.000) 
AvMonths -.002 
(.003) 
Diss_Index -.021 
(.010)** 
DCI -.014 
(.010) 
CS_Income .000 
(.000)* 
R-squared 
n 
*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 
 
0.057 
966 
Model 1C: Environmental and Organizational Influencers of PHAs’ Physical Indicator 
Model 1C addresses the question: If, and to what extent, do organizational and 
environmental conditions influence PHAs’ Physical Indicator? The Physical Indicator 
accounts for the physical inspection of PHAs’ stock and “determine whether public 
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housing units are decent, safe, sanitary and in good repair” (HUD 2016). I hypothesize that 
organizational and environmental conditions influence physical conditions of PHAs’ 
housing stock, and better environment and organizational wellness can be associated with 
better housing quality. Public Housing Authorities performance score’s sub-indicator, 
Physical Indicator (PASS), serves as the dependent variable. An Ordinary Least Square 
regression was conducted to predict the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. 
Table 14 below reports the results of the OLS regression analysis. Holding all other 
variables constant, poverty is a negative and statistically significant predictor of physical 
conditions of PHAs’ housing stock, at a 0.005 significance level. Income is the strongest 
predictor of PHAs’ Physical Indicator, with a significance level of 0.001 alpha. The 
relationship between Income and PASS is negative. Independent variables that account for 
diversity are also statistically significant predictors of PHAs’ Physical Indicator. The 
percentage of the Black and Hispanic population within the county are significant at the 
0.052 and 0.024 alpha level, respectively. While the relationship between percentages of 
Black population with Physical Indicator is negative; the one between this dependent 
variable and Hispanic population is positive. Finally, the Distressed Community Index, an 
indicator of neighborhood quality has a negative and statistically significant relationship 
with PHAs’ Physical Indicator, at 0.052 significance level.  
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Table 14. Environmental and Organizational Influencers of PHAs’ Physical Indicator 
 
Dependent Variable: PASS  
Regressor  Coef. 
(se) 
Poverty -.159 
(.056)*** 
Income -.000 
(.000)*** 
POPPCT_URBAN -.009 
(.009) 
PCT_ObamaVote .021 
(.014) 
Black_PCT -.032 
(.016)* 
Hispanic_PCT .022 
(.010)** 
AnnualChange_PCT .005 
(.028) 
HPI .000 
(.001) 
Occupied_PCT .007 
(.006) 
AvgHUDExp -.001 
(.000) 
AvMonths -.000 
(.001) 
Diss_Index -.001 
(.011) 
DCI -.018 
(.009)* 
CS_Income -1.67 
(.000) 
R-squared 
n 
0.058 
970 
*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 
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Model 2: Compounded Effect of Environmental and Organizational Influencers on the 
Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable structural factors (as predictor of 
performance) 
The second model in this study responds to the research question: Do 
environmental and organizational conditions compound the effect of the Section 8 HCV 
program’s hardly-controllable structural factors (as a predictor of performance)? I 
hypothesize that environmental and organizational conditions compound the effect of 
hardly controllable Section 8 HCV program’s structural factors. By establishing this 
statistically significant relationship, one can predict Section 8 HCV programs’ 
performance, in the absence of a performance indicator for it. In essence, Model 2 examines 
the relationship between environmental conditions surrounding Section 8 HCV programs’ 
implementation and other internal conditions of Public Housing Authorities –such as 
County Seat PHAs’ performance indicator-, with the Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-
controllable structural factors. As in previous models, I use an Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression analysis to predict the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. 
Results displayed in Table 15 below report the statistical significance of the 
percentage of urban population in the range of .01 significance level. The relationship 
between this independent variable and the factored dependent variable that comprises the 
Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable structural factors (S8_StFactors) is positive. 
In the same vein, the independent variable that accounts for the percentage of votes for 
Obama 2012, has a positive and significant relationship with the dependent variable at a 
0.001 significance level. Housing market’s tightness at the county level -represented in the 
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independent variable House Prince Index (HPI)-, is a significant and positive predictor of 
S8_StFactors, with a 0.000 significance level. The White to Non-White racial dissimilarity 
Index has a positive and statistically significant relationship with S8_StFactors, at a 0.000 
alpha level. Finally, the Distressed Community Index that comprises Neighborhood quality 
characteristics is a positive and statistically significant predictor of Hardly Controllable 
Section 8 HCV Program’s Structural Factors, at 0.019 significance level. 
Table 15. Compounded Effect of Environmental and Organizational Influencers on the 
Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable structural factors (as predictor of 
performance) 
 
Dependent Variable: Factor1 
(S8_StFactors) 
 
Regressor  Coef. 
(se) 
Income 3.18e-06 
(3.88e-06) 
POPPCT_URBAN .005 
(.001)*** 
PCT_ObamaVote .006 
(.001)*** 
HPI .001 
(.000)*** 
Diss_Index .011 
(.002)*** 
DCI .003 
(.001)** 
CS_PHAScores .002 
(.002) 
R-squared 
n 
0.30 
975 
*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 
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Model 3: Environmental and Organizational Influencers of Poverty Segregation Levels 
on Section 8 HCV Recipients 
The third OLS regression analysis in this dissertation addresses the following 
research question: Do environmental, organizational and Section 8 HCV program 
structural factors affect poverty segregation levels in Section 8 HCV recipients? I 
hypothesize that environmental, organizational, and Section 8 structural factors impact 
poverty segregation levels on Section 8 HCV recipients. Model 3 focuses on the 
relationship between environmental, organizational and policy factors and levels of 
poverty segregation among housing voucher holders. The dependent variable 
PovertyCensus stands for the percentage of the population below the poverty level in the 
Census Tract where HUD-assisted families reside (PovertyCensus) (Census 2010 
designation) (Data Dictionary for Picture of Subsidized Households 2016). PovertyCensus 
operates as a poverty segregation indicator. Independent variables are outcome influencers 
at the policy, organization and environment level.  
According to the results displayed in Table 16, and holding all other variables 
constant, the percentage of Poverty at the county level is a significant predictor of poverty 
segregation among Section 8 HCV program’s recipients. This relationship is positive at the 
strongest confidence level (p=0.000). Both Income and County Seat Income have a 
negative and statistically significant relationship with poverty segregation at 0.015 and 
0.000 alpha level respectively. In addition to these socioeconomic influencers, the 
percentage of urban population is also a positive and statistically significant predictor of 
poverty segregation levels among Section 8 recipients (0.001 alpha level). Indicators of 
race and ethnicity, such as Percentage of Black and Hispanic population within the county 
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are too, positive and statistically significant predictors of poverty segregation at p=0.000 
and p=0.001significance level, each. The White to Non-White Racial Dissimilarity Index, 
which accounts for racial disparities at the county level, holds a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with poverty segregation at the highest level of confidence 
(p=0.000). Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program Structural Factors are positive and 
statistically significant predictors of poverty segregation levels among program’s voucher 
recipients. Occupied Units as Percentage of Available in Section 8, has the most reliable 
significance level (0.000), while Average HUD Expenditure per Month in the program 
impacts poverty segregation at 0.001 alpha level. Finally, the Average Months expended 
by recipients in the Waiting List is statistically significant within the range of p< 0.1.  
Table 16. Environmental and Organizational Influencers of Poverty Segregation Levels on 
Section 8 HCV Recipients 
 
Dependent Variable: PovertyCensus  
Regressor  Coef. 
(se) 
Poverty .394 
(.064)*** 
Income -.000 
(.000)** 
POPPCT_URBAN .057 
(.008)*** 
PCT_ObamaVote -.021 
(.013) 
Black_PCT .103 
(.016)*** 
Hispanic_PCT .038 
(.011)*** 
AnnualChange_PCT -.046 
(.038) 
HPI -.000 
(.001) 
Occupied_PCT .186 
(.019)*** 
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AvgHUDExp .007 
(.002)*** 
AvMonths .007 
(.004)* 
CS_PHAScore -.013 
(.018) 
Diss_Index .053 
(.015)*** 
DCI -.015 
(.011) 
CS_Income -.000 
(.000)*** 
R-squared 
n 
0.77 
970 
*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 
Model 4: Environmental and Organizational Influencers of Racial Segregation Levels on 
Section 8 HCV Recipients 
The fourth and final Ordinary Least Square regression analysis responds to the 
following research question: Do environmental, organizational and Section 8 program 
structural factors affect racial segregation levels in Section 8 HCV recipients? Once again, 
I hypothesize that environmental, organizational, and Section 8 structural factors impact 
racial segregation levels on Section 8 HCV holders. Model 4 addresses the connection 
between environmental, organizational and policy influencers of outcomes and 
performance, with levels of racial and minority segregation among Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher recipients. The dependent variable MinorityCensus accounts for the 
minority percentage of total population in the Census Tract where HUD-assisted families 
reside (Census 2010 designation) (Data Dictionary for Picture of Subsidized Households 
2016). MinorityCensus serves as a minority/race segregation indicator. As in Model 3, 
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Independent variables are outcome influencers at the policy, organization and environment 
level.  
Holding all other variables constant (see Table 17), the regression analysis reports 
that both, Income and County Seat Income are significant predictors of racial segregation 
among Section 8 voucher holders. While Income at the County level holds a positive 
relationship with the dependent variable, at 0.081 significance level; County Seat Income 
has a negative relation with MinorityCensus, at the highest level of statistical significance 
(p=0.000). The percentage of urban population within the county is a positive and 
statistically significant predictor of minority segregation (at 0.000 alpha level). Race and 
ethnicity predictors, such as Black and Hispanic percentage of County’s population have a 
positive relationship with minority segregation levels among Section 8 HCV program’s 
recipients. The black percentage is statistically significant at p=0.000 alpha level, the same 
level of significance for the Hispanic percentage of the population within county limits. 
Market tightness -as House Price Index- is a significant predictor of minority segregation, 
at less than .05 level of significance. The relationship between House Price Index and 
MinorityCensus is positive. The White to Non-White Racial Dissimilarity Index is a 
significant and positive predictor of levels of minority segregation among Section 8 HCV 
program’s recipients.  
The organizational performance represented in the independent variable that 
accounts for PHAS’ performance, County Seat Public Housing Authority Score, has a 
negative and statistically significant relationship with levels of minority segregation, at 
0.001 significance level. As in the case of poverty segregation in Model 3, Section 8 
Housing Choice Voucher Program Structural Factors are also positive and statistically 
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significant predictors of minority segregation levels among program’s voucher holder. 
Occupied Units as Percentage of Available in Section 8, has a significance level of 0.000. 
Average HUD Expenditure per Month in the program impacts poverty segregation at the 
highest statistically significant level as well (p=0.000). Last but not least, the Average 
Months expended by recipients in the Waiting List is statistically significant at 0.013 alpha 
level.  
Table 17. Environmental and Organizational Influencers of Racial Segregation Levels on 
Section 8 HCV Recipients 
 
Dependent Variable: MinorityCensus  
Regressor  Coef. 
(se) 
Poverty .055 
(.111) 
Income .000 
(.000)* 
POPPCT_URBAN .061 
(.016)*** 
PCT_ObamaVote -.038 
(.025) 
Black_PCT 1.14 
(.027)*** 
Hispanic_PCT .923 
(.026)*** 
AnnualChange_PCT -.050 
(.062) 
HPI .009 
(.003)*** 
Occupied_PCT .163 
(.014)*** 
AvgHUDExp .011 
(.002)*** 
AvMonths .017 
(.006)** 
CS_PHAScore 
 
-.113(.034)*** 
Diss_Index .146 
(.026)*** 
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DCI -.036 
(.022) 
CS_Income -.000 
(.000)*** 
R-squared 
n 
0.86 
970 
*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 
Discussion  
The final portion of this chapter discusses the statistical findings of the dissertation 
in the light of previous research on performance and public housing. Firstly, the discussion 
focuses on the environmental and organizational influencers of performance, specifically 
to Public Housing Authorities in the U.S. Secondly, the section addresses Section 8 
Housing Choice Voucher Program’s predictors of performance, analyzing compounding 
factors of this policy’s structural conditions. Finally, the chapter concludes with the 
interpretation of results on Section 8 HCV program’s influencers of poverty and race 
segregation, and their impact on the most distinctive outcomes of this housing policy.  
Influencers of Organizational Performance: Public Housing Authorities in the U.S.  
Public Housing Authorities’ scholars concentrate their efforts on accounting for the 
evident: the federal government’s historical neoliberal shift in housing policy (Goetz, 2012: 
457), and the resultant financial hardship for programs’ execution at every PHA in the 
nation (Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 34; 2015: 623; Goetz: 2012: 457). In this same logic, 
Public Housing Authorities are also studied from an efficiency perspective, following the 
incorrect assumption that “the private market could operate more efficiently than 
bureaucratic entities” (Cunningham, 2003: 96). Nonetheless, Public Housing Authorities’ 
performance is hardly related to local environmental influencers, and to internal 
organizational predictors within the agencies.   
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The literature on organizational performance helps to understand the relationship 
between Public Housing Authorities and their environment. There is a partial affirmative 
response to Model 1 research question: If, and to what extent, do organizational and 
environmental conditions, such as demographics and political preferences of communities, 
economic factors, and racial disparities, affect public organizations’ performance? 
Confirming the hypothesis that organizational and environmental factors impose a toll on 
organizational performance (Smith in Boyne, Meier, O’Toole & Walker, 2006: 87).  
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of communities partially explain 
organizational performance. Following OLS regression outcomes in Model 1, Public 
Housing Authorities’ performance is negatively affected if they are surrounded by high 
levels of poverty, predominantly urban counties, substantial racial disparities between 
White and Non-White population, and counties with signs of neighborhood’s low quality 
and distress, such as No High School degree, adults not working, and housing vacancy. 
According to Avellaneda (2008: 293), these complex and heterogeneous environments 
impose a toll in terms of the size and nature of the organization’s target group. The smaller 
and more homogeneous the target, the higher the possibilities of success, as the cost of 
information and classification of recipients can be reduced and coverage incremented. 
Unexpectedly, political preferences (Avellaneda, 2008: 291; Rainey & Jung, in Walker, 
Boyne & Brewer, 2010: 41) are not significant in this regression.  
The only relevant organizational influencer of PHAs’ performance is Occupied 
Units as Percentage of Available in Section 8 HCV Program. The higher the occupancy 
level, the higher the performance. This is an understandable relationship when addressing 
occupancy levels as a manifestation of program’s success. However, this correlation can 
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mask the need for additional housing provision within localities (Turner & Kingsley, 2008: 
3).  
Predictors of Policy Performance: The Case of Section 8 HCV Program  
Section 8 HCV program does not have a direct measure of policy performance. Yet, 
a number of structural and hardly-controllable factors may help to predict program 
performance. Such factors stand for important program’s resources, as some authors claim 
that “variations in resources act in a similar way to variations in environmental factors in 
altering the capacity of the organization to secure good performance” (Smith in Boyne, 
Meier, O’Toole & Walker, 2006: 87). Section 8 HCV program’s resources are:  the 
Subsidized Units Available per PHA, the Occupied Units as Percentage of Available, the 
Average amount of HUD Expenditure per Month, and the Average of Months expended 
by recipients on the Waiting List. I consider these factors both, structural and hardly 
controllable, as PHAs’ managers and administrators’ room to maneuver is very limited, if 
perhaps inexistent.  
The existing literature on Section 8 HCV Program’s performance (see Chapter 2) 
provides a number of arguments that explain the lack of success of the housing vouchers 
policy. Among these causes (market, budget, family preferences, landlords’ discrimination, 
and obstacles inherent to the program), two of them are fully quantifiable: The  “market 
tightness” causes (Austin Turner, 2003: 1; Deng, 2007: 22; Ross, Shlay & Picon, 2012: 39; 
Williamson, Smith & Strambi-Kramer, 2009: 121), and the “budgeting causes” (Austin 
Turner, 2003: 1).  
Model 2 addresses the question: Do environmental and organizational conditions 
compound the effect of the Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable structural factors 
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(as a predictor of performance)? I hypothesize that environmental and organizational 
conditions compound the effect of Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable structural 
factors. Ordinary Least Square regression supports the hypothesis when confirming that, 
on one hand, complex demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of communities, as 
found in predominantly urban counties, with important racial disparities between White 
and Non-White population, and signs of neighborhood’s low quality and distress, exert 
pressure over Section 8 HCV program’s resources (Smith in Boyne, Meier, O’Toole & 
Walker, 2006: 87). In the particular case of budget limitations, I explained before how the 
fee formula based on the local Fair Market Rent (FMR), covers only around 90% of the 
administrative fees that PHAs would have received if full funding were available, that 
percentage dropped to 69.26% in 2013 and raised to 79.76% in 2014 (HUD, 2015: 1). If 
underfunding is already severe, it turns extreme when considering the external pressures 
from the environment, as presented in Model 2.  
On the other hand, the regression confirms that a tight housing market, measured 
through the predictor “House Price Index” (HPI), influences Section 8 HCV program’s 
hardly controllable structural factors, exerting pressure on both, program’s resources and 
hence, performance (Austin Turner, 2003: 1; Deng, 2007: 22; Ross, Shlay & Picon, 2012: 
39; Williamson, Smith & Strambi-Kramer, 2009: 121).  
Influencers of Policy Outcomes: Addressing Poverty and Minority Segregation among 
Section 8 HCV Program’s Recipients  
Poverty and race desegregation are the signature outcome and distinctive element 
of Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program (Devine et al. 2003; Galvez, 2010; Hartung 
and Henig 1997; Pendall 2000; Varady & Walker, 2000; Varady, 2010). This policy aim 
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derives from the idea, popular since the decade of 1980’s that urban poverty and racial 
concentration had to be tackled through the development of desegregation strategies, 
namely mixed-income housing and population mobility (Goetz, 2011: 456). Section 8 
HCV program acquired increasing importance due to HUD’s preference for a tenant-based 
rental assistance strategy to provide for housing needs across the country (Garshick Kleit 
& Page, 2015: 622). Nevertheless, Section 8 does not seem to be delivering its most 
valuable promise to their clients (Deng, 2007; Devine et al. 2003; Newman & Schnare, 
1997). The literature concentrates the causes of this policy failure in five rationales: 1. The 
shortages of moderately priced rental housing and the tightness of local housing markets 
(Austin Turner, 2003: 1; Deng, 2007: 22; Ross, Shlay & Picon, 2012: 39; Williamson, 
Smith & Strambi-Kramer, 2009: 121); 2. The budgetary limitations externally imposed by 
HUD (Austin Turner, 2003: 1; Turner and Kingsley, 2008: 3); 3. The recipients’ 
preferences or “individual needs” (Deng, 2007: 22); 4. Landlords’ racial and ethnic 
discrimination (Beck, 1996: 159; HUD, 2013: 39); and 5. The intrinsic administrative 
limitations of the Housing Choice Voucher Program (Tegeler et al., 1995).  
According to Galvez (2010), “the typical voucher household experiences 
neighborhood poverty rates in the 20% range”. Data gathered for this dissertation agrees 
with this statement, registering a mean of 16.7% for the population below the poverty level 
in the Census Tracts where HUD-assisted families reside (Census 2010 designation) (Data 
Dictionary for Picture of Subsidized Households 2016). Concerning racial disparities 
within Section 8 HCV program’s households, Picture of Subsidized Households 2016 data 
does not discriminate for the geographical location of voucher’s holders from minority 
groups. Nonetheless, the general distribution of minority percentage in the surrounding 
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Census Tract where Section 8 HCV program’s households live shows that the presence of 
minority population in these Tracts has a mean of 22.8%. Section 8 HCV program serves 
to a mean of 25.11% of Black households; while the Hispanic households account for 5.4% 
(Picture of Subsidized Households 2016).  
I identify levels of minority and race segregation among Section 8 HCV program’s 
recipients in this dissertation dataset and compare them with the available data (Galvez, 
2010). I generated dummy variables by using the Minority and Poverty Segregation 
Indicators that account for the minority and poverty percentages of total population in the 
Census Tract where HUD-assisted families reside (Census 2010 designation) (Data 
Dictionary for Picture of Subsidized Households 2016). Firstly, I identified HUD’s 
threshold for racially or ethnically-concentrated areas of poverty (R/ECAPs): a non-white 
population of 50% or more speaks for minority segregation. In the meantime, Census 
Tracts with 40% or more of individuals living at or below the poverty line defines 
neighborhoods of “extreme poverty” (Wilson, 1980 in HUD, AFFH-Data Documentation, 
2016). Secondly, I utilized such thresholds to capture the number of households living in 
poverty and ethnic segregation in the Census Tract where HUD-assisted families live, at 
the county level (poverty segregation: 1 if PovertyCensus > 40; minority segregation: 1 if 
MinorityCensus > 50). From a total of 3132 observations, only in 238 counties, the 
percentage of poverty is higher than 40% (7.6% of the total sample). Meanwhile, from a 
total sample of 3118 observations, 705 Counties display levels of minority segregation 
higher than the 50% threshold determined by HUD (22.6% of the total sample).  These 
figures show a significant improvement compared to the available data.  
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Model 3 addresses the influencers of poverty segregation among Section 8 HCV 
Program’s recipients. The research question of this model is: Do environmental, 
organizational and Section 8 HCV program structural factors affect poverty segregation 
levels in Section 8 HCV recipients? The hypothesis that environmental, organizational, and 
Section 8 structural factors impact poverty segregation levels on Section 8 HCV recipients 
is partially confirmed by the quantitative analysis. According to the OLS regression results, 
complex environmental circumstances (Avellaneda, 2008: 293), such as high poverty 
levels in predominantly urban counties with significant racial disparities between White 
and Non-White population, increase the percentage of poverty in the Census Tracts where 
Section 8 HCV program’s recipients inhabit. The presence of high percentages of the Black 
and Hispanic population within the county also aggravates the levels of poverty in Section 
8 HCV Tracts. Conversely, when Income at the county and county seat level increase, 
poverty levels within Section 8 HCV Tracts tend to diminish.  
The Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable structural factors as 
organizational and policy resources (Smith in Boyne, Meier, O’Toole & Walker, 2006: 87) 
have a positive relationship with poverty level in the Census Tract where HUD-assisted 
families reside. The highest the percentage of Occupied Units and amount of time 
expended by households in the waiting list, the higher the levels of poverty in Section 8 
HCV program’s tracts.  
Model 4 accounts for environmental and organizational influencers of minority 
segregation in Section 8 HCV Program’s recipients. This model research question is: Do 
environmental, organizational and Section 8 HCV program structural factors affect 
minority segregation levels in Section 8 HCV recipients? I hypothesize that environmental, 
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organizational, and Section 8 structural factors influence minority segregation levels 
among Section 8 HCV recipients. The research hypothesis is partially demonstrated by the 
Ordinary Least Square regression results. Following Avellaneda (2008: 293), complex 
environmental circumstances, which are again, high poverty levels in predominantly urban 
counties, with substantial racial disparities between White and Non-White population, 
augment minority levels in the Census Tracts where Section 8 HCV program’s recipients 
reside. Once more, high percentages of Black and Hispanic population within the county 
exacerbates minority percentages in Section 8 HCV Tracts. Hardly controllable Section 8 
HCV program’s structural factors -as organizational and policy resources- (Smith in 
Boyne, Meier, O’Toole & Walker, 2006: 87) repeat in their positive relationship with 
minority percentage within Census Tracts where HUD-assisted families live, expressing a 
similar behavior that the one displayed with the poverty levels in Section 8 HCV program’s 
Census tracts.   
Model 4 partially confirms a certain institutional responsibility in Section 8 HCV 
program’s recipients’ levels of minority segregation (Turner, Popkin, and Cunningham in 
Austin Turner, 2003: 3; Tegeler et al., 1995: 467). Public Housing Authorities with higher 
performance scores tend to have their voucher holders living in tracts with lower 
percentages of minority segregation. Finally, regression results support the literature 
(Austin Turner, 2003: 1; Deng, 2007: 22; Ross, Shlay & Picon, 2012: 39; Williamson, 
Smith & Strambi-Kramer, 2009: 121), by confirming that a tight housing market, measured 
by the predictor “House Price Index” (HPI), has a positive influence on minority 
segregation in Section 8 HCV program’s Census tracts. The tightest the market, the highest 
the minority concentrations in Census Tracts where HUD-assisted families reside.  
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Chapter 6: Public Administrators’ Values and Attitudes towards Citizens during 
Section 8 HCV Program’s Implementation Process 
After analyzing the environmental and organizational influencers of Public 
Housing Authorities and Section 8 HCV program’s performance, I examine three 
qualitative aspects of public administrators’ values and attitudes towards the program 
recipients. This dissertation ultimately hypothesizes that such aspects are unquantifiable 
shapers of policy implementation and eventual influencers of organizational and program 
performance. 
First, I address public administrators’ discursive devices towards citizens in terms 
of values and attitudes. I pay special attention to neutrality and their capitalization of their 
technical expertise as a source of discretion (Foucault, 1980). I also examine the rationale 
behind their attitudes (Alexander & Stivers, 2010; Alkadry & Blessett, 2010; Marr, 2016), 
and the particular set of public service values utilized by Section 8 workers while 
implementing the Program. Second, I study public administrators’ perceived scope of their 
actions during the implementation process. Next, I explore practitioners’ perceived impact 
on Section 8 HCV program’s outcomes: housing and neighborhood quality, and poverty 
and race desegregation. Finally, I include administrators’ perception on the constrictions 
posed by hardly controllable structural factors that affect the program (Marr, 2016: 225).  
This qualitative phase of the dissertation addresses the fifth research question: If, 
and to what extent, do public administrators’ preferred set of values and attitudes coincide 
with either positive or negative organizational and policy performance of PHAs and 
Section 8 HCV Program? I hypothesize on the existence of four sets of public service 
values that define the behavior of public administrators towards citizens: Client 
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(Orthodoxy); Customer (NPM); Citizen (NPA - NPS); and Subject (Critical Theory). 
Following this rationale, I further hypothesize that, on the one hand, a more democratic-
centered set of public values and attitudes will coincide with positive policy performance 
in terms of poverty/race desegregation and higher levels of housing and neighborhood 
quality. On the other hand, an orthodox/NPM/domination-oriented set of public values 
(Client/Customer/subject types) will coincide with negative policy performance. I 
interviewed Section 8 HCV Program’s implementers and staff members of Public Housing 
Authorities in the states of California and Florida.  
The Semi-Structured Interview  
The semi-structured interview questions qualitative aspects of public 
administrators’ values and attitudes towards Section 8 HCV program’s recipients. In the 
first section, I asked public administrators about their preferences regarding public service 
values utilized during the implementation process. I provided an open question about 
values preferences: “In your opinion, what are the main values that guide your work at the 
Section 8 HCV Program?” Then, I asked Section 8 implementers to choose amongst a 
specific selection of values trios. These trios speak for the four possible sets of public 
values that define the behavior of public administrators towards citizens: Client 
(Efficiency, accountability & neutrality); Customer (Economy, performance & 
entrepreneurship); Citizen (Social equity, sovereignty of the people & participation); and 
Subject (Control, domination & power). Following this discussion, I asked administrators 
to select between two case scenarios where democratic and bureaucratic values compete. 
Hereafter, the questionnaire explores Section 8 workers’ neutrality and uses of expertise as 
a source of discretion (Foucault, 1980), and questions the rationale behind public 
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administrators’ attitudes towards citizens (Alexander & Stivers, 2010; Alkadry & Blessett, 
2010; Marr, 2016). 
In the second part of the interview, I asked Program administrators about the 
perceived scope of their actions during the implementation process. I included questions 
on the limitations derived from PHAs and Section 8 HCV program’s hardly-controllable 
structural factors –such as budget- that affect program’s performance (Marr, 2016: 225). 
This section includes questions related to public administrators’ specific actions and 
quotidian decisions while implementing the program.  
In the final section, I interrogate public administrators’ perceived impact on policy 
outcomes by asking them questions about Section 8 HCV program's signature outcomes 
and their actions to tackle both, neighborhood and unit quality problems, and race and 
poverty segregation.  
Participant Observation 
I conducted participant observation (Peek & Fothergill, 2009: 46) and observation 
techniques, accounting for Section 8 HCV program administrators’ milieu, their quotidian 
routines, and the verbal and nonverbal details of their interactions and rapport with program 
recipients. I initially introduced myself into the fieldwork as the “credentialed expert” 
(Snow, Benford & Anderson, 1986: 385). Nevertheless, a more accurate introduction as a 
graduate student in the pursuit of her Ph.D. degree, seeking for learning about the Section 
8 HCV program and Housing Authorities, proved itself as a better starting point. I visited 
six Public Housing Authorities in total. Three in California, and three in Florida. My 
fieldwork notes account for every contact established at PHAs. From minimal encounters 
with reluctant clerks at uncooperative agencies, to interviews, and tours inside more 
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responsive Housing Authorities, to an extended visit for a full working week, from 9:00 
am to 5:00 pm, inside a cooperative Housing Authority in Northern California.  
Selection and Depiction of the Study Participants 
As explained in Chapter 4, I utilized a “judgment sample” criteria to select the 
participants of the study (Marshall, 1996: 523). A first attempt to access the field occurred 
through a number of reliable contacts. Housing policy scholars in California, and housing 
practitioners and PA scholars connected to the housing world in Florida. Such action 
resulted in the first interview with a Section 8 Administrative Analyst at a Californian 
major Public Housing Authority. In a second phase, I randomly contacted Public Housing 
Authorities executive directors and Section 8 HCV Program’s managers via email in the 
pursuit of interviews with both, managerial and operative levels of the Program. I also 
emailed specific caseworkers and practitioners within Housing Authorities and Section 8 
HCV programs across the country, in the hope to receive individual responses to the 
interview requests. This strategy produced three more interviews, the first one with an 
Executive Director of a rural Public Housing Authority in Northern California that 
connected me with his Section 8 HCV program’s Manager. I conducted the third interview 
of this round with an Assistant Manager at a large urban PHA in the Southern California 
area. After exhausting the email/telephonic contact resources with no further success, I 
followed the advice of pursuing a “show up” strategy, visiting six Public Housing 
Authorities in total, three in Florida, and three in California. Because of that action, I 
obtained my only interview within Floridian territory, a Director of the Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher Program in a populated city located south of the state.  
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As a final resource, I decided to take my chances and travel to California. I 
contacted again with initial participants of the study in the state, being able to interview up 
to eight more Section 8 HCV practitioners at the rural Northern Californian Housing 
Authority. After contacting the Assistant Manager at the urban, large PHA in the southern 
California area, I was able to interview one Section 8 HCV program’s supervisor and one 
caseworker. In total, I interviewed fifteen PHAs and Section 8 practitioners at both, 
managerial and operative level (see Table 18 below).  
Table 18 – Depiction of Participants of the Study   
 
Interviewee 
Position 
Gender Ethnicity/race  Years of 
experience 
PHA 
location  
PHA 
score 
Administrative 
Analyst* 
Male -- 11 Urban 
City 
94 
Assistant 
Manager 
Male African 
American 
-- Urban 
County 
96 
Executive 
Director 
Male White 30 Rural 
County 
96 
S8 Program 
Manager 
Male White 8 Rural  
County 
96 
S8 Program 
Director 
Female White 37 (PHA) 
5 months 
(S8) 
Urban 
City 
85 
A&E 
Supervisor 
Male White 
Hispanic 
10 Urban 
County 
96 
Caseworker Female  White 
Hispanic 
11 Urban 
County 
96 
Occupancy 
Specialist 
Female White 2.5 (S8) 
10 (PHA) 
Rural  
County 
96 
Occupancy 
Specialist 
Female White 20 (S8) 
30 (PHA) 
Rural  
County 
96 
Occupancy 
Specialist 
Female White 9 Rural  
County 
96 
Special 
Programs 
Coordinator 
Female Asian 2.5 Rural 
County 
96 
Occupancy 
Specialist 
Female Asian 13 Rural  
County 
96 
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Intake 
Specialist 
Female White 
Hispanic 
-- Rural 
County 
96 
Housing 
Quality 
Standards 
Inspector 
Female Asian -- Rural  
County 
96 
Housing 
Quality 
Standards 
Inspector 
Male White 25 Rural  
County 
96 
*Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance  
(PHA) = years of experience in Public Housing Authorities and/or Housing Policy 
(S8) = years of experience in that particular position 
 
Data Analysis  
I utilized a recording device to document and store interviews. After the scheduled 
time devoted to fieldwork was exhausted, I manually transcribed the fifteen interviews, 
and proceeded to analyze them using NVIVO 12 software. Besides the interviews, I coded 
and analyzed my handwritten fieldwork notes, photographs, audio follow-ups, and several 
institutional documents that PHAs and Section 8 HCV Program’s administrators gave me 
while I visited the field.  I created analytical nodes following the theoretical structure of 
the dissertation and the qualitative research question. Specifically, I based the nodes 
construction on the semi-structured interview questionnaire previously explained in this 
chapter. Nonetheless, before proceeding to report fieldwork results, I first need to report 
on silence.  
Results and Discussion  
Reporting on Silence: An Archeology of Rejection  
Environmental circumstances of a given policy determine the openness of those 
who implement it. The discursive trends (Conners, 2017) that legitimized housing policy 
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have changed from positive to negative within the last three decades (Garshick Kleit & 
Page, 2008). Public housing programs stopped receiving reputational, financial and 
political support from legislators (Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 34), the federal 
government (Cunningham, 2003: 97), the media (Semuels, 2015), and the population 
(Cunningham, 2003: 96). If housing policy in this nation has been systematically 
“dismantled” (Goetz, 2012:452), one would understand that policy implementers at low 
and standard performance PHAs identify a threat in a research invitation. How does this 
current state of affairs reflect on fieldwork access and the qualitative research?   
I entered the field fully conscious of the difficulties posed by my topic. Not only 
was I asking about the mysteries of the Black Box of decision-making and implementation 
process; but I was further categorizing such actions and decisions according to values. In 
an attempt to anticipate the effect of these conditions, I initially followed a key informants’ 
strategy (Payne & Payne, 2004). UCLA and FIU housing and PA scholars, and a HUD 
managerial level practitioner introduced me to several Public Housing Authorities directors 
and managers. This strategy seemed promising at the very beginning when I received 
enthusiastic email responses from PHAs’ practitioners. Shockingly, after the initial 
introduction, the effort diluted in a single interview. I will illustrate the situation using an 
example. 
In February of 2017, one of my contacts linked me via email with a nearby PHA’s 
executive director. My contact and I explained the content of my dissertation research and 
the purpose of the interview. The director’s assistant scheduled a telephonic appointment 
for middle March. I was both, surprised and pleased on the promptness of the process and 
exchanged all the necessary documentation, including the written consent to be signed 
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before the telephonic appointment. I did not receive the signed consent, and as the meeting 
evolved, it turned clear that the PHA’s director did not have in mind to conduct an 
interview. He introduced me to some of his staff members, assistants, and HR 
professionals. They would “study” the possibility of allowing me to develop my research 
within his Housing Authority. I was formally assigned to a liaison person, to whom I will 
call Mr. X.  
Mr. X explained that my petition would be studied by the PHA’s General and Labor 
Counsel, in the meantime, I could contact him to receive updates on the status of my 
request. I emailed Mr. X three times asking for updates, such emails are dated at the end 
of March, and the middle and end of April. Mr. X finally replied on May 10th of 2017, 
explaining that after informing to his Section 8 HCV program’s workers on the 
“opportunity to volunteer” in the study, unfortunately, they had shown no interest in 
participate in the research. He kindly apologized for “any inconvenience this may cause,” 
and I knew that the door was closed. With similar failures contacting other Public Housing 
Authorities, I started to realize that the strategy of looking for specialized informants 
through equally specialized and highly connected contacts was not guarantee of success.  
From June to August, I put in place a random and repetitive exercise of callings and 
emails. According to my institutional email browser, I sent at least sixty emails to Public 
Housing Authorities across the country. I sat down every day at my desk with the goal of 
calling no less than twelve to fifteen housing authorities. I purposefully chose those of 
different performance levels so I could satisfy my comparative hypotheses of bureaucratic 
vs. democratic values. On July 12th, 2017 I wrote in my fieldwork notebook: 
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“Having started the telephone calls I have noted how difficult it is to reach lowest 
score PHAs. Disconnected telephones, a receptionist that does not have a clue 
anddoes [sic] not care and a long, long etc.!” 
I came as far as receiving several positive responses that were withdrawn as soon 
as I sent them the Informed Consent to be signed. Just to illustrate my point, in an email 
dated at the end of July, I found myself replying to an enthusiastic Eligibility and 
Occupancy Director. She had reached me on the phone five minutes earlier and agreed to 
conduct the interview. After emailing her the consent, the informational letter, the IRB 
approval, and the questionnaire (as she requested), she replied: “Hi Melissa, We will not 
be participating in the research. Thank you” I questioned myself about some 
miscommunication caused by the documents. Maybe I was scaring practitioners away with 
my formalities.  
I went through the documents with one of my committee members experienced in 
qualitative research, and a fellow student who had just finished the qualitative portion of 
her dissertation. They both agreed that the paperwork was acceptable and did not appear 
threatening. My committee member suggested that perhaps my approach was too formal, 
strict. We decided to relax the tone of the emails and being more amicable and human. In 
an undated entry of my fieldwork notebook, I enumerated an “Interview Strategy 
Approach” list, based on my committee member’s advice. The list includes points such as:  
“10. BE SHAMELESS! In begging them and giving them a reason to want to 
cooperate.  
11. Sounding like a formal researcher won’t win any hearts” 
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Despite the shift in the strategy, I did not receive any further responses. Another 
member of my committee suggested a “Show up” strategy, under the assumption that it 
may be difficult to say no to a person that has come all the way to the venue. I visited three 
Public Housing Authorities in Florida on October 10th, 19th, and 27th. I was able to 
interview one Section 8 HCV program’s director. Simultaneously, I continued with the 
other strategies mentioned above, of calling, emailing and reaching PHAs staff through 
common contacts. One of these Florida visits brought a slight clarity on the rationale behind 
the unenthusiastic Housing Authorities’ response to my research. The events occurred as 
follow:  
At the end of September, one of my contacts linked me to another executive director 
from a nearby PHA. I guessed that because of the importance of my contact’s contact, the 
process of scheduling the interview had been, again, prompt and smooth. On September 
29th, the PHA’s Communications and External Affairs Manager scheduled the interview, 
adding a “We would like to get the questions ahead of time” to her email. As I expected, 
the Manager canceled the interview shortly after I emailed the questionnaire, stating that 
the Executive Director was “still dealing with the post-Irma issues.” Later that week, due 
to my “Show up” strategy, I visited the same local Section 8 HCV program facilities where 
a reluctant clerk made me wait for another employee. Coming out from the enclosure 
facilities, the staff member handed me a yellow memo with a name while indicated me that 
the program’s staff did not have the authorization to participate in studies. The name in the 
memo would authorize the participation in the research upon my request. The name was 
the same Communications and External Affairs Manager that had scheduled and then 
canceled me right after I emailed the questionnaire. I called the number that joined the 
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name that same day, October 10th of 2017. I wrote my impressions of the call in my 
fieldwork notebook under the memo stuck to the page:  
“Went to Section 8 [mention of the locality] 
Was given the contact of [Communications and External Affairs Manager] – Things 
are PRETTY BAD. They really don’t want to talk. She implied that the 
questionnaire was ‘unapropriated’ [sic] since Section 8 staff can, and I quote, “talk 
about what the program is about but NOT about what do they think or how do they 
feel”. She promised to come back to me – I don’t think she will. She also expressed 
a lot of concern about being oversaw [sic] by HUD.” 
This hint of clarity brought to the table the possibility of abandoning the research 
interest on unresponsive standard and substandard performance Public Housing 
Authorities while focusing on cooperative high performers. I contacted previously 
interviewed practitioners from Californian high-performance agencies that then operated 
as key informants (Payne & Payne, 2004) and partially opened the field. This change 
impacted the research by reducing the qualitative hypothesis, from:   
A more democratic-centered set of public values and attitudes will coincide with 
positive policy performance and higher levels of poverty/race desegregation, and housing/ 
neighborhood quality. On the other hand, an orthodox/NPM/domination-oriented set of 
public values (Client/Customer/subject types) will coincide with negative policy 
performance and lower levels of poverty/race desegregation, and housing/ neighborhood 
quality.  
To:  
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A more democratic-centered set of public values and attitudes will coincide with 
positive policy performance and higher levels of poverty/race desegregation, and housing/ 
neighborhood quality.  
I account for the outcomes of this ethnographic exploration in the rest of the 
chapter. 
High-Performance PHAs Administrators’ Values and Attitudes towards Citizens 
during the Implementation Process of Section 8 HCV Program  
Analyzing Administrators’ Interpretation of the Notion of Public Service Values  
As stated before, I purposely included the first question of the semi-structured 
interview questionnaire: “In your opinion, what are the main values that guide your work 
at the Section 8 HCV Program?” The intention was to promote a self-reflective exercise 
among public administrators on the values that they utilize to implement Section 8 HCV 
program, and in general, the way they do their jobs. With an open question, I attempted to 
avoid creating an immediate bias by providing specific values’ names. This question also 
allowed public administrators to discuss their qualities, temperament, and personality 
traces, along with customized methods and practices applied on their day to day duties.  
Such reflections were not distant from the original notion of public service values as 
“ideals, coined as principles to be followed when producing a public service or regulating 
citizens’ behavior, thus providing direction to the behavior of public servants” (Andersen 
et al., 2012: 293). Later, while conducting the data analysis, I utilized the dissertation's 
theoretical structure to align administrators’ expressions with specific values. 
Public administrators’ spontaneous responses to the question of their values align 
mainly with what Frederickson (1989: 96) calls the “democratic values,” where equality, 
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freedom, social responsibility, and the general welfare prevail. There is a common 
awareness of what Section 8 HCV program’s implementers invariably call “the people,” 
their needs, and the different ways in which the program may assist them. An 
Administrative Analyst reflects on the structurally unequal socio-economic situation of the 
citizens that the program serves:  
“People we’re helping, we are helping the neediest people, the neediest segment of 
our population is the homeless. In many cases, we are kinda the last resource for 
them, you know in terms of getting them housed.” 
This awareness on the variations of social and economic conditions (Frederickson, 
1997: 37) within the general population and the identification of those segments that most 
urgently demand governmental actions locates social equity at the center of the discussion. 
Citizens, or “the people” are the starting point of the conversation on public service values, 
and Section 8 HCV program implementers  intuitively formulate the basic questions of 
social equity: [this program is] “well managed for whom? Efficient for whom? Economical 
for whom?” (Frederickson, 1997: 37). A program’s director provides her response to the 
question on public service values introducing a “for whom”/social equity statement:  
“The main values? The quality of life, that people have, you know, their living 
conditions, you know the basic needs that we all have, and food, shelter, those are 
too the basic needs, so being able to help with that.” 
After locating public service values as a social equity, or “people in need” matter, 
Section 8 HCV program’s administrators discuss their role, orientation, personalities, and 
actions towards the satisfaction of people’s necessities. A Housing Quality Standards 
    
102 
 
Inspector and a Special Programs Coordinator share their views on how their values and 
character reflect on the program:  
“I have always been concerned about trying to get people back to a comfortable or 
standard lifestyle so I’m going into the houses with the impression of that is people 
who has had problems and people that is in a tough situation. My first thing is to 
try to calm them down, defuse it, so I go in with a friendly demeanor, I “kill them 
with kindness” is kind of my motto, so I’m very concerned about keep people at a 
calm level, a level where I can communicate with them.” 
“So one of the values that I was kinda instilled on and that matches my personality 
and my background was to improve people to be self-sufficient so that they could 
be less reliant on public assistance and that they could focus on other things, 
education, you know increasing economic… earning income, especially a job and 
things like that, depending on the individuals that we look at, health plans, health 
goals, credit scores, things like that just so that they can become more healthy and 
have more sense of a wellbeing  status.”  
Not all interviewees invest themselves exclusively in social equity and democratic 
values. Four of them express a twofold interest, and practice both, democratic and 
bureaucratic values. These public servants give importance to the legislation and policy 
regulations while attributing equal relevance to the satisfaction of citizens’ needs. An 
Occupancy Specialist equates the importance of complying with the Program requirements 
with the personal satisfaction that comes from providing housing to low-income families:  
“(…) we are helping low-income families so, who is low-income and qualify and 
as long as they follow the rules they are gonna be fine, and I, to me I feel we do 
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good for the public because we are helping a lot of low-income families with the 
Section 8, a lot of families cannot afford the rent, so I think that the value of having 
a roof over your head especially like in winter and it’s cold and raining, it’s pretty 
good.”  
A final group of three Section 8 HCV program’s implementers aligns its selection 
with the set of bureaucratic values of efficiency, accountability, and political neutrality. An 
Intake Specialist’s preference for neutrality emerges as she explains the irrelevance of her 
beliefs when applying the regulation:  
“The values that guide my work are pretty much based upon what the rules and 
regulations of the program are, so what I feel is irrelevant (laugh), so you know, I 
have to go by whatever it is that the rules and the regulations of the program go 
by.”  
In the meantime, accountability is the major guidance and preoccupation of a 
Section 8 HCV program's Assistant Manager:  
“As far as it being a public agency, you know this is… our program is federally 
funded so our dollars and stuff come from the federal government, as far as running 
the program and as far as the assistance goes that we provide on behalf of our tenant. 
So, it’s an obligation because we have tax dollars, you know this is not our money 
or anything, (…) we have an obligation to do the best we can because these are tax 
dollars so I come in here and always try to make sure that you know, we are very 
prudent, very prudent with the money and that we are making good, sound decisions 
because, again this is public money, and so you know we [are obliged to do] the 
right thing by.” 
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The “Balancing Act,” or the Complexities of Selecting a Unique Set of Values  
This dissertation accompanies Frederickson (1997: 31) in his hypothesis that one 
specific set of values, usually bureaucratic ones, are at the top and “have a lock” on public 
administrators’ preferences and actions when implementing policy. This dominant set of 
values influences the extension and quality of services delivered by policy implementers 
to citizens via administrative discretion (Watkins-Hayes, 2009: 59). On the other side of 
the theoretical spectrum lies Montgomery Van Wart (1998). Van Wart advocates for a 
legitimate competition of values, where the selection of the “best” values “must be made 
within specific context” (Van Wart, 1998: 255). To my surprise, neither Frederickson nor 
Van Wart coincided with Section 8 HCV program administrators’ responses.  
Addressing the Importance of Bureaucratic and Managerial Values  
I included two questions in the semi-structured interview with the purpose of 
classifying program’s implementers within a particular set of values. In the first question, 
I encouraged PHAs and Section 8 HCV Program’s administrators to select one out of the 
four possible set of values. Their particular choice would define the behavior of public 
administrators towards recipients: Client (Efficiency, accountability & neutrality); 
Customer (Economy, performance & entrepreneurship); Citizen (Social equity, 
sovereignty of the people & participation); and Subject (Control, domination & power). In 
the second question, I read out loud the description of two different possible scenarios of 
administrators’ actions. The first case scenario accounts for a more democratically-oriented 
decision; while the second scenario aims for a more bureaucratically-oriented choice.  
As first responses were flooded with democratic-oriented references and constant 
mentions of “the people,” I expected similar positions when it came to a more specific 
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values’ selection. Nonetheless, PHA and Section 8 HCV program administrators delivered 
answers of complexity only comparable with the decisions that their jobs entangle. 
When selecting among the different values’ trios and locating themselves in a 
particular end of the public administrators-recipients’ rapport typologies, a vast majority 
of Section 8 HCV program’s administrators (eleven interviewees) opted for the ‘Client’ 
perspective, choosing the values of efficiency, accountability and neutrality as the main 
guidance of their work. A program’s Managers conceptualizes his selection:  
“So, the neutrality is as I mentioned, we don’t have a lot of discretion so we’re 
basically just following the rules and we’re looking at the facts, you know, if 
someone is making too much money every year, so they can’t come to the Program, 
it doesn’t matter if they are yellow, black or purple. Efficiency, I tell my staff that 
that’s the way we can provide customer service in this type of Program is by being 
efficient, so when we do paperwork to process it as quickly as possible and as 
correctly as possible so that we can get people housed onto the Program in a 
timeline manner. And then, the other… what is the other point in there? Neutrality, 
efficiency and…? (Interviewer: And accountability, yeah). And accountability, so 
yes! Because we are a federally funded program we have to be held accountable on 
how we do our calculations, how we maintain our files, and so we are audited on a 
regular basis, both externally and internally.”  
Most Section 8 HCV program’s public servants considered the utilization of these 
values as necessary tools for conducting a clean and proper operation. A sense of 
compliance with their duties and responsibilities prevails when caseworkers reflect on the 
quotidian practice of managerial/bureaucratic values. An Occupancy Specialist explains:  
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“Well, everything is on a deadline, you have so many cases a month that you have 
to get completed, so you have to make sure that the clients get their paperwork in 
and when they need assistance you have to try to help them to get it in, make sure 
that they have provided everything we need to calculate everything correctly and 
just be as accurate as possible with, you know, and get everything done in a timely 
manner by the deadline, as efficient as possible.” 
Three of the interviewed administrators selected the set of democratic values that 
include social equity, sovereignty of the people and participation. A Special Programs 
Coordinator elaborates on her selection, and “the people” as a subject reemerges:  
“HUD does try to create these programs so that there could be more… I mean if 
you read in to the background of why these programs existed was to provide people, 
you know, take for example with the HUD-VASH program, the homeless vet, the 
goal of that program is to stabilize housing, once you stabilize housing, not just for 
homeless vets but for low-income individuals, you then, with the hope that they can 
then focus on other things, because housing is such an important factor in the health 
and well-being of people that without that they can’t really focus on “oh, I should 
go get a job! I should go and get to school!” and so, once you stabilize that and 
hopefully eliminate that stress, you then can provide them a sense of power to go, 
or empowerment to go and achieve things that they normally wouldn’t be if they 
were currently homeless or they have to stress about that situation, and I have seen 
that when some client, once that you stabilize housing for them then they can focus 
on other issues in their lives so that they could be self-sufficient.” 
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Only one administrator, at the managerial level, selected the ‘customer’ rapport 
associated with the values of economy, performance, and entrepreneurship. Such 
preference becomes understandable in the light of his role of executive director.  Since the 
congressional approval of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act, Public 
Housing Authorities experienced an expansion in their scope of action. Such changes 
include increased flexibility (Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008: 38, 2015: 624), and a growing 
need of a search for resources and strategic alliances with both, public and private partners 
(Bingham & Kirkpatrick, 1975: 66; Garshick Kleit & Page, 2015: 625). The PHA’s 
Executive Director illustrates the case:  
“I think entrepreneurship is really required in today’s day and age because the 
reality is we are facing a decline, a flat decline in federal budget so we have to be 
very creative about what we do, and in this day and age where our solutions usually 
revolt around the provision of housing and supportive services, we have to seek 
partnerships to provide the supportive services, so it invites a whole spirit of 
camaraderie given the special needs on target population, putting together special 
programs, special relationships with service providers on an entrepreneurial spirit 
by the way they are serving the various populations that we work with.” 
Curiously enough, the ‘subject’ category of public service values (Control, 
domination, and power) spawned a humorous reaction and amused rejection among PHA 
and Section 8 HCV program’s administrators. From a “Well is not that one! Of course! 
(Laugh) Not that one! Never!” of an Occupancy Specialist, to a “And control, and 
domination, and power, not quite sure what that one would mean, I have none of them! 
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(Laugh)”, of another Intake Specialist, this choice seemed strange to the workers’ 
imagination. 
Navigating Between Bureaucratic and Democratic Values 
As stated before, I included a second question related to the selection of one specific 
set of values. This question consisted of a description of two different possible scenarios 
that demanded Section 8 HCV program administrators’ actions. The first scenario accounts 
for a more democratically-oriented choice; while the second one aims for a more 
bureaucratically-oriented decision.  
Previously, when PHA and Section 8 HCV program’s workers had to pick a single 
option of values’ trios among the four possible administrator-recipient’s rapports of 
‘client,’ ‘customer,’ ‘citizen,’ and ‘subject,’ interviewees expressed nonconformity 
towards the exclusivity of these options. Through elaborated explanations, they provided 
choices that reached two or more categories of values simultaneously, proposing 
combinations of public service values selections that accounted for a far more complex 
reality than the questionnaire had predicted. When asked to choose, one Occupancy 
Specialist reflects on this simultaneity of values:  
“I would say it’s a mixture of the first two [bureaucratic and democratic values’ 
selections]. You know, you have to be efficient, but we have to do it without losing 
perspective of the client so. I would say, probably number one, with a mixture of 
two. But number one, probably.” 
A Section 8 HCV program’s director finds herself navigating between both, the 
managerial and the democratic sets of values:  
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“Between number two and number three. (Interviewer: Social equity, sovereignty 
of the people and participation; and economy, performance and entrepreneurship?). 
But and again you have to consider budget, so that’s where number three place into 
number two.” 
A Housing Quality Standards inspector provides the key to understand this back 
and forward exercise. The inspector makes a distinction between the different scenarios 
and audiences for each set of values’ selection. Democratic values such as social equity, 
sovereignty of the people, and participation aim towards “the clients,” or recipients of the 
program. Meanwhile, the bureaucratic choice of public service values that includes 
efficiency, neutrality, and accountability points towards organizational duties and 
responsibilities:     
“I would have to say, it would have to be selection one and two, a little bit of one 
and two. I think for one it’s more for me being efficient, but I think that when it 
comes to the clients and going out on the field I’m more empathetic to the second 
category, you know I value what their opinions are, so it’s one and two.” 
This PHA and Section 8 HCV program administrators’ tendency to make more 
sophisticated uses of different sets of public service values simultaneously, and towards a 
variety of audiences, intensified along the case scenarios’ responses. Six of the 
interviewees opted for solving the case through the use of a democratic values approach. 
Other six implementers reflected on the navigation of both, democratic and bureaucratic 
values. A reduced group of three public servants turned to a rigorous bureaucratic 
perspective. Coincidently, two out of these three workers deal with the strictest segments 
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of the policy implementation process: Housing Quality Standards inspections, and 
eligibility. 
The democratically-oriented selection of values cares for the abidance of policy 
regulations, HUD and Housing Authorities’ rules. In the following exchange with a 
caseworker, she establishes the precise limits of their actions within the case scenario 
before opting for the more lenient response. She assures explicitly that her actions will not 
contradict eligibility requirements, which is by far, the strictest stage of the Section 8 HCV 
program implementation process and the one that allows near zero levels of discretion:  
Caseworker: No, correct, so is it referring to what? You help the client even though 
they can’t really qualify for it? Or which you go by the book? 
Interviewer: no, if they have already qualified but they still need more paperwork 
or more, in order for them to find like a proper…  
Caseworker: The unit? 
Interviewer: Yeah  
Caseworker: Do I help beyond that or I…? Or I say “Let me ask and make sure” 
(laugh)  
Interviewer: Exactly… or you say “these are the rules” 
Caseworker: Correct 
Interviewer: “you don’t have this paper” or, you know… “You don’t have this” … 
“you have to fill this requirements, I’m sorry but I cannot help you” 
Caseworker: “so, it’s still number one, regardless. It’s still number one. The one I 
go by, because we are by the book, but being [case] number one you can also be by 
the book because you can provide the guidance and the resources that they need. If 
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I can’t give a decision because it’s not up to me to give a decision I give the clients 
the tools to request what is available for them through the supervisor, the 
management, because it’s not “your voucher is gonna  expire today so if you don’t 
bring it by five o’clock that’s it”, No.” 
There is a cohabitation of the democratic and bureaucratic perspectives. A 
utilization of high levels of discretion is present too, in caseworkers that do not identify 
themselves exclusively with one case scenario. Two different Occupancy Specialists 
navigate the combination of values that entails their response:  
“Somewhere in between there. I’m a rule follower, these are the rules, but we have 
policies and procedures to try to be lenient in certain situations, there has to be a 
precedent and yes, we do… it’s a case by case situation, it’s definitely a case by 
case… I would never use the word “leniency”, just because we do have to treat 
everyone the same, we can’t just be lenient with this family and not lenient with the 
other family so, but if we set a precedent is like “in this situation we can do 
something extra” so, in this situation “ok, we have done it for this family in this 
situation so we can do it for this family in this situation,” but we still have to follow 
the rules and the regulations.” 
“Try to be as lenient as possible within the rules. So if we are able to extend, or 
help them in any ways and not being in violation of anything, yeah, that’s the route. 
I’m not real strict! (Laugh) on people or anything, if usually I can do anything to 
help within what we are able to do for them.” 
Operative levels of the program tend to respond from a day-by-day experience to 
the case scenario question. Meanwhile, the managerial level produces a more elaborated 
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discourse on the rationale behind the simultaneous approach to democratic and 
bureaucratic values during Section 8 HCV program’s implementation process. In her 
answer, a program’s director points at what seems to be the problematic knot of values 
cohabitation. The simultaneous use of values sets is possible, as bureaucratic-oriented 
policy and regulations provide room for democratic values utilization. The catch lies in the 
scope of individual administrative actions. “Running the extra mile” (Marr, 2016) reveals 
itself as the starting point of the discretion needed for exercising the democratic set of 
values and approach program’s recipients as ‘citizens’:  
“I will work within the guidelines to my best capability. We are required to work 
within the core of federal regulations. Now, this is a human industry, so, I think 
part of that also entails going the extra mile. It doesn’t mean bending the rules, it 
doesn’t mean breaking the laws, it simply means working with people. So, there 
have been administrations, not only here, but in other agencies that I have been, 
that the administrator was by the book. It’s not by the book always, it’s not 
something that you read and you implement, because, it’s the human factor. So, 
you’re able, and you have to be able to remain within the regulations and the 
regulations generally do apply because they give you guidance, more than just strict 
rule books, and they also allow you to run your program with a little bit of flexibility 
because it’s a guideline and not a law. But, you know, some people see it as “You 
know, that’s the way it is, so that’s how it’s gonna be done, and I don’t care what 
the circumstances are”. That’s not how I ever implemented anything, I have always 
tried to adhere to the policy. However, had that policy worked with the intent that 
it was designed? To guide it.” 
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A Balancing Act 
Frederickson (1997) and Van Wart (1998) fall short when interpreting public 
service values utilization during Section 8 HCV program’s implementation process. A 
dominant bureaucratic set of values and its efficiency fever (Frederickson, 1997) does not 
marginalize the delivery of services under democratic values. Contrariwise, the Section 8 
worker recognizes the “duty and the obligation to deploy his [or her] efforts on behalf of 
the less advantaged” (Frederickson, 1997: 42):  
“(…) if your development is like disabled and elderly I don’t know what else they 
can do, they have a limited amount of income, is not like they can even go to school 
to get help with education or jobs or anything like that, there is some people that 
they are just not capable of obtaining employment.” 
Neither is there a “reachable gestalt” (Van Wart, 1998 in Molina, 2015: 49) that 
allows public service values to circulate by selection, depending on specific context to 
eventually let the “best” values be “widely maintained or adopted” (Van Wart, 1998: 255).  
In the particular analysis of Section 8 HCV Program, public administrators identify 
policy stakeholders and their demands. Such demands can be either democratic, 
bureaucratic, or managerial. Next, implementers comply with their different duties and 
responsibilities by simultaneously utilizing various sets of public service values. The 
selection of values depends on the situation and the audience (See Figure 6 below).  
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Figure 6: The Balancing Act  
 
Back to Frederickson, it is important to concede that the application of democratic 
values demands an extra effort from public servants to make. The utilization of 
bureaucratic values seems to be mandatory as the agency is formally accountable to HUD 
and subject to penalties. The use of democratic values appears to be optative, as citizens 
have fewer accountability resources. In the case of high-performance Public Housing 
Authorities and Section 8 HCV programs, public servants have naturalized and 
institutionalized running the “extra mile” needed by the use of democratic values. Such 
behavior may count as a differentiator factor for achieving high-performance, as Chapter 
4 explains how environmental and organizational conditions equally affect both, agencies 
and policy. In the following exchange, an Occupancy Specialist tells me about one of the 
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many ways she assists citizens beyond her organizational duties. She also responds to my 
question for the “extra mile” (Marr, 2005: 101): 
Occupancy Specialist: “I have one person that was late getting paperwork in, I 
mailed twice and for some reason she still isn’t getting the mails, not able to drive 
to come to [town] to pick it up so that I reached for one of our inspectors who is 
going to be in the area and can actually hand deliver the paperwork to her, so she 
can get it, so we can get everything completed for her continue the occupancy and 
not be having taken through termination because she wasn’t getting the things 
turned back in. So that just whatever we can help, you know kinda hold their hand 
and try to get stuff in, if they don’t understand, they will come in and I go through 
the paperwork with them, help them fill it out, answer questions that they don’t 
understand on the forms… yeah, just do anything that we can within our power to 
try to help them through the process if they are not able to on their own.”  
Interviewer: And, only to ask, this may seem like a rhetorical question but, you 
don’t have to do that right? You don’t have to… like, but you do it. Why do you do 
it?  
Occupancy Specialist: “Because we don’t wanna terminate people off the Program 
for something silly. You know, they are not breaking the rules, they are just maybe 
having a hard time, especially the elderly, you know, these persons unable to drive 
to come in. No, it’s not a requirement that we do it but it’s… for disabled and elderly 
especially, I think, you know, they may need an extra help than an able-body 
person. But still even the able-body people, they need help just with paperwork, 
    
116 
 
you know, just it seems silly to go through a whole termination just because they 
can’t get the paperwork (loud laugh) on time, you know.”   
PHA and Section 8 HCV program’s administrators interviewed for this dissertation 
displayed high levels of professional and emotional investment in the utilization of 
democratic values to consciously address social deprivation (Frederickson, 1997: 38). 
Nonetheless, two external elements turn the simultaneous utilization of democratic and 
bureaucratic sets of values into what one of the interviewees calls “a balancing act.” These 
elements are limited funding and HUD regulations. An assistant Manager and a Supervisor 
illustrate the limits of the norm, especially in eligibility matters.  
“I think it is a balancing act, you know there is never one thing that you just wanna 
lean on so much to work as guide every day, you know, you may come and you 
may hear an extremely sad story and you may wanna do everything in your power 
to help out a particular participant, right? But if it’s gonna break the rules or 
whatever it is you try to do, if it’s gonna break the rules and regulations, you know, 
unfortunately, you can’t do that. You can help them as much as you can, but within 
reason as well. So, it’s a balancing act.” 
“So we can’t do that, I mean, we will try to assist them as much as we can but if 
documents submitted suggested that they are not eligible, unfortunately they will 
not be eligible even, you know, as sad as it is I have had to say someone is not 
eligible because of 50 dollars, you know, 50 dollars over the income limits, 
unfortunately means 50 dollars over the income limits, no way, no matter how you 
see it, how you calculate it, it’s 50 dollars and I have to accept that. So that’s a little 
harder and that’s a little strict for me. But, certainly in other things I’m more lenient 
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and I can see, you know, us being able to help them more, but unfortunately not 
with eligibility.” 
Budget is another controlling element of administrative discretion and the exercise 
of democratic values. In a way, the due process actions and bureaucratic compliance 
guarantee the necessary funding to ensure democratic actions and citizens’ assistance. An 
Occupancy Specialist reflects on the matter: 
“[I] try to help them in as much as I can while staying within all the rules because 
there are certain things that, you know, we have to follow, in order to receive 
funding, you know, we are a high performer so we do everything we can correctly 
to keep receiving all the funds to help as many people as we can.” 
Where Are These Values Coming From?  
Celeste Watkins-Hayes defines “professional identities” as “relatively stable and 
enduring constellations of attributes, beliefs, values, motives, preferences, and experiences 
that individuals use to define themselves in an occupational role (Schein 1978; Ibarra 1999 
in Watkins-Hayes, 2009: 26). The semi-structured interview explores the elements 
comprised in the organizational ethos of Section 8 HCV program’s implementers by 
including two questions: “Do you feel that your values’ trio selection is an autonomous 
one?” And “Do you think your PHA’s values are the same as yours?” 
Ten PHA and Section 8 HCV program’s implementers recognize either partial 
organizational influence (four respondents) or full institutional guidance (six respondents) 
on the ways they select and utilize public service values during policy implementation. 
Five public servants coincide in recognize their private milieu and family upbringing as the 
origin of their values’ preference. One of such servants recognizes her ‘evolution,’ from a 
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more conservative and bureaucratic approach to a more social equity and democratic 
oriented perspective:  
“I have a totally different perspective than when I started working here, when I first 
started working here I wasn’t familiar with the clientele and the individuals I’ll be 
working with and I really changed and softened up in saw the hardship that a lot of 
the families go through here, and so I definitely evolved, that’s the best word I can 
say, so I am much more compassionated, much more understanding (…). My dad 
told me, my dad is a very conservative individual and he is not happy about how 
liberal I become lately (laugh), and he is like “working for the government has 
made you liberal” and that’s true, because he doesn’t see what I see, he doesn’t see 
the undocumented, Hispanic individual who was brought here at three years old 
and she can’t do anything, because her parents are dead now, she doesn’t even know 
Spanish really, this is all she knows, and she is scared she can’t…we can’t  even 
pay rent for her, you know, he doesn’t… people don’t see what we see here.” 
Political Neutrality and Technical Expertise as Source of Administrative Discretion 
In Chapter 2, I introduced seven hypotheses on the political neutrality of public 
administrators: 1. the principle of political neutrality is an ideal, impossible to accomplish 
in the reality of public administrators (Friedrich, 1940: 3). 2. Public administrators do exert 
administrative discretion in their daily decision-making and implementation processes 
(Friedrich, 1940: 7; Svara, 2006: 122; Lipsky, 1980). 3. Due to the impossible applicability 
of the principle of political neutrality in real scenarios, administrators replace neutrality 
with a more reachable value. 4. Public servants use technical expertise as the proxy for 
political neutrality (Dahl, 1947: 1). 5. Administrative discretion is justified by 
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administrators’ technical expertise (Dahl, 1947; Foucault, 1980). 6. Public Administrators’ 
‘expertise’ is founded not exclusively in technical knowledge but in political (citizenship), 
social, and cultural constructions of identities (socio-economic status, race, gender, 
background) (Forester, 1984: 26). 7. This impacts policy outputs (Habermas, 1973, in 
Fischer, 1993: 166). I will provide qualitative evidence that either support or refute the 
hypotheses mentioned above. 
Notion and Scope of Political Neutrality According to Section 8 HCV Program’s 
Implementers  
Contrary to my initial theoretical proposition, PHA and Section 8 HCV Program’s 
administrators endorse the validity of the principle of political neutrality. Section 8 workers 
consider this traditional public service value achievable in its full extension. Neutrality is 
regularly practiced by the program’s implementers when interacting with recipients. How 
do Section 8 HCV program’s implementers elaborate the notion of political neutrality? The 
response to that question would be: precisely as PA scholars present the notion within the 
academic field. (Finer, 1941; Kernaghan, 1976; Overeem, 2005).  Whether it has to do with 
elected officials or citizens, Section 8 public servants agree that they “do not have personal 
feelings or interests involved” (Beck, Jorgensen & Bozeman, 2007: 372) in the 
implementation of the program. When the rule and only the rule mediates the public 
administrator-citizen rapport, the regulation always wins. Expressions such as “You have 
to be impartial, you can’t be someone that is biased across the board,” “You can’t be biased 
on who you’re helping,” or “(...) you don’t pass judgement, that’s not what we’re trying to 
do, we are trying to assist” are fairly common among the group of fifteen interviewees. 
When asking a supervisor to expand on his concept of neutrality, he explains:  
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“Yeah. Not being biased. Go in there and assist whoever it is you’re assisting the 
same way you assisted the person before you and the person after, you can’t go in 
there because the person before you lied to you thinking that this new person is 
gonna lie to you about the same thing or about something different. Everyone’s 
case is differently, you have to give them a chance to tell you what it is and assist 
them to however you can.” 
Section 8 HCV program’s practitioners enumerate various sources of 
apprenticeship of political neutrality. Eight practitioners indicate some organizational 
resource as the basis of their ability to make impartial decisions in front of program’s 
recipients. Both operative and managerial level workers mention several pieces of training 
that, though not explicitly related to neutrality, count as a resource to address impartiality 
in the decision-making process. “Discrimination classes,” “How not to judge at the 
moment,” “Fair Housing training,” “customer service,” and “how to deal with difficult 
people” are some of these training. Experience, information, the resolution of similar cases 
in the past, team work and the support of fellow staff members, and formal education are 
other valid sources of neutrality.  
Four program’s implementers coincide with elaborating neutrality as a personal 
trace of character, individual quality of their personalities, or skill acquired outside the 
organizational environment. In this regard, a PHA executive director expresses his view:  
“No! No one teaches you how to be neutral, in fact, the greatest source I find in 
American politics and in this idea in surrounding neutrality is this idea that… we 
don’t give our leaders a good ethics and morals training, I happen to get a really 
good ethics and moral training but it wasn’t in the United States and I had to go a 
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long way to get it and it is one of the most valuable foundational stones upon which 
I stand because it is only with a really highly developed personal philosophy and a 
highly developed ethics and morality that you can exercise neutrality. And so, NO! 
We don’t get educated in this so you’re really hoping that when you’re hiring a 
director for any given agency that they bring with them those values and that 
expertise.” 
The politics-administration dichotomy prevails. The separation between elected 
and appointed officials and the hierarchical relationship between policy creation and 
execution (Finer, 1941) remains untouchable over the years. A Special Programs 
Coordinator reflects on the extension of her discretion to modify Federal mandates: 
“There is not a lot of things that I could do that can make a difference, so the only 
thing I could do is maybe, when it comes to voting for who is in the White House I 
can look at what their view point is related to HUD and who they are going to elect 
to be in charge of HUD, I think that’s when you can have more of a bigger say in 
the outcome of Section 8 and the Housing Authority, but other than that, yeah! Once 
the election is over and whoever is in the White House and the Budget comes down 
and the policy comes down, we are subject to follow those rules.”  
Technical Expertise as a Tool for Achieving Political Neutrality 
I had stated that because of the impossible applicability of the principle of political 
neutrality in real scenarios, administrators replace this public service value with a more 
reachable one. In this vein, I further hypothesized that public servants use technical 
expertise as a proxy for political neutrality (Dahl, 1947: 1) and that administrators justify 
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their discretion towards policy recipient by applying technical expertise (Dahl, 1947; 
Foucault, 1980).  
The evidence from the interviews’ responses and qualitative fieldwork took these 
hypotheses to a different but equally compelling direction. PHA and Section 8 HCV 
program’s administrators consider neutrality a reachable and achievable value, and 
technical expertise is not a proxy but the most valuable tool to guarantee impartiality. 
Implementers keep the disciplinary aspiration of scientism (Dahl, 1947: 1) by following a 
positivist and rational method to make decisions. Political neutrality is achievable through 
the expert knowledge and thorough application of the regulation. When asked about 
neutrality, Section 8 workers emphasize in the importance of being proficient in the norm 
to reach an impartial decision. After a Section 8 HCV program’s Manager defined 
neutrality as “just being consistent with the enforcement of the rules,” he completes his 
statement providing the best approach to neutrality: “So long as you structure the situation 
to the regulation. By following the regulations you can maintain neutrality.” Another 
practitioner praises the importance of maintaining uniformity in the application of the rules:  
“We are, at least for our agency here, we reference the policy a lot, so that one, it 
safeguards from the client getting misinformation, so if one caseworker was telling 
a client something else and then the next day another caseworker was telling 
something else, it creates a lot of confusion so the standard and the streamline of a 
policy really helps ensure that we here give the same information to everyone, no 
matter who they are talking to, and we do have to train the front as well, so they are 
giving the same information so that does help [to] eliminate a lot of confusion.” 
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As the regulation reveals itself insufficient in some situations, knowledge by past 
experiences counts as an essential instrument for achieving neutrality. An HQS inspector 
provides the most technical example by using water heaters as reference:  
“So there are certain things like for example, you’ll know what you’re supposed to 
be looking at but you won’t know in particular because there are so many different 
types. I’m gonna use water heaters for an example. There is three or four different 
types of water heaters, they only teach you the basics, “Turns the water hot”, “No 
leaks”. Along the line you learn different things of different systems, where they 
can fail, where the weak spots are... so, that’s what you learn because people are 
pointing it out, or because you actually see it physically, but you didn’t learn it from 
a book, that’s kinda an ongoing thing, so after twenty years or so of doing that, you 
pick up a whole bunch of different things so it definitely puts you at a total different 
level than the people that just had their experience straight out of a book or straight 
out of the classes.” 
I will address the existence of this room for administrative discretion and its 
implications for the utilization of democratic values in the next section.  
The Parallel Avenue of Administrative Discretion  
I had anticipated that public administrators exert administrative discretion in their 
daily decision-making and implementation processes (Friedrich, 1940: 7; Lipsky, 1980; 
Svara, 2006: 122). I further hypothesized that such administrative discretion is endorsed 
by administrators’ technical expertise (Dahl, 1947; Foucault, 1980). What I did not foresee 
was the possibility that administrative discretion of Section 8 HCV program’s 
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administrators worked as a vehicle for the provision of democratic values to the most 
vulnerable segments of the population (Frederickson, 1997: 42).  
In the particular case of Public Housing Authorities and the Section 8 HCV 
Program, a process named "devolution" allows this practice. Devolution is “the rapid 
deregulation and greater local control in federal social assistance programs” 
(Congressional Research Service, 2012: 2). Although the cause of many setbacks, 
predominantly financial ones, devolution facilitates dedicated public administrators in 
high-performance agencies to incorporate the practice of social equity, participation, and 
sovereignty of the people, among many other democratic values. They are neutral in front 
of the regulation because, in fact, the regulation has not been bent, violated, or broken. 
Instead, the regulation has room for flexibility and adaptation. Public servants utilize this 
adaptive capacity, not for oppressive purposes, as Foucault (1980), and Alkadry and 
Blesset (2010) state; but to expand as much as possible the public service values portfolio. 
Section 8 implementers comply with the New Public Management’s high-performance, 
and economy demands slowly introduced thirty years ago (Goetz, 2012: 457); while 
refusing to abandon the values of the historical anomaly that brought Public Housing 
Authorities to life, the New Deal. The managerial and middle level of authority is essential 
in this action:  
“And then, being that I am a supervisor, I am more lenient on how I read what they 
want me to do, and I assist people how they want, you know, yes, they want you to 
abide by all the rules, and for the most part we try to, we try to go 100% of whatever 
is on there, it’s gonna be based on the book, because that’s ultimately what we 
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wanna do, the Admin. Plan is there for a reason, but a lot of it is vague, and we can 
read it differently or see differently to be able to assist.” 
In this case, Section 8 HCV program workers’ administrative discretion operates 
within the regulation. However, there is another variation of discretion that functions on 
the verge of the policy operation. In many occasions, recipients do not need to capitalize 
on the flexibility of the regulation, but a push to make it to the rule. This reality reveals the 
limitations of the policy which does not provide services beyond the issuance of the 
voucher. Recipients’ needs fall beyond merely issuing a voucher and implementer are 
aware of this reality. Elderly recipients and those with mental and physical disabilities 
receive informal assistance from caseworkers that help them navigate the simplest tasks 
within the program. An occupancy specialist provides an example:  
“Ok, I have some of my clients that have some mental disabilities that make it 
difficult for them to do paperwork, and their paperwork is very straight forward, 
the recertification packet is pretty simple to do, but it’s overwhelming for them and 
so, then I meet with them and I fill out the recertification packet with them, just go 
over the documentation I may need, I try to… because a lot of our clients are on 
Social Security, and that information we can pull without stressing them out about 
having to go find a letter, so yeah, the one on one makes it different for quite a few 
of my clients. You know, to help them with that paperwork.” 
I had predicted that public administrators’ discretion is founded not exclusively in 
technical knowledge; but in political (citizenship), social, and cultural constructions of 
identities such as socio-economic status, race, gender, and background (Forester, 1984: 
26). I stated that this hybridization of public servants’ administrative discretion impacts 
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policy outputs (Habermas, 1973, in Fischer, 1993: 166). I followed Foucault (1980), 
Alexander and Stivers (2010), and Alkadry & Blessett (2010) in the assertion that Section 
8 HCV public administrators linger stereotypes on policy implementation.  
The interviews and participant observation tell otherwise. Section 8 HCV 
program’s practitioners utilize administrative discretion to introduce democratic values in 
the implementation process. They also locate particular identities, especially elderly and 
disabled individuals, and reshape the policy by these specific identities’ needs and 
disadvantages as the product of historical inequalities. A Section 8 HCV program Manager 
explains the lawful modifications made to the policy to address accessibility barriers in 
African-American households during the strictest phase of the program, eligibility:  
“HUD does have guidelines, so, for example HUD would say this is what you can 
do… so for example for Criminal Backgrounds, you can do steps point two and 
three and you’re allowed to may do them, you have to do step one, and you may do 
step two, three, and four. So what we typically do is we do the we have to dos, and 
then where there you have may dos, if it looks like it may be putting a barrier in 
anyone’s individual way, then we don’t put that into place. So for example, if 
someone has been arrested, we don’t look at that, but if there was conviction, then 
we will look at that. Some Housing Authorities are gonna look at… I have looked 
at some Housing Authorities’ policy and procedures manuals and they have three, 
four, five pages of Criminal History that will disqualify someone, and typically you 
will find that that impacts people of color, what we have done is we have just done 
the bare minimum because we realize that (…) the criminal justice system has had 
this impact upon people of color and if we adopt it as more strict then we will be 
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impacting folks that shouldn’t be. So, we are fairly progressive in the Housing 
Authority, and we do follow the rules and so I think what the difference is that… 
where HUD says you may do something that may be a little more restrictive, we 
tend not to do that…particularly, in our lookback periods of Criminal History, you 
know some agencies go five years, seven years, HUD says that you only have to go 
back three. So that would be, we just do the three.” 
The Demeanors that Challenge Neutrality  
There are two demeanors, not identities, which challenge Section 8 HCV program 
practitioners’ ability to remain impartial in front of recipients.  Firstly, there is the Free 
Rider demeanor. A recipient that meets the requirements to be eligible but implementers 
perceive as an individual that may not be as vulnerable and in need as others, such as 
elderly, disabled, homeless, and working families with children. The most frequent the 
rapport with recipients, the highest the chances for public servants to face situations where 
experience indicates an anomaly. An Occupancy Specialist provides examples on these 
indicators: 
“Those are difficult clients for me, because I see so much need, and then I see these 
people “do they really need the assistance?” you know, they start a job, I raise the 
rent, they quit the job, when they get actually paid for self-sufficiency, but there is 
nothing we can do about that. So some of that can be frustrating.”  
Section 8 HCV program’s administrators face these situations by applying the rules 
exactly the way they would do with any other recipient:  
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“You know, some people come in that actually need it, some people don’t really 
need it but want it, and to me, I help them either way, it doesn’t affect how I feel or 
my feelings are not gonna get in the way of me choosing not to help someone 
because I feel they don’t deserve it. No, if you turn in paperwork to me and it shows 
you’re eligible, whether I like it or not, whether you were mean or not to me, it 
shows that you’re eligible and guess what, you will get your voucher, that’s strictly 
all that matters, is whether you’re eligible or not. My feelings have nothing to do 
with actual work or how someone is selected or… it’s who is next on the list, who 
gets selected, are you eligible or you’re not eligible, done (laugh).” 
The second demeanor that Section 8 HCV Program’s administrators find 
challenging to address by being neutral is what can be generalized as “difficult people.” 
‘Entitled,’ verbally abusing, or violent recipients. Despite training, upsetting encounters 
with recipients demand an extra effort and further preparation. An Occupancy Specialist 
shares her strategy to deal with these emotionally taxing episodes successfully:  
“I try to treat everyone professionally and the same so, we have phone calls, lots of 
phone calls, whether someone is very angry and agitated I try to be professional 
and treat them the same as someone who is not, who is doing just fine so. It’s just 
trying to be even, even-tempered and not take anything personal.” 
When I conducted fieldwork, I observed Section 8 HCV program’s inspections 
routines with a Housing Quality Standard inspector. I waited in the car while the Inspector 
asked for recipient’s authorization for me to join the inspection. During the very first visit, 
I was waiting in the car while I could clearly see the Inspector kindly speaking with the 
recipient, which was a mentally disabled woman. She rejected my presence, but also did 
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not allow the Inspector into the house. I could clearly hear screams and shouts. I wrote in 
my fieldwork journal seated in the car as the events occurred and after they passed:  
November 30th, 2017  
Inspections with [Inspector’s Name] around 11: 00 am to almost 2:00 pm  
I wasn’t allowed to the inspection by the tenant as she is having a mental breakdown 
as is also hostile towards [the inspector]. I clearly heard [the inspector] formulating 
the question “I have a question, I have an intern with me, do you agree to have her 
at the inspection?” And then I heard a clear and loud NO! [The inspector] is politely 
asking to come in, I think I hear the tenant screaming leave! This work is utterly 
stressful. (…) [The inspector], I asked her about concerns about her safety, she said 
she treats people the same and that when she shows respect and consideration 
people usually calm down. She is a pro! She calmed the client while conducting the 
inspection. She [the tenant] has 21 days to correct with the landlord. She got 
housekeeping requirements write down.  
The general strategy is not to take the situation personally, keeping in mind the 
complicated circumstances of most of the recipients: 
 “I try to think it is not taking their personality in the situation… into consideration 
but on what are the facts, you know, they are frustrated and upset because you have 
not approved their medical allowance, it’s just stay neutral, it’s not, it hasn’t been 
done because you’re naming a person (…), it hasn’t been done because the 
regulation doesn’t allow us to take the allowance into consideration.” 
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Public Administrators’ Attitudes towards Section 8 HCV Program’s Recipients  
The notion of attitude comprises the cultural patterns (Alexander and Stivers, 
2010), as well as psychological and emotional drivers that influence public administrators’ 
approach to the implementation of the policy and its recipients. These elements are not part 
of implementers’ organizational ethos and come from the social environment. The way 
public servants “think and feel about” (The Merriam-Webster dictionary) recipients 
influence their behavior and the program’s outcomes.  
According to Alexander and Stivers (2010: 582), many of these attitudes are 
undesirable as they reproduce an “adversarial tone” between public agencies and 
traditionally disadvantaged communities.  I already illustrated how in the case of this study 
interviews, public administrators recognize recipients’ identities (Eagan, 2006), not to 
reproduce “society’s customs and conventions” (Alexander & Stivers, 2010: 582); but to 
level the institutional disparities in access to the policy, caused by prejudice. In this section, 
I will provide a thorough explanation of this rather unusual public administrators’ behavior.  
Life Happens  
Marr (2016) emphasizes the importance of public servants’ understanding of 
poverty. This emotional, psychological and social construct leads practitioners to elaborate 
a rationale on why recipients seek for the benefits of Section 8 HCV program. On the one 
hand, if implementers understand that poverty causes are “multiple, interdependent, and 
operating at different social levels” (Marr, 2016: 223), their rapport with program’s 
recipients will be permeated by empathy and compassion. Hence, the chances to provide a 
broader spectrum of services will be higher. On the other hand, if practitioners attribute a 
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particular responsibility to recipients’ identities and/or life decisions, then the public 
administrator-recipient rapport will change in nature.       
To identify Section 8 HCV program administrators’ attitudes towards recipients, I 
included three related questions in the semi-structured interview questionnaire: “What are 
your thoughts and feelings about people that seek for Section 8 HCV benefits?”, “Do you 
think people could do any different to avoid finding themselves applying for a voucher?” 
And “In your opinion, which are the factors that take a household in need of assistance to 
apply for a Section 8 voucher?” Interviewees’ responses correspond to what Marr calls 
“Holism,” or a complex and multifactorial understanding of poverty causes. Following the 
author, this approach “encourages trust between clients and staff” (Marr, 2016: 223).  
PHA and Section 8 HCV program administrators interviewed display a 
compassionate view towards recipients. This view builds on the belief in the unpredictable 
twists of anyone’s fate. For these public servants, life entangles uncontrollable difficulties 
that encounter some remedy in the program’s existence. An HQS inspector shares his 
reflection:  
“Some people, they just get bad cards, they can be doing everything right and they 
kinda end up in certain situation, I try to keep that in my mind so I try to keep the 
judgement out of it completely because I don’t know where people came from and 
what their situation is.” 
The power of this certainty becomes evident when an inspector suggests applying 
to the program as an anticipatory act of a possible life’s calamity:  
“I told a lot of people “Hey, you know what, [the City] opened up the waiting list, 
apply!” they say “I got a job! I don’t need to apply!” I said “Yeah, you don’t need 
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to apply now, but you don’t know your situation in ten years” your situation can 
completely change and why worry about that now, just apply, if you don’t need it 
then, then you don’t need it, you say “thanks, no thanks, I’m good, I’m a millionaire 
now, I don’t need Section 8” (laugh), you know, but you don’t know, and without 
assistance you can be in the waiting list for years, decades and not being able to call 
off the waiting list for many reasons.” 
This rationale behind poverty and the need of housing unfolds in a variety of 
answers to the question: What are your thoughts and feelings about people that seek Section 
8 HCV benefits? Such answers go from the most rational ones to those mediated by 
emotion. This contrast is visible in the responses provided by an Occupancy Specialist and 
a PHA executive director: 
“(…) so they came to the program obviously because their income level is such that 
they need help with the rent, they can’t pay all the rent themselves, with their 
income base. So, definitely where they apply, they are seeking to get that help just 
so they can survive on [it] on the month-basis.” 
“Oh My Goodness! Yeah! The people we serve… Oh my! My heart goes out to 
them! Let me tell you. They live in a world that is very, very difficult. We live in a 
high-cost area where way many households use way much of their income for rent 
and utilities, I feel very, very passionate about the importance of social justice and 
providing these households we serve some measure of economic stability through 
housing. Oh! My heart goes out to our clients.” 
In this vein, implementers describe the complexity of the factors that take a 
household in need to seek for Section 8 HCV program’s benefits. Among these factors, the 
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most frequently named are physical and mental disabilities, elderly, limited or no income, 
family disagreements, natural disasters, homelessness, insufficient education, tight housing 
markets, unemployment, gentrification and increase in the rent-controlled property. When 
asked if people could do any different to avoid finding themselves applying for assistance, 
the vast majority of responses were No, starting with an “it takes a lot for a person to 
actually walk into an agency and ask for help,” by a HQS inspector. An Occupancy 
specialist adds: “(…) anything could happen in life, so you could have a perfect life and 
then something happens and you find yourself homeless or something, it’s just, I don’t 
think it’s a decision that people make that could make any different.” 
Representative Bureaucracy, or a Hypothesis on the Compassionate Rationale  
The representation of interest groups within bureaucratic structures occurs due to 
the inclusion of a workforce that represents “the very ordinary people” (Rohr, 1986: 48) 
inside public agencies. Usually, that representation is limited to the identity traces of race, 
ethnicity, and gender (Bradbury & Kellough, 2011: 157). However, public administrators’ 
socio-economic identity can be as powerful as the ones mentioned above. The shared 
experience of poverty and need may influence both, conscious and unconscious acts of 
correspondence between bureaucrats and population.  
Section 8 HCV program’s administrators “share core attitudes, values, and beliefs 
with the social groups” (Bradbury & Kellough, 2011: 158) that they serve. As voucher 
recipients, they are socialized in the experience of poverty. A PHA executive director 
comprises the situation in one phrase: “in our area, we are all poor here.”  
The vast majority of interviewees (eleven) practice a life-experience-based 
empathy towards Section 8 HCV program’s recipients. Some of the practitioners account 
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for a general “share of struggle in life.” Others are more specific and describe episodes of 
their past such as being a young single mother in search of employment while receiving 
Section 8 assistance, brief periods of homelessness, and a background with a low-income 
family under welfare assistance, including food stamps. One Intake Specialist reflects on 
her experience as a young single mother on Section 8 HCV program’s assistance:  
“I was in public housing myself, so I mean, I’ve been there, I know what it is like 
to be a single mom, and you know, I’m grateful for that, I had the opportunity to 
use the Program, you know, and so… even though it was only like a year (laugh). 
Yeah, but yeah, I know what it is and so, I can relate.” 
When questioned if whether this experience influences or not their attitude towards 
program’s recipients, only one administrator responded: “It’s why I’m here.” Other 
responses pointed to a null influence of these experiences on the decision-making process. 
An Occupancy Specialist explains:  
“I do connect with a lot of experiences to either my family or my personal 
experiences, and sometimes I share this with my clients “you know, I understand 
what you’re going through because I have done this, you know, I have been there” 
or my family, because I like to let them know that I’m a real person too and I have 
experiences and that that teaches me, but I don’t let it make my decisions because 
the guidelines that we have, they are pretty cut and dry. Yes! I would like to lower 
the rent for somebody but I can’t do that based upon the information that I have, 
but I can let them know that I understand how they’re feeling, you know, and I 
think that’s important to my clients.” 
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Once again, Section 8 HCV program’s implementers subordinate their 
administrative discretion to the regulation that, as I previously stated, entails levels of 
flexibility and leaves room for the utilization of democratic values. How can these 
neutrality/discretion dynamics operate simultaneously? I will provide an explanation in the 
next section.  
Devolution, Democratic Values and Regulations: The Multiple Levels of Discretion  
In Chapter 3, I make a case for public administrators’ agency (Frederickson & 
Smith, 2003: 41; Waterman & Meier, 1998: 175). I further hypothesize that public 
servants’ discretion and autonomy shape the implementation process (Allison & Halperin, 
1972: 43) and that implementers interacting directly with the public are prone to introduce 
‘alterations’ to the policy (Winter, 2002 in Bastien, 2009: 666). Some PA theorists display 
a genuine distrust of public administrators’ discretion (Gulick, 1978, in Elmore, 1979: 
609). Contrariwise, other scholars understand discretion as “necessary to avoid 
malfunctions in situations not foreseen by the law” (Bastien, 2009: 667), and essential for 
programs’ adaptation to local conditions (Palumbo, Maynard-Moody & Wright, 1984 in 
Matland, 1995: 148). 
I depict Section 8 HCV program administrators’ exercise of discretion as a complex 
‘balancing act.’ This act is defined by policy devolution (Congressional Research Service, 
2012: 2) and the regulation flexibilities that it entails, leaving room for discretionary 
behavior. Administrative discretion of Section 8 HCV program’s implementers is also 
mediated by the naturalization of the extra mile, and the utilization of bureaucratic values, 
within, and parallel to the regulation. 
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In this section, I break down Section 8 HCV program’s implementation process 
into some of its most critical services and actions to determine the level of administrators’ 
discretion –low, medium and high. I establish the level depending on the amount of 
flexibility that the regulation allows, public administrators’ agency (depending on the need 
of managerial intervention or not), and if whether or not public administrators utilize 
democratic values to execute program’s implementation actions.  
These services are 1. To apply for the waiting list; 2. Pull out recipients off the 
waiting list, screen, and being deemed eligible; 3. Housing placement counseling and 
assistance; 4. To search for a unit; 5. Payment standards; 6. To process approval paperwork 
(Request for Lease Approval) and PHA and landlord’s contract submission; 7. Inspection 
of the unit; 8. Additional financial assistance for moving and searching costs. I classified 
the actions and services as follow (see Table 19):  
Table 19. Section 8 HCV Program Levels of Administrative Discretion and Actions 
 
High  Medium  Low 
Extension of searching 
time 
Additional Counseling or 
Assistance 
+ Parallel  
+Referral to external 
service  
Additional Financial 
Assistance 
+ Referral to external 
service 
 Process of Approval 
Paperwork (Request Lease 
Approval and PHA-
Landlord contract) 
+ A lot depends on 
landlords and Voucher 
holders. 
Eligibility requirements 
and times 
  Payment Standards 
  Time on the waiting list  
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High Levels of Administrative Discretion 
Extension of Searching Time 
Once the household or individual is issued a voucher, it is their responsibility to 
search for, and secure a unit. Due to the multiple hazards of this stage of the process, related 
to both, the recipient (disability, elderly), and the environment (tight housing market), 
Section 8 HCV program’s implementers assist recipients in the extension of their voucher 
for them to be able to find a proper unit. An assistant Manager makes a thorough 
description of the process:  
“in our particular agency the initial issue is 60 days to search so once actually they 
have the voucher in hand, we can request extensions, in general the extensions can 
go up to 190 days, so we need to provide the reason on whereas you know, tracking 
why you need the extension, you need to tell us why… so you say things like they 
don’t have the security deposit, you can’t find units in a certain area, things of the 
sort, so we can provide extension to a 190 days. Sometimes, due to extenuating 
circumstances that clients can go through, so we can take that into consideration 
and we can actually go to 270 days to search, and that’s going to be reviewed on a 
case by case basis with the extenuating circumstances beyond 190 days, and there 
is even a Reasonable Accommodation process where you can go above 270 days  
just depending on what it is, you know, whatever the disability is and how it is 
affecting your search to find an unit, so we have to look at those on a case by case 
basis as well.” 
The operative members of the staff seem to have high levels of administrative 
discretion to extend the search time. Two resources, extenuating circumstances and 
    
138 
 
reasonable accommodation, appear to be the most relevant tools when a recipient’s 
situation approach desperation. According to Brady (1993: 32), “HUD defines extenuating 
circumstances as those beyond the tenant’s control and provides examples: hospitalization, 
travel for a family emergency, or overseas military duty.” Meanwhile, O’Hara and Cooper 
(2003: 25) invoke reasonable accommodation for individuals with disabilities to be able to 
ask for changes in the application process. Such as “allowing additional time to submit an 
application; allowing applications to be dropped off at the PHA by a friend, family 
member, advocate, service provider, etc.; and conducting home visits to allow an applicant 
to complete the application.”  
While interviewees appeal to reasonable accommodation only in extraordinarily 
difficult circumstances, they seem to utilize only democratic values and extra time towards 
recipients when assisting them in more simple demands. The common perception among 
Section 8 HCV program’ administrators is that extending the searching time seems to be 
the most expedited way to guarantee success in housing a recipient: 
“The regulation states that it’s up to the Housing Authority how much time they 
wanna give a family. We have a policy in place that they have to request in writing 
to extend their search time. We have extended it, oh my gosh! I think the record for 
us was an entire year of searching. And it’s terrible right now, the rental market is 
terrible, the rents are high, we always are extending right now and we keep that in 
mind, we know that there isn’t enough vacancy out there and the rents are climbing 
and we don’t have the funding to cover those increasing rents, so it’s more and 
more difficult for families to find units, so yes! We definitely take that into 
consideration and give them additional time, case by case but yes!” 
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Medium Levels of Administrative Discretion 
Approval Process 
The process of approval entails two critical moments. First, the submission of the 
Request for Tenancy Approval (RTA) by the recipient once she/he has found a unit. And 
second, the submission of the contract between the Public Housing Authority and the 
landlord, named HAP (Housing Assistance Payments) contract. According to Section 8 
HCV program implementers, the Code of Federal Regulations stipulates times and 
deadlines for the approval process. A Section 8 HCV program’s Manager describes the 
operation:  
“When the recipient finds a unit, they turn in paperwork, the tenant and the 
landlords allow, so once when we receive it, we will contact the landlord within 24 
hours to schedule an inspection, we can take up to 15 days to schedule an 
inspection, based upon the size of our Housing Authority.  HUD has guidelines out 
there on when you have to schedule an inspection by, and in ours, what HUD 
mandates is in 15 days. We do try to process, the Request for Tenancy Approval 
within 24 hours, and typically we can get an inspection scheduled anywhere 
between 72 and 40 hours of receipt because of the schedules need between the 
landlords and then, the inspectors, depending on their schedules.” 
Despite practitioners’ efforts in reducing the time that takes to house a family or an 
individual, there are limits to their administrative discretion on expediting the process. 
These limitations are associated with the tenant’s promptness when turning paperwork in. 
Above all, it depends on landlords’ wish to comply. An Occupancy Specialists reflects on 
landlords’ role in the approval process:  
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“Some landlords, they do complete all the paperwork and return with the contract, 
and you know, copy of lease. Sign everything as soon as possible, then the reduction 
is, you know, it goes by smoothly, you know, fast. The inspection depends on if the 
unit if livable or not, if the unit has a lot of things and the landlords are taking their 
time, it will take time to do that, there is nothing we can really do.” 
Additional Counseling  
The provision of additional counseling or assistance faces a completely different 
predicament. Formally, it does not exist as a service. Public Housing Authorities and 
Section 8 HCV program’s administrators do not have the expertise, resources or time to 
conduct this action. And nonetheless:  
“Well, again, it’s a human field. I mean, we’re dealing with people’s homes, so, 
you can help to get some counseling, on some level if you get someone here that is 
obviously needing a little bit of guidance, so you try and keep it to minimum; but, 
I’m not gonna sit here and watch somebody make a huge mistake and not say “Hey! 
Wake up!”” 
Housing Authorities with better resources and more connections partner with 
organizations that are able to provide counseling to recipients. An Occupancy Specialist 
and a Special Programs Coordinator reflect on the effects of lacking the provision of this 
service:  
“We are not able to do that here, we don’t have the training. We just administer the 
Program. You know, some people say “I need help!” you mean that as needing 
help, and we just refer them to other agencies. We don’t have the staffing or the 
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training for actually being a social worker, so we try to steer them in the right 
[direction].” 
“(…) at the end of the day is always the mental health, you know, you see all these 
patients that come in, or clients, and they are crying, and they are distressed and 
they have anxiety and I just try to work with them and not having… I mean, I have 
talked to, I have thought about the idea of having a mental health therapist here to 
kinda deal with some of these patients, but again HUD doesn’t allow room for that.” 
Low Levels of Administrative Discretion 
Eligibility  
Eligibility seems to work as the perfect example of the effects of policy devolution 
(Congressional Research Service, 2012: 2) on regulation, and the limits of implementers’ 
administrative discretion once the managerial level stretches the norm to its maximum. An 
Occupancy Specialist describes how the Public Housing Authority minimized eligibility 
requirements while maintaining its allegiance to HUD’s mandates: 
“We have reduced for eligibility especially, and for termination. We go to the bare 
minimum of what is put in place by HUD as far as regulations, so we used to be a 
little, a lot more stringing because we could be but yeah we have reduced like for 
eligibility we have reduced the criminal background check from five years to three 
years, the past three years for violent crime and drug activity and then even now 
we’re a little bit more not strict as far as the type of charges they are convicted out 
so, we have done that.” 
There is no room for utilization of democratic values or further assistance in this 
phase. With no exception, interviewees emphasized in the impossibility to intervene in 
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eligibility matters. A Supervisor explains: “Regarding eligibility, it’s strictly strict. You 
know, I can’t say that I would try to do anything regarding it.” 
Intake specialists rely on other agencies to screen an applicant’s background. Time 
may vary from the moment a person is pulled out of the waiting list to the moment this 
person is deemed eligible. Implementers acknowledge recipients’ situation and operate in 
consequence. Not always the process is smooth:  
“We can determine eligibility between three days to six months. It’s all based on 
our different situations unfortunately. You know, if someone turns in all their 
[paper]work, we do the background check, ah, criminal check, I’m sorry, and that 
gets returned within two days, and we have everything, they can get a voucher in 
three days. But if for whatever reason the person doesn’t turn everything in, they 
have to go for finger printing, they have to go through the sheriff department and 
everything, that can potentially take you know, three to six months to get all that 
paperwork done. So can it be lowered, yeah, it can but due to unforeseen 
circumstances, sometimes they get just delayed” 
Payment Standards  
According to O’Hara and Cooper (2003: 36), the PHA establishes payment 
standards for the units based on their number of bedrooms. Payment Standards are also 
based on HUD’s Fair Market Rents, an estimate that reflects “modestly priced rental 
housing costs” in a specific housing market area in the country.  
Payment Standards are, as the name indicates, a highly standardized aspect of the 
policy. They are difficult to modify but not impossible to do so.  Extraordinary 
circumstances in recipients’ life mobilize the modification in Payment Standards. Usually, 
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a caseworker advocates for a tenant’s particular situation while the ultimate decision rests 
at the Managerial level. It is valid to mention that these decisions are made under delicate 
funding considerations, overcome only by considerations on democratic values. An 
Occupancy Specialist narrates a recent case:  
“I have a client whose daughter tried to commit suicide and requested that they can 
extend their voucher so that she can get her own private space so that she can, you 
know, hopefully mend and not feel so threatened and then I was very grateful that 
[the Section 8 Manager] actually again, has the final say on the exceptions, the 
client has to provide a reason, with the funding being so tight, most exceptions are 
probably not being approved… but I was very grateful that… this is one that we 
just did last week so, the week before…I’m hoping that this makes a difference in 
this teenager’s life, they provided documentation that I didn’t need to see, but it 
was heartbreaking.” 
Time on the Waiting List  
The waiting list is the least controllable phase of Section 8 HCV program as Federal 
resources are the exclusive fund for vouchers. Two events provoke waiting lists to 
circulate: More funding, and vouchers liberated by recipients that were either terminated 
or voluntarily left the program. None of such events occur often. By the time I was 
conducting fieldwork in California, the Federal Government had announced cutbacks to 
the program, and there was a climate of uncertainty within the agencies. I drafted a brief 
reflection on my fieldwork notebook:  
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Dec 1st 2017 
“I think – because I just had lunch with [a caseworker], that a lot of uncertainty in 
the program comes from HUD funding unstability [sic]. [The caseworker] 
explained me that this year, HUD already cutted [sic] the funds for Section 8 by 
around 7% and that may continue. Depending on HUD decisions, the Section 8 will 
be able to deliver. With this [sic] shortages there is uncertainty on about how many 
people to serve, second, there may be a situation of lack of funding where the 
waiting list gets FROZEN. After that, the worst case scenario would be a 
WAIVING in the program, meaning starting to reduce the number of vouchers 
(Very BAD).”  
Despite its lack of mobility, PHA and Section 8 HCV program’s implementers have 
developed strategies to activate the waiting list to the best of their abilities and serve their 
community using limited resources. Managerial level workers shared two of these 
strategies. On the one hand, there is the introduction of preferences in the waiting list 
according to the needs of the vulnerable populations surrounding the PHA's area:  
“We have a veteran preference, you know, people who are veterans get our 
preference on the waiting list. For those, so two people apply the exact same day or 
something, one is a veteran, the veteran will get selected before the other person. 
Let’s say for example, residential preferences, oh excuse me, jurisdictional 
preferences, people who actually reside in our jurisdiction get a preference over 
those who don’t. So, if somebody, you know, we have a huge geographical 
jurisdiction, but, somebody in [the] County jurisdiction is on the waiting list, and 
somebody from New York apply to the waiting list, the person who is in [the] 
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County jurisdiction is gonna get preference over, and selected over the person who 
lives in New York. So, our preferences on the waiting list are taken into account.” 
On the other hand, the second strategy consists in switching the waiting list to a 
lottery style list. This system seems to benefit the population by providing citizens with a 
more rapid and precise response to their question for the chances of getting selected for a 
voucher:  
“We reduced our wait list so what we used to do was open up our wait list, we 
usually take 4500, 5000 applicants and then that wait list would last for three, or 
four, or even five years. By the time we got to the year three to five, we couldn’t 
find most of the applicants and it became a sort of an exercise of futility, so we got 
to a system now where we open our wait list yearly, giving folks a better 
opportunity in the community and we pick only… we do a lottery with our annual 
opening. Our last time we opened last year, we got 5500 applicants, we did a 
random drawing and drew 1200 from that group in order to establish our final wait 
list pool for this year. We will open up the wait list again this fall, which allows a 
whole fresh batch to come in, so our wait list is being renewed a lot more frequently 
than it used to be and that really helped our ability to find households. They don’t 
tend to disappear over a year as much as they do over a three or four year period of 
time.” 
Aside these strategies, the most pressuring and invaluable waiting list’s mobilizer 
is funding.  
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Additional Financial Assistance  
A regular worker struggles to put together move in costs, deposit, and the first 
month of rent monies. It is not hard to imagine an unemployed, elderly, or disabled Section 
8 recipient trying to meet these requirements from a landlord that has accepted his/her 
voucher. Public Housing Authorities and Section 8 HCV program’s implementers are 
aware of such circumstances. Unfortunately, due to the limited resources of the program, 
they cannot provide those much-needed services. As in the case of counseling, the only 
way out is partnering and networking: 
“We don’t have a move in assistance, we actually provide them with the 2-1-1 
number, [the] County resource, and they also can go to the DPSS (Department of 
Public Social Services), if they are currently receiving GR or CalWORKs, they can 
also go through them as resource, they have a once in a lifetime move out assistance 
which could be provided to them. And if they have Social Security and not 
CalWORKs or GR, then we let them know “you know what, try to speak with your 
Social Security administration to see if they have any resources for you”, but we 
don’t have those move in costs.” 
The Limits of the Administrative Discretion and the Signature Outcomes of the 
Program  
The Section 8 HCV program builds its rapid and sustained growth on its promises 
of outcomes improvement regarding neighborhood and unit quality, and race and poverty 
desegregation (Schwartz, 2010 in Ross, Shlay & Picon, 2012: 36). Despite the initial 
optimism around the program’s pledge of exterminating traditional public housing 
diseases, the evidence presents a different and daunting reality. Section 8 HCV program’s 
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recipients tend to cluster within areas of high levels of poverty and racially segregated 
communities. According to Varady (2010: 392), “without especial geographical 
requirements and intensive counseling, vouchers recipients generally do not move to low-
poverty suburban neighborhoods.” 
HUD mandates portability actions with the purpose of promoting vouchers mobility 
towards more prosper and racially desegregated areas across the country. Public Housing 
Authorities comply with portability by explicitly presenting it as an opportunity to new 
voucher holders. PHAs devote exclusive staff to serve port-in, or recipients coming to a 
jurisdiction with other PHA’s voucher; and port-out recipients, or those that port to another 
area with a local PHA’s voucher. Agencies act in tandem with other Housing Authorities 
to either absorb, which means taking the voucher as its own; or bill for the incoming 
voucher. An Occupancy Specialist in charge of assisting port-in and port-out vouchers’ 
recipients explains the ropes of the process and how it works the same that with regular 
Section 8 local recipients:  
“We really don’t care where they are going. Regardless of where they are going we 
will port them out, whether billing or absorbing, we will port them out. Port in 
depends on what other Housing Authority, some Housing Authorities will not port 
out unless other Housing Authority is absorbing. If they are not, they won’t port 
out. And when people come here, that’s really easy and simple, that’s how I look 
at it because the minute I get the portability to port in, I send notification to the 
tenant to contact me for intake appointment. Once we schedule the intake 
appointment at that time I issue them a voucher and the Request for Tenancy 
Approval to start looking for places. So I feel like in our Housing Authority is pretty 
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much easy and simple, and all the rules, pretty much a lot of rules are pretty much 
the same.”  
Despite this positive account, portability may be creating a new set of problems for 
Public Housing Authorities. Affordable housing scarcity is a reality nationwide. However, 
structural measurements such as increasing housing policy budgets and developing 
affordable housing are not being implemented. Hence, portability is falling into distortions 
to satisfy the desperate need of housing of vulnerable population. An Occupancy Specialist 
reflects on the “shopping” practice:  
“The hard thing that we see especially these days are they are shopping around, 
they are just trying to… Well! No, that’s not true either! Because if you think about 
it people shop around, because you know Section 8 is throughout the United States, 
anybody, and so we have people applying from New York, applying here, and then 
they are trying to get it back to New York, which I understand, the reason why they 
are shopping for is because they need it, so now that I think about it, no one would 
be applying for this if they didn’t need it.” 
These practices may hurt Public Housing Authorities, especially those located in 
rural settings with low Payment Standards:  
“Well, what happens then is “ok, we approve the Reasonable Accommodation, they 
are a disabled household, you need to stay where your doctors are” and then that 
Housing Authority bills us 2000 dollars for rent for that family, when it would costs 
us 500 dollars here. So that’s one of the problems that we are facing right now. 
Most Housing Authorities are billing because they just can’t afford it, and we can’t 
afford it either but they have the right to do it.” 
    
149 
 
Can Section 8 HCV program fulfill its promises of neighborhood and unit quality, 
and race and poverty desegregation? Public administrators respond to these questions.  
Neighborhood and Unit Quality 
There are two opposite perspectives among interviewees on neighborhood and 
housing quality within Section 8 HCV’s recipients. On the one hand, practitioners 
recognize the difficulties to find decent, affordable, and well-maintained housing. 
Landlords in less desirable areas have the advantage of price and availability. Sometimes, 
this availability and willingness to take vouchers play against quality conditions as 
landlords bet for the bare minimum to comply. Implementers on this side of the spectrum 
express their low discretionary power towards this problematic situation:  
“You know we don’t have any room here to kinda help with that. Unfortunately we 
are stuck with the landlords that are willing to rent to Section 8 and some of them 
are slum landlords, they just meet the minimum housing standards for our needs.” 
On the other hand, a number of Section 8 HCV program’s implementers praise 
these Housing Quality Standards and inspections as a guarantee of decent living conditions 
for recipients:  
“I think the housing quality inspections are very important in that we can assure for 
those residents that they have got a decent, safe and sanitary unit, with life safety 
feature functions, windows lock, doors lock, there is not hazards in the unit, that’s 
really important, in fact, ironically, in [a nearby city] here, which is a very 
challenged community here, in [the city], the city managers keep telling us they 
like our housing, they like the Section 8 program because is typically the best 
housing in their community, because specifically of the quality controls that go 
    
150 
 
alone with us, (…) and our involvement in the three party agreement with the 
landlord and the tenant. It just makes a better outcome.” 
Race and Poverty Desegregation 
Communication and information seem to be the most powerful tools to guide 
Section 8 HCV program’s recipients to concentrate their search on low-poverty and racially 
desegregated neighborhoods. The Vouchers’ briefing is the best opportunity to address the 
topic, present portability as a valid option, and provide the necessary information. A 
Section 8 HCV program’s Manager explains the content of the talk: 
“(…) when we do our voucher presentations we do provide local maps divided 
amongst Census Tracts and poverty areas, we provide maps and so where social 
services are available, transportation lines are available so hopefully… and we do 
encourage people and we do talk to folks about the benefits of living in less poor 
neighborhoods such as, perhaps schools, opportunities for employment and better 
outsides too, and social services…” 
Following the Manager, another critical task lies in alluring landlords to the Section 
8 program through the presentation of its benefits and conditions: 
“Well, first, we do outreach to landlords outside of poverty areas to encourage them 
to lease up to Section 8 participants, we do regular presentations at local property 
owners’ association regarding housing quality standards and inspections 
standards.” 
This informational task has a limit as HUD forbids Section 8 HCV program and 
PHA staff to ‘stir’ recipients towards a particular development, area, or landlord. 
Implementers take this warning very seriously, and many of them prefer to comply with 
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HUD's requirement than risk misinterpretation by recipients’ part. A program’s director 
explains:  
“I can’t tell you how many times our voucher holders: “I can’t find anything, would 
you please help me!” No, we cannot. That’s one sure way to get in trouble, and 
deconcentration, you know, you got all these big words that really do mean 
something. Stirring is huge, we don’t want to stir, you know, we really have to be 
careful there.” 
PHA and Section 8 HCV program implementers support literature on recipient 
households’ preferences (Deng, 2007: 22). Voucher holders stay within areas nearby their 
support circles of family, church, and other social connections. An HQS Inspector 
introduces a brilliant perspective about the discrepancies between policymakers and 
recipients on the notions of quality, safe, and healthy:  
“I think that, you know it goes back to what previously where we talked about 
tenants and where they choose to live. They choose to live because of familiarity, 
or accessibility to resources around them. I think that just thinking in the 
community that I live in, that I go in in inspects, you know a lot of families, they 
choose to live in the South Side area because the low-income clinic is there, because 
their families are there, because the schools are there, it’s just walking distance, you 
don’t have to drive, if they move with their kids to another location, they are gonna 
have to drive to the clinic now, they are gonna have to ride the bus to the clinic. 
And also taking to account, what I consider quality, or safe, or healthy, they may 
see, tenants may have a different perception, you know they feel comfort, they feel 
safe in that environment rather than moving them to Downtown, where the homes 
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are bigger and nicer but they have no idea, you know?  Houses are more scattered 
and you don’t know your neighbors. So I think, tenants’ definition of what’s safe 
and healthy is different from what an outsider’s perception is.” 
Obstacles to Section 8 HCV Program  
Section 8 HCV program’s administrators mention four specific obstacles to the 
program. I organize them by the frequency with which implementers name them when 
responding to the question: "What would you think is the main obstacle for the Section 8 
HCV program's complete success in your area? These obstacles are funding; tightness of 
local housing markets; limits to recipients’ services delivery; and landlords’ attitudes 
towards the program and voucher holders.  
Funding  
The funding game is an expression of the tensioning relationship between HUD 
and Public Housing Authorities across the nation. PHA and Section 8 administrators seem 
both, constrained and disheartened by HUD’s unpredictable determinations to reduce the 
program’s budget. This uncertainty transpires in every interview, not only in this section’s 
question but along the whole dialogue. The exclusivity of the funding source places PHAs’ 
managerial level in a position of permanent discomfort, trying to anticipate every 
movement from HUD to avoid traumatisms in the Program. An Assistance Manager 
explains his strategy:  
“I always have this speech of, you know, that you have to be prudent, that you’re 
always forecasting, you know, projecting, you never just wanna just come at this 
day (…), you always have to look into the future, and make sure that you always 
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gonna have enough funding and that you’re not on some collusion course, you 
know, in few month or in a year or something like that.” 
HUD’s capacity to deliver (or the lack of it) affects every aspect of the Section 8 
HCV program’s implementation process. It interrupts the ability to pull people out of 
endless waiting lists and limits the local competitiveness of Payment Standards. HUD 
cutbacks also hold the delivery of new and issued vouchers and force workers to leave their 
posts in times of extreme crisis. Implementers face emotional stress linked to job insecurity 
and the limitations in the distribution of services to recipients. Sometimes, HUD’s will is 
inscrutable, forcing both, Section 8 implementers and voucher holders to interact in an 
environment filled with uncertainty:  
“Right now with the new administration unfortunately we were put on hold, marked 
as a shortfall agency, we had to suspend all my vouchers and all my pending 
applications since April, so it sucks for us because now I have 130 families that 
were in the process of getting their Section 8 voucher and then I have another 145, 
I believe, families that already had their vouchers since April… you know, a little 
bit before April, and they can’t get a house until the suspension is lifted. You know, 
whether it’s political, whether it’s budget related, it all comes from HUD, it has to 
do maybe with the new administration? Cutbacks, and everything, because we were 
such a high performing Housing Authority, we didn’t have any leeway because we 
were so good that we… you know, we were punished for it. So we are still waiting 
because of that.” 
Policy flexibility and devolution (Congressional Research Service, 2012: 2) are 
allowing PHA and Section 8 HCV program’s managerial level to consider alternative ways 
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of meeting housing needs within their jurisdictions. A PHA executive director explains 
how they “are now moving to project-based vouchers because we’re trying to capture 
housing opportunity.” Most of the times, such housing opportunities entail strategic 
alliances with the private sector (Garshick Kleit & Page, 2015: 621).  
Tightness of Local Housing Markets 
Interviewees concur with scholars when affirming that market tightness is one of 
the most challenging obstacles to overcome by voucher recipients (Austin Turner, 2003: 1; 
Deng, 2007: 22; Ross, Shlay & Picon, 2012: 39; Williamson, Smith & Strambi-Kramer, 
2009: 121). Unlike scholars, public administrators reveal the role of low Payment 
Standards in a market-oriented environment in the midst of a national housing crisis. An 
Administrative Analyst pictures the reality that Section 8 HCV recipients face on a daily 
basis: 
“We have a case worker with them, to help them with the paperwork, there is 
already a waiting list with 25 people for that unit and now we are gonna tell that 
landlord “hey, we know you can get far higher than the Fair Market Rents for your 
unit in the open market but, hey why don’t you actually help our client and we are 
gonna pay you less” and think our client is dealing with other issues, as you know, 
special needs.” 
On the flip side of the coin, according to implementers, the increase in Payment 
Standards by Public Housing Authorities encourages landlords to raise rents, in a circle 
that never ends. An Occupancy Specialist explains: 
“But it’s a double edge sword, it would be great if we have the funding to increase 
our Payment Standards to coincide with the rent; however, every time we increase 
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the Payment Standards the community finds out and the landlords increase the rents 
so it’s kind of a double edge sword but it would be nice to have the funding so 
people really, truly can get safe and decent housing as opposed of whatever they 
can afford in the bad part of town.” 
Limits to Recipients’ Services Delivery 
Section 8 HCV administrators address housing needs as the tip of an iceberg 
compressing various necessities. The program's target population is frequently affected by 
both, mental and physical disabilities, unemployment, educational deficits, elderly, and 
abandonment, among others. Not too many years ago, Public Housing Authorities were 
able to assist Section 8 and public housing recipients in a more holistic fashion (Bingham 
& Kirkpatrick, 1975: 68). Nonetheless, when the discursive approach (Conners, 2017) and 
the federal support to the American housing policy started to faint in the decade of 1980s 
(Garshick Kleit & Page, 2008), these services vanished as well. 
Today, only Public Housing Authorities with ample resources such as expertise, 
motivation, time, personnel, organizational networking, and a democratic set of values, can 
compete for HUD’s scarce resources that allow assistance provision beyond the voucher. 
Initiatives such as HUD-VASH, and the Family Self-Sufficiency Program function under 
the assumption that an integral service is an anomaly.  The commitment to help vulnerable 
recipients to return from whichever hardship they are facing entails more than issuing a 
voucher. A caseworker explains:  
“We house, but there is more than they need that just housing. Sometimes you just 
need a caregiver, sometimes is not a living aid, sometimes they just need somebody 
to help them with their computer stuff, like paying their bills or something, so you 
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know that the elders get abused more, you might see it in the way that they come 
and present themselves. Some of them probably are not cleaned. So it’s how you 
see them when they come, it’s like “what else is there for them.” 
In the specific case of recipients’ attempts to meet Section 8 HCV program’s 
requirements, there is information and skills that deprive households of securing a unit. An 
Occupancy Specialist enumerates recipients’ setbacks that would demand to address the 
situation through a whole different set of services: 
“I know a lot of people have a hard time successfully getting into the unit because 
maybe they have a bad credit rating, or they don’t have money for deposit, or they 
have no credit at all and they have to have a co-signer, usually it’s something in 
regard to them being proved by the landlord’s check.”  
Landlords’ Attitudes towards the Program and Voucher Holders 
Once again, Section 8 HCV program’s administrators coincide with housing 
scholars in stating that not every landlord in the nation is cooperative towards voucher 
recipients (Beck, 1996: 159). Two motivations operate behind this negative approach: 
discrimination and profit. Landlords distrust in Section 8 HCV program’s recipients has to 
do with racial and ethnic discrimination, but also with the validation of prejudiced images 
of voucher recipients. A Section 8 Director discusses landlords’ apprehensions about the 
program and its beneficiaries:   
“They have this mindset of “Oh! They’re gonna trash my unit, and I never gonna 
get paid for the damages and…” that may be true but could be true for a rate market 
person too. So you have to police your lease, you have to screen, you have to 
monitor your property, you know, those are things that you have to do.” 
    
157 
 
Furthermore, in this particular moment of the housing market landlords do not feel 
the allure of Section 8 HCV program’s benefits. The rental tightness is allowing them to 
profit greatly through the open market renters. An experienced Administrative Analyst 
explains how these cycles of landlords’ interest and disinterest in the program come and 
go:  
“There are other times, Melissa, where the market [let’s] say, it’s the opposite. We 
have landlords begging down our door that want those Section 8 tenants because 
they have vacant units and they are willing to take our clients because if that person 
loses their job it doesn’t matter, the Housing Authority, the Section 8 Voucher will 
pay the Fair Market Rent… up to the Fair Market Rent for that unit. So, that’s just 
not what we are dealing with now, I mean, there is that challenge of the tight market, 
there is the challenge of right now, and pretty much every year.” 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Research Structure   
This dissertation explores public service values in the light of performance. I 
examined how public administrators’ values and attitudes towards policy recipients shape 
implementation and influence organizational and program performance. I selected the 
Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program due to its ambiguous results as a policy (Deng, 
2007: 22; Devine et al. 2003; Galvez, 2010: 6; Newman & Schnare, 1997: 726; Pendall 
2000; Varady, 2010: 402). Section 8 HCV program assists low-income families, elderly 
and disabled people to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private market.  
My main research hypothesis claims that environmental and organizational factors 
impose a toll on organizational and policy performance, and that public administrators’ 
values and attitudes towards recipients buffer some of these effects.  
In Chapter 1, I introduced the research problem by pointing to the American 
housing policy failure in delivering housing and neighborhood quality to vulnerable 
citizens (Newman & Schnare, 1997: 726). The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher 
Program failed as well, in the attempt to meet its signature outcomes, named voucher 
holders’ mobility, and poverty and minority desegregation (Varady & Walker, 2000; 
Varady, 2010: 402; Deng, 2007: 22). Do public administrators’ values and attitudes play a 
role in this policy failure? To answer this question I developed one research question and 
two operative ones:  
Do values and attitudes applied by public administrators to the implementation 
process of Section 8 HCV program influence recipients’ access to high quality, affordable, 
non-racially segregated and non-poverty concentrated homes? 
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If, and to what extent, do organizational and environmental conditions, such as 
demographics and political preferences of communities, economic factors, and racial 
disparities affect public organizations’ performance? 
Do public administrators’ preferred set of values and attitudes coincide with either 
positive or negative organizational and policy performance at the Section 8 HCV 
Program? 
I attached several hypotheses to these questions: 1. Public Housing Authorities and 
Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program nationwide display dissimilar performance 
that results in recipients’ differentiated access to quality, affordable, non-racially, and non-
poverty concentrated homes. 2. Such performance disparities are correlated to 
environmental, organizational, and policy factors and these factors impact both, PHAs and 
Section 8 HCV performance. 3. An implementers’ democratic-centered set of public values 
and attitudes will coincide with positive policy outcomes regarding poverty/race 
desegregation and higher levels of housing and neighborhood quality. Conversely, an 
orthodox/managerial/domination-oriented set of public values will coincide with negative 
policy outcomes.   
Chapter 2 accounts for the literature review. My main conceptual avenues are the 
normative notion of public service values in public administration, and the difficulty in 
linking them to administrators’ behaviors and the realities of policy implementation and 
outcomes. I also included organizational performance as “a socially-constructed concept 
(Brewer, in Boyne, Meier, O’Toole Jr., & Walker, 2006: 35), and brought attention to the 
unexplored questions on performance measurability when addressing democratic values 
such as “equity, democracy, participation, and citizenship” (Talbot, 2010: 49). I further 
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questioned the apparent incompatibility between democratic and bureaucratic values when 
pursuing and measuring performance (O’Toole & Meier, 2011: 2). Finally, I connected 
Section 8 HCV program’s Administrators to the values and attitudes that may influence 
performance and policy outcomes by the use of “discretionary administrative practices” 
(Tegeler, Hanley & Liben, 1995: 467) towards recipients.  
In Chapter 3, I introduced the operative questions, those that helped me to develop 
the research, with their correspondent hypotheses. In the theoretical framework, I utilized 
theories of bureaucratic politics and the Principal-Agent Model to build a public 
administrator full of agency (Allison & Halperin, 1972: 43; Frederickson & Smith, 2003: 
41). In the same vein, I included the street level bureaucracy theory (Lipsky, 1980) to 
address public administrators-recipients rapport and bureaucrats’ high levels of 
administrative discretion. I also developed the four typologies of public servants-
recipients’ rapports by theoretical and historical moments of the PA field: Bureaucratic, 
democratic, managerial, and the critical theory inquiry to political neutrality. 
Chapter 4 comprises the research design.  I described the two consecutive and 
interdependent stages of the study. In the first stage, I used quantitative techniques to 
determine how environmental factors impact PHAs’ organizational performance and 
Section 8 HCV program’s outcomes. In the second stage of the study, I utilized a qualitative 
approach to determine the most predominant sets of public values and attitudes among 
Section 8 HCV program officials.  
Findings 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 contain the research findings. Chapter 5 addresses the 
environmental and organizational influencers of performance in Public Housing 
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Authorities and Section 8 HCV programs’ outcomes nationwide. The main hypothesis of 
this quantitative portion of the research is that environmental and agencies’ structural 
factors impose a toll on organizational and policy performance and outcomes.  The results 
support the hypothesis that organizational and environmental factors impose a toll on 
organizational and policy performance (Smith in Boyne, Meier, O’Toole & Walker, 2006: 
87). In the first model, demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of communities 
partially explain organizational PHAs’ performance. In Model 2, the OLS regression 
confirms that environmental influencers, such as a tight housing market, influence Section 
8 HCV program’s hardly controllable structural factors, pressuring both, program’s 
resources and performance (Deng, 2007: 22; Austin Turner, 2003: 1; Ross, Shlay & Picon, 
2012: 39; Williamson, Smith & Strambi-Kramer, 2009: 121). The third model also 
confirms that environmental, organizational, and Section 8 structural factors impact 
poverty segregation levels on Section 8 HCV program’s recipients. Finally, Model 4 not 
only endorses the hypothesis that environmental, organizational, and Section 8 structural 
factors influence minority segregation among voucher holders, but displays some 
institutional responsibility in Section 8 HCV program’s recipients’ levels of minority 
segregation (Tegeler et al., 1995: 467; Turner, Popkin, and Cunningham in Austin Turner, 
2003: 3).  
Chapter 6 accounts for the findings of the qualitative portion of the research. I 
addressed public administrators’ discursive devices towards citizens regarding values and 
attitudes, paying special attention to neutrality and the capitalization of their technical 
expertise as a source of discretion (Foucault, 1980). Next, I examined the rationale behind 
their attitudes (Alexander & Stivers, 2010; Alkadry & Blessett, 2010; Marr, 2016), and the 
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set of public service values utilized by Section 8 workers while implementing the Program. 
I studied policy implementation process and Section 8 workers’ administrative discretion. 
I further explored practitioners’ perceived impact on Section 8 HCV program’s signature 
outcomes: housing and neighborhood quality, and poverty and race desegregation. Finally, 
I included administrators’ perception of the program’s most significant obstacles.  
Due to the impossibility of contacting with low and standard-performance PHAs’ 
interviewees, I had to narrow my initial hypothesis from: A more democratic-centered set 
of public values and attitudes will coincide with positive policy performance and higher 
levels of poverty/race desegregation, and housing/ neighborhood quality. On the other 
hand, an orthodox/NPM/domination-oriented set of public values 
(Client/Customer/subject types) will coincide with negative policy performance and lower 
levels of poverty/race desegregation, and housing/ neighborhood quality.  
To: A more democratic-centered set of public values and attitudes will coincide 
with positive policy performance and higher levels of poverty/race desegregation, and 
housing/ neighborhood quality.  
Qualitative findings turned out to be quite surprising. Firstly, I expected that my 
research evidence would support Frederickson’s (1997) claim that a dominant bureaucratic 
set of values marginalizes the delivery of services under democratic values. In opposition 
to Van Wart’s “reachable gestalt” (1998 in Molina, 2015: 49). Instead, I found that high-
performing PHAs and Section 8 HCV program’s administrators identify policy 
stakeholders and their demands. Such demands vary and can be democratic, bureaucratic, 
or managerial. Then, implementers develop strategies to comply with their different duties 
by simultaneously utilizing various sets of public service values. The selection of values 
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depends on the situation and the audience. In Frederickson’s favor, the use of democratic 
values demands a deliberate extra effort by implementers’ part.  
Contrary to my initial theoretical proposition, PHA and Section 8 HCV Program’s 
administrators endorse the validity of the principle of political neutrality. Section 8 workers 
consider this traditional public service value achievable in its full extension. Also 
contravening my initial hypothesis, technical expertise is not a proxy but the most valuable 
tool to guarantee neutrality.  
Section 8 implementers’ administrative discretion works as a vehicle for the 
provision of democratic values to the most vulnerable segments of the population 
(Frederickson, 1997: 42). In the case of PHAs and Section 8 HCV Program, policy 
"devolution" allows this practice. The neutrality of the regulation and the practice of 
democratic values through implementers’ administrative discretion cohabits harmonically 
as regulation’s flexibility provided by devolution prevents it to be bent, violated, or broken. 
Public servants utilize this “superpower” to expand the public service values portfolio and 
include democratic ones in their quotidian rapports with recipients. As I expected, Section 
8 HCV program’s administrators are not neutral towards recipients’ identities (Eagan, 
2006). Unexpectedly, they use this information to address recipients’ historical 
vulnerabilities and level the policy field in recipients' benefit. One of the rationales behind 
this behavior may be related to a shared socio-economic identity between workers and 
voucher holders that encourages conscious and unconscious democratic-oriented actions 
of bureaucrats towards population (Bradbury & Kellough, 2011: 158).  
The qualitative portion of the research reveals the limited or null discretionary 
power of public administrators over Section 8 HCV program’s signature outcomes: 
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neighborhood quality, and overall, poverty and race desegregation. Housing Quality 
Standards and regular inspections can guarantee safe, decent and affordable housing for 
voucher holders; nonetheless, that is as far as the program goes due, in part, to the scarcity 
of funding to increase Payment Standards and housing market dynamics that do not allow 
recipients’ mobility and distort portability strategy. Recipients also have a say in their 
location and living conditions. In this vein, David Varady (2010: 391) makes an important 
policy recommendation by claiming that “Efforts to maintain, and expand, the voucher 
program should be based on the program's proven ability to provide decent and affordable 
housing rather than on unproven claims that it promotes poverty deconcentration and 
family self-sufficiency.”  
Section 8 HCV program administrators are in sync with the quantitative portion of 
this dissertation. Implementers responses to the question about the most pervasive and 
harmful obstacles to the program, namely funding and housing markets, coincide with two 
significant environmental and organizational influencers of policy and PHAs’ 
performance.  
Contribution, Limitations and Future Research  
PA scholars usually address public service values from a theoretical perspective. 
This dissertation’s contribution lies in addressing highly theoretical topics of the field, such 
as public service values, the political neutrality of public administrators, and the politics-
administration dichotomy, and translate them to the more material sphere of policy, 
implementation, and performance.  
My research interests lay in examining public service values applied to 
implementers’ administrative discretion in a concrete policy and determine if they affect 
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the implementation process and the service delivery to recipients. I also wanted to 
determine if public servants’ attitudes towards citizens influence the amount and quality of 
assistance.  I aspired to make these findings coincide with a more concrete branch of the 
discipline. I considered Performance. What if, contrary to what scholars claim (O’Toole & 
Meier, 2011: 2), democratic values are compatible with high performance? And high-
performing agencies had room for social equity, sovereignty of the people and 
participation? I partially succeeded.  
As I hypothesized, there is a coincidence between a more democratic-centered set 
of public values and attitudes, and a positive organizational and policy performance. There 
are limitations inherent to these findings. Firstly, as the performance indicator for Public 
Housing Authorities is randomly distributed between cities and counties, I had to select 
county seat PHAs’ scores and combined them with county indicators. This action produced 
a mixed dataset that opens the door to focus the study in cities only. Secondly, the behavior 
of the variable ‘Income’ needs to be further analyzed as it displays unexpected behavior 
towards PHAs’ performance.  
Third, I only conducted qualitative research within high-performance PHAs and 
Section 8 HCV programs. In consequence, I could not develop the other end of the 
hypothesis that relates low and standard-performance PHAs and Section 8 HCV programs 
with bureaucratic, managerial, or domination-related values. There was not possible to 
make a comparison. Fourth, a majority of Californian PHAs accepted to be part of the 
study, while only one public administrator at a Floridian PHA acceded to respond to the 
semi-structured interview.  
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The fifth “limitation” has to do with the particular conditions of the selected policy. 
By the time I defended my proposal, I was aware of the broadly criticized operation of the 
American housing policy (Austin Turner, 2003; Carlson, Haveman, Kaplan & Wolfe, 
2009; Deng 2007). What I did not know was the historical background that explained these 
critiques, and the current situation of housing policy as nearly dismantled (Goetz, 
2012:452). Housing Policy stands still in an ever-changing neo-liberal world that fiercely 
attacks any remnant of that political anomaly once called The New Deal (Bingham & 
Kirkpatrick, 1975: 65). These elements make PHA and Section 8 HCV program’s 
implementer a one-of-a-kind administrator. They have a particular commitment to the 
policy and the utilization of democratic values. They also display a remarkable capacity to 
use devolution in favor of recipients.  Devolution, in fact, was introduced to strip PHAs off 
funding and overwhelm them with responsibilities and duties (Garshick Kleit & Page, 
2015: 621). Public Housing Authorities and Section 8 HCV programs across the country 
are using the weapons against them to survive. Under the hardest conditions of scarcity, 
they are finding allies to continue the provision of decent, quality, and affordable housing 
in their communities. Most of these allies are nonprofit and developers from a private 
market. How long can they resist? Will they be able to provide for the poorest of the poor 
under these conditions? (Fraser et al. 2012, in Garshick Kleit & Page, 2015: 622).  
Future research is needed in public service values to continue demystifying their 
incompatibility. The politics-administration dichotomy demands to be questioned in real 
life, as public administrators are too, human beings, with interests and preferences.  I 
addressed public administrators’ part in policy implementation. I further analyzed the 
influence of their actions, values, attitudes, and the direction of their discretionary power 
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on performance and outcomes. The human factor has been the most neglected element 
when analyzing housing, or any other policy. This dissertation considers a holistic way to 
do so.   
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Appendix A 
 
Public Service Values and Disparate Outcomes: The Case of Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher (HCV) program 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE   
To Directors, case managers and front desk public administrators (1 hour) 
Interviewer: Melissa Gomez Hernandez 
Date:    
Place:  
Starting Time:    
Interviewee/ Pseudonym:     
 
SECTION A. PUBLIC SERVICE VALUES AND ATTITUDES 
In this section, I will ask you about the public service values and attitudes that, in 
your opinion, you employ while implementing the Section 8 HCV Program.  
   
 Preferred Set of Values  
1. In your opinion, what are the main values that guide your work at the Section 8 
HCV Program? 
2. Among these following values trios that I will read to you, please tell me the one 
that fits your work the most. Please explain your choice:  
a. Efficiency, accountability & neutrality 
b. Social equity, sovereignty of the people & participation 
c. Economy, performance & entrepreneurship 
d. Control, domination & power  
2.1.If possible, please provide examples or real life experiences at the program where 
you have applied your preferred set of values.  
2.2.Do you feel that your values’ trio selection is an autonomous one? Why?  
3. Case Scenario of Democratic vs. Bureaucratic values: At the end of the day you 
prefer: 
- To adopt a lenient interpretation of the rules to ensure a satisfied household who 
has found a quality unit in a proper neighborhood, even if involves assisting them 
with the proper documentation, or recommending an acceptable rationale to justify 
an extension on the term of their voucher?  
Or 
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- Do you adopt a strict interpretation of the rules, that is, follow them by the book, 
don’t get yourself involved in time consuming tasks or extra complications, and 
accomplish your aims only in accordance with the institutional guidelines?  
And       
- If you apply the lenient interpretation; do you do so with every applicant? Or are 
you lenient to certain category of applicants only?  If that is the case, why?  
 
4. Do you think your PHA’s values are the same as yours? Please explain by referring 
and comparing within the trios already provided.  
 
 Capitalization of Technical Expertise as source of Administrative Discretion  
1. How do you define political neutrality of public administrators?  
2. Were you instructed about how to be impartial when serving Section 8 HCV 
Program’s recipients? 
3. Do you consider yourself impartial in political issues and towards program 
recipients when executing your tasks?  
4. Do you consider political impartiality of public servants reachable in real life? 
5. Which criteria/instrument/value do you use to reach the most neutral possible 
decision?  
6. Do you use your expertise and knowledge to reach the most impartial decision? 
Please provide examples through your experience.  
7. Do you think that your expertise and knowledge on Section 8 HCV program 
empowers you in front of recipients? How?  
 
 Attitudes  
1. What are your thoughts and feelings about people that seek for Section 8 HCV 
benefits? 
2. Do you think people could do any different to avoid finding themselves applying 
for a voucher?  
3. (Holism) In your opinion, which are the factors that take a household in need of 
assistance to apply for a Section 8 voucher?  
4. (Flexibility) Do you implement program rules and services according to the diverse 
circumstances of the recipient household, 
Or  
Do you apply them in a uniform fashion? 
5. Do you feel related in any way to the recipient’s experience? Have you been in a 
similar situation throughout your life?  
SECTION B. PERCEIVED SCOPE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS’ ACTIONS 
DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
In this section, I will ask you about your perceived scope of action during the 
implementation phases of the Section 8 HCV program.  
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 General Actions 
1. Do you think that the following actions make a difference in terms of assuring 
Section 8 HCV better outcomes (better quality housing and neighborhood, and 
higher desegregation)?  
Please give time to explain those that you personally apply on a daily basis, and 
how do you think they impact the recipients:  
- Reduction of average time for determining eligibility  
- Provision of additional housing placement Counseling and assistance.  
- Provision of extended time of search 
- Reduction of number of requirements  
- Exceptions to the payment standard 
What type of rationale do you typically use to grant exceptions to the payment 
standard?   
- Increase of orientation time and frequency  
- Reduction of average Months on Waiting List (per race) 
- Provision of recipients additional financial assistance (move in costs/search 
costs) 
- Reduction of approval time average in: 
 Request for lease approval (RLA) form. 
 Inspection of the unit. 
 PHAs & voucher holder contract submission. 
 Funding Actions 
2. Does your program seek for alternative sources of funding such as grants and 
awards? 
- Is this action mandatory (by HUD)? 
- Why do you think it is important to seek for alternative sources of funding? And 
why do you and your program do it? 
- Does it improve or change Section 8 performance? Please elaborate 
 Portability Actions  
3. Let’s talk about portability. Do you and/or your PHA implement these following 
actions?  
- Explicit commitment to portability implementation 
- PHAs portability collaboration/cooperation 
- Assignment of specific personnel to process portability paperwork 
- Existence of PHAs administrative procedures to facilitate movement of families 
across jurisdictions  
- Voucher recipients are provided with assistance and suggestions to improve 
relocation 
- Mobility of Section 8 Voucher recipients across PHAs jurisdictions affects 
administrative costs  
- PHA and caseworkers’ positive attitude towards portability of the program 
- PHA and caseworkers have experience with portability  
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- Financial and technical support by HUD in portability matters 
- PHA practices absorption (of families that has exercised portability) 
- Presentation of portability to recipients as a greater opportunity when moving 
to a new jurisdiction  
- Additional procedures when implementing portability  
- Briefing requirement 
- Recipients may require porters to make a scheduled appointment with a 
portability clerk  
- Recertification of recipients (recipients need to be recertified before they can 
use their vouchers in the county) 
 Structural Factors  
- What would you think is the main obstacle for the Section 8 HCV Program’s 
complete success in your area?  
(Market causes, budgeting causes, family preferences, landlords’ racial and 
ethnic discrimination, “discretionary administrative practices”) 
SECTION C. PERCEIVED IMPACT ON POLICY OUTCOMES  
 Neighborhood Quality & Unit Quality  
1. How do you think your actions help to improve Section 8 HCV program’s 
recipients’ access to quality housing and neighborhood?  
2. Which actions help the most to this aim?  
3. Please provide examples if possible.  
 Race and Poverty desegregation  
1. How do you think your actions help to improve Section 8 HCV program’s 
recipients’ access to non-racially segregated and non-poverty concentrated 
neighborhoods?  
2. Which actions help the most to this aim?  
3. Please provide examples if possible.  
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Appendix B 
INFORMATIONAL LETTER 
PUBLIC SERVICE VALUES AND DISPARATE OUTCOMES: THE CASE OF 
SECTION 8 HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER (HCV) PROGRAM 
To Whom It May Concern   
Hello, my name is Melissa Gomez Hernandez. I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Public 
Administration at Florida International University. You have been chosen at random to be 
in a research study about Public Service Values and Policy Outcomes. The purpose of this 
study is to understand how public administrators’ values and attitudes influence policy 
outcomes. If you agree, you will be one of 40 people in this research study. Participation 
in this study will take about one and a half to two hours of your time.  Your consent to meet 
with me will involve the following:    1. Contact me, Melissa Gomez Hernandez, at 786-
448-6513 or mgome255@fiu.edu to schedule an appointment for an interview at a time 
and place of your convenience.    2. During the interview, answer questions about public 
administrators’ attitudes toward the implementation process of Section 8 Housing Choice 
Voucher Program.   There are no foreseeable risks to you for participating in this study. A 
foreseeable benefit to you for participating in the study may be the resulting provision of 
insights to public organizations interested in the improvement of their policy outputs and 
outcomes. There is no cost or payment to you. If you have questions while being 
interviewed, you may ask and always have the option of terminating the interview.     Your 
answers are confidential. Your identifying information (name, surname, and email) along 
with other records of this study will be kept private and will be protected to the fullest 
extent provided by law. Any resulting publication may not include any information that 
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will make it possible to identify you as a participant. Researcher records will be stored 
securely, and only the researcher will have access to the records.    If you have questions 
you may contact my dissertation advisor Professor Mohamad Alkadry by phone at 305-
348-4338 or by email at malkadry@fiu.edu.      If you would like to talk to someone about 
your rights of being a subject in this research study or about ethical issues with this research 
study, you may contact the FIU Office of Research Integrity by phone at 305-348-2494 or 
by email at ori@fiu.edu.   Your participation in this research is voluntary, and you will not 
be penalized or lose benefits if you refuse to participate or decide to stop.  You may keep 
a copy of this form for your records. 
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